

EX LATERE CHRISTI

THE PONTIFICAL NORTH AMERICAN COLLEGE



W I N T E R 2 0 2 0 - I S S U E 1

EX LATERE CHRISTI

EX LATERE CHRISTI

Rector, Publisher (ex-officio)

VERY REV. PETER C. HARMAN, STD

Academic Dean, Executive Editor (ex-officio)

REV. JOHN P. CUSH, STD

Editor-in-Chief

REV. RANDY DEJESUS SOTO, STD

Managing Editor

MR. ALEXANDER J. WYVILL, PHL

Student Editor

MR. AARON J. KELLY, PHL

Assistant Student Editor

MR. THOMAS O'DONNELL, BA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A WORD OF INTRODUCTION FROM THE EXECUTIVE EDITOR Rev. John P. Cush, STD	7
EX LATERE CHRISTI Msgr. William Millea, STL, JCD	10
SALVE, AEDES MATER! Rev. Randy DeJesus Soto, STD	11
WOMAN: HER NATURE & VIRTUES Sr. Mary Angelica Neenan, O.P., STD	13
AS THE PERSON GOES, SO GOES THE WHOLE WORLD Aaron J. Kelly, PHL	39
BEING IN THE RIGHT Alexander J. Wyvill, PHL	51
HANS URS VON BALTHASAR AND DIALOGICAL PHILOSOPHY Rev. Walter R. Oxley, STD	91
JESUS CHRIST: WORD, PREACHER AND LORD Rev. Randy DeJesus Soto, STD	101
HOMILY FOR THE MASS OF THE PASSION OF ST. JOHN THE BAPTIST Rev. Adam Y. Park, STL	131
LOGOS, CREATION AND SCIENCE Rev. Joseph Laracy, STD	135
HOLINESS Msgr. James McNamara, M.Div., MS, PA	163
CATHERINE PICKSTOCK'S EUCHARISTIC THEOLOGY Rev. John P. Cush, STD	167
CONTRIBUTORS	211

REV. JOHN P. CUSH, STD

A WORD OF INTRODUCTION FROM THE EXECUTIVE EDITOR

As the college's academic dean, it is a joy to present to you *Ex Latere Christi*, the first academic journal published by the faculty, alumni, and friends of the Pontifical North American College. In honor of the College's 160th anniversary of its foundation, Fr. Randy Soto had the inspiration to create this journal, the first of its kind in our history, to feature and celebrate the intellectual life and its application to the pastoral and spiritual life at the College. I am immensely grateful to Fr. Soto for his leadership in this project as well as to our Rector, Fr. Peter Harman, for his permission to proceed with this journal and for his kind encouragement as well to Bishop Robert Deeley and the College's Board of Governors.

The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops' Program of Priestly Formation, Fifth Edition, states:

The first task of intellectual formation is to acquire a personal knowledge of the Lord Jesus Christ, who is the fullness and completion of God's revelation and the one Teacher. This saving knowledge is acquired not only once, but it is continuously appropriated and deepened, so that it becomes more and more a part of us...At the same time, this knowledge is not simply for personal possession but is destined to be shared in the community of faith (PPF #137)

Studying, in the life of the priest and the seminarian of the College is not solely one's own spiritual development. It is also an act of pastoral charity for the People of God. Gerhard Cardinal Müller opines: "If the ultimate concern of theology is bringing people into the living dynamic of Revelation and the response of faith, then this concern must burn all the more in the hearts of priests who have been ordained *for* the Church and are sacramentally configured to Christ the bridegroom who laid down his life for his bride the Church."

This journal hopes to offer some contribution to the life of the College,

the life of the Church in the United States, and the intellectual life of the Church. Its contributors are from the faculty, alumni, and friends of the College, and we aim to offer both an academically rigorous and pastorally engaging approach to theology, philosophy, and related fields.

I thank Msgr. William Millea, a loyal son of Alma Mater for his Latin introduction to the work of his journal.

In “Woman: Her Nature & Virtues: Thoughts Taken from Saint Edith Stein & Saint Thomas Aquinas,” we are pleased to offer some insights into a great 20th-century saint and into the feminine genius. Sister Mary Angelica Neenan, OP, is a great friend to so many of us at the College and her love of the Church and her fine pedagogical skills shine forth in this article. We are grateful to Mother Anna Grace Neenan, OP, Prioress of the Congregation of the Dominican Sisters of Saint Cecilia in Nashville, Tennessee, for permitting Sister Mary Angelica’s work to be published in this first edition of *Ex Latere Christi*.

Aaron Kelly and Alexander Wyvill, two of our second theologians who possess licentiates in philosophy from the Catholic University of America, have graciously contributed to this volume, demonstrating not only the depths of their knowledge, but also their pastoral hearts.

Fr. Walter Oxley in “Hans Urs Von Balthasar and Dialogical Philosophy: Convergence and Reciprocity” offers a comparative analysis of Balthasar and his contemporaries. Fr. Oxley’s theological precision offers an important contribution to Balthasar studies.

In “Jesus Christ: Word, Preacher and Lord: Model of the New Evangelization,” Fr. Randy Soto demonstrates the proper use of *Lectio Divina* as well as a useful spiritual reflection.

Fr. Adam Park kindly permitted us to publish a fine homily he offered at the conclusion of our new students’ orientation period. Fr. Park is a masterful homilist and I believe that his words will resonate with all.

Fr. Joseph Laracy in “Logos, Creation and Science: Insights from Benedict XVI” offers a fascinating study on the relationship between scientific

research and the theology of creation. Fr. Laracy, a recent alumnus of the College, is well on his way to becoming one of the more important theologians in the U.S.A. in the field of fundamental theology.

In “Holiness,” Msgr. James McNamara graciously permits us to hear his wise and gentle words of encouragement to our new seminarians upon their arrival at the College in August 2019. Given as a spiritual conference in Assisi in their fraternity weekend, I believe that all alumni of the College can relate to and appreciate Msgr. McNamara’s contribution.

In “An Introduction to and Appreciation of Catherine Pickstock’s Eucharistic Theology in her work: *After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy* (1998): A Study in Radical Orthodoxy,” I offer an introduction to one of the most influential theologians in Anglo-American theology, Dr. Catherine Pickstock. A founder of the Radical Orthodoxy movement in England in the 1990s along with John Milbank, Dr. Pickstock offers a unique perspective on Eucharistic theology. It is my hope that you might find this piece to serve as a contribution to both dogmatic and ecumenical theology.

I invite each of you to read this first edition and also to please feel free to offer feedback by e-mailing us your comments at exlaterechristi@gmail.com. Information for those who might wish to submit an article can also be requested by email. Please know of my prayers for you and please pray for us here at the Pontifical North American College.

Sincerely yours in Christ,

REV. JOHN P. CUSH, STD
ACADEMIC DEAN
EXECUTIVE EDITOR, EX LATERE CHRISTI

MSGR. WILLIAM MILLEA, JCD, STL

EX LATERE CHRISTI

Refulget etiamnum in antiquissimis Urbis ecclesiis signum crucis Domini gemmis auroque coruscantis, unde erumpit flumen aquae salubris quae laetificat terram et vivificat sanctam civitatem Dei. Sub hac sane figura ostenditur supernae mysterium gratiae, fons vitae olim a prophetis praefiguratus, in fluxu sanguine et aqua manante ex latere Christi crucifixi tandem revelatus, et continenter saliens in cordibus fidelium et in sacramentali Ecclesiae vita.

In hac salutiferi scaturigine cerni potest typus seu figura ipsius sacrae traditionis Ecclesiae, de qua, ad instar fontis, haurire hortantur praesertim cultores sacrarum disciplinarum. Probe ergo constituerunt magistri theologi Pontificii Collegii Foederatorum Americae Borealis Statuum nomen Ex latere Christi hisce ephemeridibus imponere, in quibus, benigne lector, invenies fructus delectos studiorum, orationis et contemplationis eorum qui divitias illius traditionis investigant et sese accingunt ad praedicandum Evangelium Christi in patria nostra.

Respondeat hoc volumen auspicio Summi Pontificis Benedicti XVI ut in Ecclesia Americana foveatur “cultura” seu forma mentis “authentice catholica, innixa in alta necessitudine fidei et rationis, et prompta ad illustrandas lumine fidei controversias quae vitam et sortem rei publicae Americanae hoc tempore tangunt” (Homilia Vasintoniae prolata, die 17 aprilis 2008). Quod quidem auspiciatus est ipse Pius PP. IX, Collegii nostri parens et auctor, ita consulens ut iuvenes e longinquis Americae oris aliam Urbem venientes experiri possent indolem catholicam Ecclesiae, sanam doctrinam ab Apostolica Sede usque servatam et propagatam, necnon urgens opus praedicandi veritatem salutarem Christi ubique in terris.

Foveat Deus hoc inceptum et omnibus has paginas inspicientibus benigne concedat ut, duabus alis fidei et rationis elevati, ex latere Domini crucifixi inenarrabiles divitias sapientiae, scientiae et caritatis ibi absconditas altius in dies haurire valeant.

REV. RANDY SOTO, STD

SALVE, AEDES MATER!

160TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE PNAC

*Salve, Aedes Nobilissima!
In Urbe sedes dilectissima!
O, Lux praeclara filiorum
Mater omnium studiorum.*

*Tu Scientiae sanctuarium
Et amoris relicarium;
Pharus flammae inextinguibilis,
O, Fidei oleum inevulsibilis!*

*Mater Immaculata et Regina,
O Nobilis Patrona nostra Domina!
Fac nos Christum servire
et Verbum eius semper audire!*

*Mater Immaculata et Regina,
O, Nobilis Patrona nostra Domina!
Fac nos Christum servire
et Verbum eius semper audire!*

*Tu, Christi cordis speculum,
Ex latere eius hauris fructum:
Aquam, fulgorem salutis Theologiae;
Merum, potum arcis Sapientiae.*

*Mater pia! Oh, nutrix eximia ave!
Seminarii altrix magistra, salve!
Semper magna cum humilitate,
doce nos benignitatem:*

*Mater Immaculata et Regina,
O, Nobilis Patrona nostra Domina!
Fac nos Christum servire
et Verbum eius semper audire!*

*Mater Immaculata et Regina,
O, Nobilis Patrona nostra Domina!
Fac nos Christum servire
et Verbum eius semper audire!*

SISTER MARY ANGELICA NEENAN, O.P.¹

WOMAN: HER NATURE & VIRTUES

THOUGHTS TAKEN FROM SAINT EDITH STEIN & SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

Saint Edith Stein—Jewish philosopher, Catholic convert, Carmelite nun, and martyr of Auschwitz—is only recently becoming well-known as a defender of authentic femininity. With two parallel “new feminist movements” both in the secular world and in the Church, we have seen (and continue to see) that there are opposing philosophical opinions about the nature of woman. Edith Stein falls squarely in the essentialist camp² and makes bold statements about what it means to be “truly feminine” while trying to effectively inspire women (especially in Germany at that time) to rise up and insist on equal rights without abjuring any inherent differences. She insists on the differences between men and women as being God-given and carefully and artfully explicates those differences with keen insight. Most of her thoughts on this subject can be found in her *Essays on Woman*, but also in her letters and treatises on education, especially the education of women. It is from these works that I am extrapolating her thought on the nature of woman and her ideas on the necessity of and inculcation of feminine virtues.

I. FEMININE NATURE

Aristotle says, “Not by nature nor contrary to nature do the virtues come to be in us; rather, we are adapted by nature to receive them and are

1 “Permission is hereby granted to copy this work unmodified, without adaptation, for non-commercial use, while maintaining this copyright attribution.” Printed with permission. Copyright 2018 L.B.P. Communications.

2 Linda Lopez McAlister, “Essential Differences,” in *Contemplating Edith Stein*, ed. Joyce Avrech Berkman (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), 202.

perfected by habit.”³ There are two ways in which something can be said to be natural to man, either according to his specific nature or according to his individual nature.⁴ The specific nature refers more to the soul, and the individual nature refers more to the body. Since human nature is composed of body and soul, certain natural principles may come from either source, and therefore certain natural principles will be according to the body.⁵ In fact, our bodies make us “[...] aware of a wedding which has already taken place, a marriage in which the mystery of our destiny and human nature is realized, in which our supreme calling is made clear.”⁶ In a way, our body reveals to us the mystery of our calling. Some characteristics of a woman seem to be based on her body, but are also reflected in her soul, and in the powers of her soul, and therefore have a relation to virtue. For example, from the simple fact that a woman’s body is meant to nurture new life, the new life of a specific human being, she has natural gifts of soul that are also meant for this very task. It makes no small difference, then, Aristotle says, whether we form habits of one kind or another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference.⁷ And so for this reason, I spent some time, many years ago, studying feminine nature, so as to be more ready to serve others and to receive the work of the Holy Spirit, which brings our individual nature to perfection.

In her *Essays on Woman*, Edith Stein says,

I am convinced that the species human being reveals itself to be a double species, man and woman, that the essence of the human being—from which

3 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* in Vol. II of *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathon Barnes (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), Book II, 1 (1103a25).

4 Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I-II, 63, 1.

5 “Since wherever there is a distinction of sex, the active principle is male, and the passive is female; the order of nature demands that for the purpose of generation there should be concurrence of male and female.” Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I, 98, 2:

6 Paul V. Mankowski, “Mulieris Dignitatem,” in *The Thought of Pope John Paul II: A Collection of Essays and Studies* (Roma: Editrice Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1993), 238.

7 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, II, I (II 03b25).

no essential characteristic can be missing—is imprinted by this duality, and that its entire structure bears this specific stamp. It is not just a matter of [male and female] bodies being differently constructed, it is not just individual physiological functions that are different; rather the entire physical life is different, the relationship between body and soul is different, and within the soul the relationship between the spirit and the senses is different, as are the relationships among the various spiritual powers. To the female species corresponds unity and consistency of the total-psycho-physical personality, and the development of one's powers in a harmonious way: to the male species corresponds the perfection of one's individual powers to the maximum level of performance.⁸

In studying these characteristics of a woman, it will be evident that each characteristic has its advantages and disadvantages. These gifts of her femininity can be used for good or for evil, hence the necessity for virtue, which includes the knowledge of truth—the truth about her feminine nature, and the truth about what is good for her according to her nature. Related to the aspects of virgin, bride, and mother, Stein often wrote about certain qualities inherent in woman that lead her to her true vocation. Here I will center on six qualities of the feminine nature that occur most in her writings: desire for union, receptivity, person-centeredness, intuitiveness, sensitivity, and generosity—and their corresponding virtues of receptivity, kindness, gentleness, generosity, and spiritual motherhood.

II. QUALITIES OF FEMININE NATURE

A. *DESIRE FOR UNION*

“The deepest feminine yearning is to achieve a loving union which, in its development, validates this maturation and simultaneously stimulates and furthers the desire for perfection in others [...] Such yearning is an essential aspect of the eternal destiny of woman. It is not simply a human longing, but it is specifically feminine.”⁹ This natural gift was

⁸ Edith Stein, *Essays on Woman* (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1987), 138.

⁹ Stein, *Essays on Woman*, 93-94.

observed by Aristotle as something to be honored by a man,¹⁰ and not only honored, but such a fact should cause him to approach his wife with self-restraint, trust, and awe.¹¹

St. Edith Stein describes this longing for intimate union in women as given by God and meant for her good as well as that of others, yet it can easily degenerate into a false form of self-abandonment if she carelessly surrenders herself to something less than God.¹² Stein insists that woman's nature is an interior ground plan or developmental blueprint, and that it exists and can be known by revelation and by reason,¹³ and that it is meant to be "*transformed from within*"¹⁴ by the Divine Giver.

The natural desire in a woman for a lasting union in love is meant to be a benefit first of all to her husband, then to her family, and then to all with whom she comes in contact. Stein says that this desire is for one man only, and it is more natural to a woman than it is for a man. This primary relationship then, colors all her other relationships, as we shall see. It will become more evident that this desire for intimate union, this deep longing to be completely and exclusively united with only one other, is the foundation for, and is intertwined with, all other aspects of a woman. It is the basis for her person-centeredness and inspires her natural receptivity, generosity, and intuition. Hence the need for virtue to govern this deepest desire, because it underlies all her actions, thoughts, and desires.

10 Aristotle, *Economics*, III, 2: "Now a virtuous wife is best honored when she sees that her husband is faithful to her and has no preference for another woman; but before all others loves and trusts her as his own. And so much the more will the woman seek to be what he accounts her. If she perceives that her husband's affection for her is faithful and righteous, she too will be faithful and righteous towards him [...] Now to a wife nothing is of more value, nothing more rightfully her own, than honored and faithful partnership with her husband."

11 Aristotle, *Economics*, III, 3.

12 Robin Maas, "A Shelter for Unfolding Souls: Edith Stein on the vocation of women," *Anthropotes* 15 (1999): 167.

13 Maas, "A Shelter for Unfolding Souls," 172.

14 Maas, "A Shelter for Unfolding Souls," 173.

B. RECEPTIVITY

The second quality of a woman has already been mentioned and marks her definite advantage of nature; she is by nature receptive. As an archetype of the receptivity of the human race, the most wonderful gift that she receives is love. Her physical receptivity represents her spiritual receptivity toward another¹⁵, and most especially toward God, the giver of all Good. In her *Essays on Woman*, Stein says, “The intrinsic value of woman consists essentially in exceptional receptivity for God’s work in the soul.”¹⁶ As one not prone to exaggeration or for bestowing undeserved flattery, St. Edith Stein’s claim is not a boast, but a careful observation. When this natural gift is perfected by virtue, the heights of divine life are opened to a woman, because she is disposed to reaching them. For this reason, she says, “Women are naturally and supernaturally more predisposed for the vocation to consecrated life than men.”¹⁷

In order to receive another person, the woman must be “empty of self and self-contained.”¹⁸ Only then can she receive souls in need of “shelter.”¹⁹ This ability is caused precisely by her natural desire to give herself to

15 A fascinating viewpoint, offered by an anonymous woman, is related by Maas: “The sperm is one in a million, whereas the ovum is a single, solitary and self-contained cosmos, a world unto itself, waiting in the dark - in that secret and protected place we call the ‘womb.’ And like ‘Sleeping Beauty’ it waits, alone, to be awakened into life. The female ovum is pure potential, all promise, until it receives the masculine spark of life. In order for this potential to be liberated, it must first be united to something from beyond itself, something utterly other. And so, as nature has designed it, woman must wait. The feminine must consent to receive what the masculine offers [...] She waits to receive not just anything or anyone but that which is chosen, that to which she gives her consent. In a certain sense, woman’s body is a revelation of her nature, and, therefore, of her vocation.” Cfr., Maas (“A Shelter for Unfolding Souls,” 163-164.)

16 Stein, *Essays on Woman*, 253.

17 Fidelis Stöckl, *Mary, Model and Mother of Consecrated Life: a Marian Synthesis of the Theology of Consecrated Life based on the Teachings of John Paul II* (Quezon City, Manila: ICLA Publications, 2003), 190.

18 Maas, “A Shelter for Unfolding Souls,” 170.

19 Maas, “A Shelter for Unfolding Souls,” 170.

someone and needs to be perfected by virtue so that she does not become a victim of inner storms and exterior pressures. It is this very receptivity that makes her vulnerable, which is fertile ground for growing in virtue. Grace and virtue will help her to heal from the wounds of Original Sin, wounds that can give her the tendency to risk asserting her own identity through others,²⁰ and/or toward a decline of her spiritual life into a predominantly sensual one.²¹ Instead of trying to comprehend the other or receive the other, she tries to become the other. Her gift of openness and receptivity can become subverted into excessive identification of herself with the other.²² It is not easy for the woman to be “*completely available for service and equally unavailable for exploitation.*”²³ The gift of receptivity in a woman is meant to be open and inclusive yet expansive and unselfish, not for her own sake, but ready to be given according to the needs of the other.²⁴ A certain “*quietness of soul*” is necessary for her to be able to hear the almost imperceptible voices of those who need her.²⁵ It leads to the next quality of person-centeredness.

C. PERSON-CENTEREDNESS

The third quality of a woman is that her attitude is personal, and she has a tendency toward completeness.²⁶ Stein says,

20 Rachel Feldhay Brenner, “Edith Stein: A Reading of Her Feminist Thought” in *Contemplating Edith Stein*, 220.

21 Stein, *Essays on Woman*, 180.

22 Brenner, “Edith Stein,” 220.

23 Maas, “A Shelter for Unfolding Souls,” 170.

24 “Ironically—and cruelly—it is at the point of women’s greatest strength that we are most deviously undermined. What should be our glory can all too easily become our perversion. The feminine preoccupation with relationships can degenerate into something other than a healthy counterweight to masculine preoccupation with the task, becoming a source of inner fragmentation, debilitating distraction, and a tendency toward greed and self-indulgence.” Maas, “A Shelter for Unfolding Souls,” 171.

25 Maas, “A Shelter for Unfolding Souls,” 169.

26 Stöckl, *Mary, Model and Mother of Consecrated Life*, 248-9.

Woman: Her Nature & Virtues

The woman is oriented toward the living/the personal and toward the whole. Holding, protecting, and preserving, nurturing, and encouraging growth: those are her natural, genuinely maternal aspirations. Lifeless things, objects are interesting to her primarily insofar as they serve the living/the personal, not so much for their own sakes [...] The living/the personal toward which her care is directed is a concrete whole and needs to be protected and supported as a whole - not one part at the expense of the other, not the spirit at the expense of the body or vice versa, and not one mental capacity at the expense of another. She can bear that neither in herself nor in others.²⁷

Stein asserts that a woman naturally attends to the other person, because she is meant to be a companion and a mother. Pope John Paul II emphasized this fact many times: that the virtues of a woman correspond to her nature, which is to receive, welcome, and care for the human person.²⁸ In philosophical language, she naturally gives emphasis to the person and emphasizes existence more than act. She intuits more easily that *"the person is unique and unrepeatable, someone chosen by eternal Love,"*²⁹ and teaches others to see human beings this way. More easily than a man, she can focus on each person as a gift and not as a means to be used. She even sees that *"she is gift."*³⁰ If, on the other hand, she indulges this instinct without practicing virtue, she risks losing self-control, and tends toward vain curiosity, gossiping, and an unhealthy emotional dependence on others.³¹

An abuse of this gift will lead to an unchecked need for communication, vain desires for praise and recognition, and an indiscreet penetration into the intimate life of others.³² For this reason, Stein strongly recommends training in virtue for the emotional sphere of women. She must be able to center on the other person with holy detachment, thus raising her

27 Stein, *Essays on Woman*, 3.

28 John Paul II, General Audience, Nov. 24, 1999.

29 John Paul II, *The Theology of the Body: Human Love in the Divine Plan*. Reprinted with permission from L'Osservatore Romano, English ed. (Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 1997), 65.

30 Fulton Sheen, *The World's First Love* (New York: Garden City Publishers, 1953), 128.

31 Maas, "A Shelter for Unfolding Souls," 168.

32 Maas, "A Shelter for Unfolding Souls," 172.

natural capability to become an instrument through which God can reach others.

Through this natural ability, Pope John Paul II says, women help to make human relations more honest and authentic, simply by the fact of being a woman.³³ Her nature is meant to be a leaven in society, gently influencing and responding to the needs of others in truth and with supernatural love.

D. INTUITIVENESS

Fourthly, it belongs to the feminine nature to be intuitive. Edith Stein says that it is due to her practical orientation to the concrete that woman's natural way of knowing is not so much conceptual and analytic but intuitive and experiential, directed toward the concrete. *"This natural endowment enables the woman to care for and raise her own children, but this fundamental attitude of hers is directed not only toward them but also toward her husband and all other beings who come in contact with her as well."*³⁴

She calls this a kind of "perception of the good"³⁵ which is related to her biology:

Her body and soul are fashioned less to fight and to conquer, than to cherish, guard and preserve. Of the threefold attitude toward the world—to know it, to enjoy it, to form it creatively—it is the second which concerns her most directly: she seems more capable than man of feeling a more reverent joy in creatures; moreover such joy requires a particular kind of perception of the good, different from rational perception in being an inherent spiritual function and a singularly feminine one. Evidently, this quality is related to woman's mission as a mother, which involves an understanding of the total being and of specific values.³⁶

This understanding is immediate and intuitive and expresses itself in the everyday language of a woman, especially a motherly woman. She

33 John Paul II, *Letter to Women* (Boston: Pauline Books & Media, June 29, 1995), 2.

34 Stein, *Essays on Woman*, 3.

35 Stein, *Essays on Woman*, 72.

36 Stein, *Essays on Woman*, 72-72.

has a keen sense for body language, non-verbal communication, and what is sometimes called “vibes.” Expressions of these perceptions, because they seem to bypass the reason, are seen mostly in the emotions, which she herself may or may not understand. This information can be used for great and noble purposes, if she develops her gifts virtuously. “On the other hand,” Edith Stein writes, “the one-sidedness to which she is exposed is a particularly perilous one... Her reverent joy in the things of this world may degenerate into greed, leading her, on the one hand, to the anxious, avaricious scraping together and hoarding of things for which she has no use; and on the other, a lapse into a mindless, idle life of sensuality.”³⁷ There is an irony to this gift of nature; while she does not need to rely on reason for her perception, she does need the check of reason in regard to the emotions that result from these perceptions. As St. Edith Stein says, a woman’s strength lies in the emotional life, but this also has the danger of becoming one-sided, a unilateral emotional development.³⁸ Because her soul is more responsive to her body than a man’s, she must strive for a patient detachment, a kind of training of the emotions, otherwise she risks becoming compulsive, living on illusions, a victim of her own moods, or in a constant search for excitement.³⁹ The remedy is, not surprisingly, objective study of philosophy and objective work—both of which require linear thinking, in order to distinguish reality from fantasy and to appreciate the truth of her own nature,⁴⁰ the kind of truth that sets her free.⁴¹

E. SENSITIVITY

The fifth characteristic of femininity is a special sensitivity.⁴² St. Edith Stein asserts that woman feels more easily and more deeply. This can

37 Stein, *Essays on Woman*, 73-4.

38 Stein, *Essays on Woman*, 96.

39 Maas, “A Shelter for Unfolding Souls,” 172.

40 Maas, “A Shelter for Unfolding Souls,” 173.

41 “You will come to know the truth, and the truth will set you free,” John 8:32:

42 John Paul II, *Mulieris Dignitatem: Apostolic Letter on the Dignity and Vocation of Women* (Boston: St. Paul Books & Media, August 15, 1988), 16. Henceforth MD.

be at once a torture and a great blessing. In fact, it is necessary for the nurturing of life, especially new life, for a woman to be able to sense and enter into the needs of another human being. "*Part of her natural feminine concern for the right development of the beings surrounding her involves the creation of an ambience, of order and beauty conducive to their development.*"⁴³ When she sees her sensitivity as a gift, and joins this attitude with love and sacrifice, then she has the capability of becoming "[...] *particularly sensitive to receiving the things of God.*"⁴⁴ St. Edith Stein also refers to this ability as "*expansive,*"⁴⁵ meaning that she is able to search out and carry the burdens of others.⁴⁶ John Paul II stressed the fact that the human race needs woman to be sensitive to those around her, and is dependent on her to develop this virtue correctly. He said, "*Our time in particular awaits the manifestation of that 'genius' which belongs to women, and which can ensure sensitivity for human beings in every circumstance.*"⁴⁷

A woman also has a unique sensitivity to morality. She is usually the first to realize that something does not feel right. When informed by truth, she can be an instrument of grace for those people around her. Stein says, "*A quality unique to woman is her singular sensitivity to moral values and an abhorrence for all which is low and mean [...] Allied closely to this sensitivity for moral values is her yearning for the divine and for her own personal union with the Lord, her readiness and desire to be completely fulfilled and guided by His love.*"⁴⁸

F. GENEROSITY

The sixth characteristic of feminine nature is generosity of spirit. A

43 Stein, *Essays on Woman*, 77.

44 Chiara Lubich, *Mary, Heart of Humanity* (Manila: New City Press, 1988), 92.

45 Stein, *Essays on Woman*, 130-131.

46 Joan Gormley, "Edith Stein on the Interplay of Nature and Grace in the Formation of Women," *FCS Quarterly* (Fall 1999): 7.

47 MD, § 30.

48 Stein, *Essays on Woman*, 77-8.

woman is only happy when she is giving of herself.⁴⁹ It is usually in the realm of generosity that a woman can assess her growth in virtue. If she is not happy, she should check to see if she is distorting this gift by spending herself for the wrong reasons: for example, allowing herself to be used, or, on the other hand, refusing to give of herself for whatever reason—excessive fear, selfishness, or laziness. If she is truly being generous according to the gifts she has been given, she will have a certain peace along with her tiredness or even exhaustion.

“Selflessness is a state of real freedom—freedom from the need to possess, to dominate, to control, to use people as means to our own ends.”⁵⁰ By her example, woman teaches man to give himself, which comes a little less naturally to a man. “She is to help man achieve the deepest and most authentic meaning of life: namely, that of being a gift which is fully realized in the giving of self.”⁵¹ She teaches man the nuptial meaning of the body, as John Paul says, and the freedom that goes with it, “that is, the capacity of expressing love, that love in which the person becomes a gift and—by means of this gift—fulfills the meaning of his being and existence.”⁵² Perhaps this is easier for her to understand because the union of the soul with the body is naturally more intimate for a woman. St. Edith Stein even goes so far as to say that woman’s soul is present and lives more intensely in all parts of the body,⁵³ and it is inwardly affected by that which happens to the body. Since this phenomenon is closely related to the vocation of motherhood, the expression of the soul with the body would be connatural for her. She needs to express her love through her body. Her heart, her mind, her hands will go out to any life in need, and this is a gift of her feminine nature. St. Edith Stein calls this a “costly virtue,” yet it is imperative that

49 Robert Wenderski, “The Beauty of a Virtuous Woman’s Heart,” *The Catholic Faith* (May/June 2001): 14.

50 Maas, “A Shelter for Unfolding Souls,” 176.

51 Wenderski, “The Beauty of a Virtuous Woman’s Heart,” 17.

52 John Paul II, *Theology of the Body*, § 63.

53 Stein, *Essays on Woman*, 95.

women consider others as gifts entrusted to her by God.⁵⁴ As we shall see, this natural gift bears fruit in a spiritual maternity, which Edith Stein considers to be the greatest gift of any woman.⁵⁵

Fulton Sheen claimed that the level of any society is measured by the level of its womanhood. He gave a very Thomistic reason for this. The reason, according to him, is to be found in the difference between knowing and loving:

When we know something, we bring it down to the level of our intelligence. Examples of abstract subjects must be given to children to suit the level of their minds. But when we love something, we always have to go up to meet it. For example, if we want to master music, we must obey its laws and meet its demands. Since a woman is to be loved, it follows that the nobler a woman is, the nobler a man will have to be to be deserving of that love. That is why the level of any civilization is always the level of its womanhood.⁵⁶

III. FEMININE VIRTUES

St. Edith Stein, in her many lectures and writings on the formation of women, emphasized with great clarity and insistence the necessity of grace for the true development of the feminine nature. *“Openness and surrender to grace through faith are absolutely necessary prerequisites to fulfillment of the feminine form given with existence.”*⁵⁷ A virtue is a good habit, that is, a quality of soul by which one is well-disposed toward acting well—and, as St. Thomas Aquinas says, acting well means acting according to nature. Therefore, good habits are necessary for the perfection of human nature. For a natural quality to become a virtue, it is necessary that the principle of action proceed from intellect and will, so that what was once a natural disposition for an action is now a rationally chosen action. This then is part of the definition of moral

54 Maas, “A Shelter for Unfolding Souls,” 176.

55 Freda Mary Oben, “Edith Stein: Holiness in the Twentieth Century,” in *Spirituality Today* vol. 35, no. 2 (Summer 1983): 146.

56 Fulton Sheen, *Live is Worth Living* (New York: Garden City Publishers, 1953), 173.

57 Gormley, “Edith Stein,” 11.

action—that the act is freely and rationally chosen, with deliberation that confirms the act as truly good. Thus, we see the necessity for a woman to act not only out of natural disposition, but sometimes against natural inclination, so as to perfect her nature according to the truth. So, she needs to reflect with honesty about her natural gifts, with their accompanying risks, so that she may direct her freely chosen actions to bring her own particular nature to fulfillment and to the beautiful flowering of grace in her soul. Her nature is given to her as a gift, and its perfection is not meant to be a complete reversal, much less a rejection of, her nature, but rather an inner transformation of that nature that can take place peacefully, with joy and sometimes with ease, according to God’s grace and plan.

The classical virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance are of course, indispensable, and I am not trying to overlook their necessity. They are, in fact, implied here. From the writings of Edith Stein, a few specific and rather unconventional virtues have been selected in relation to what has been said about feminine nature, with a view toward the refinement of feminine gifts and because of their seeming timeliness for our culture, so fraught by a misunderstanding of true femininity. These are the virtues of receptivity, empathy or compassion, kindness, gentleness, generosity, and spiritual motherhood.

A. VIRTUOUS RECEPTIVITY

By her special ability to be receptive, a woman needs first of all to receive the love of God. This can happen only by prayer and an honest striving to live according to the Gospel. The requirements are the same for men of course, but women have an extra advantage by nature. When her own receptivity to God and his love is filled by God’s grace, she can truly give what she has received—God himself—and she can teach others by her example of selfless love. In his apostolic letter *Mulieris Dignitatem*, Pope John Paul II wrote that a woman is called to manifest the truth to every one of the existence and depth of the love “with which

every human being—man or woman—is loved by God in Christ.”⁵⁸

A woman needs to be unselfish with what she receives, and unbiased about what she receives from God. Sometimes she receives solely for the sake of others, and for this reason she may not receive from God exactly what she would have wanted. The one who receives a gift does not choose the gift for herself. There is implied here a kind of virtuous emptiness. *“In this respect, the moral life is not so much a matter of what we do, but of what we allow ourselves to receive.”⁵⁹*

A woman’s natural ability to emphasize the person has many virtues allied to it. It is interesting to see that the faults that are most common to woman have to do with persons: jealousy, fault-finding, gossiping, and over-sensitivity to the opinion of others. Similarly, the virtues that she is in most need of cultivating are related to persons—such as understanding, sensitivity, creativity,⁶⁰ submission, acceptance, resignation,⁶¹ intuitiveness, generosity, fidelity,⁶² and receptiveness.⁶³ Receptivity is virtuous when it is reasonable, that is, when it proceeds from rational choice to be in accord with what is truly good here and now. First of all, a woman must be receptive to truth, especially the truth of her own situation, of her own gifts, and her own faults. Then she can truly be receptive to higher truths concerning others. Accepting the truth of her situation helps her to use her gift of receptivity according to God’s plan, in the way that God wants to work in her and through her. When her receptivity is placed at God’s disposal, then the life of the Holy Spirit can dwell and work in her soul.

58 MD, § 29.

59 Paul Wadell, *The Primacy of Love* (New York: Paulist Press, 1992), 140.

60 MD, §§ 15, 16, and 19.

61 Sheen, *The World’s First Love*, 81.

62 John Paul II, *Letter to Women*, § 2.

63 John Seward, *The Beauty of Holiness and the Holiness of Beauty: Art, Sanctity, and the Truth of Catholicism* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997), 135; and Wenderski, “The Beauty of a Virtuous Woman’s Heart,” 14-15.

B. *COMPASSION*

Precisely because she can center on the person, the virtuous woman should be rich in sympathy, kindness, and tenderness.⁶⁴ As we have seen, there is a natural inclination for a woman to sympathize and to care for another's life.⁶⁵ The virtues of empathy, sympathy, and strength through gentleness should come easier to a woman because they are needed for nurturing young life. A woman needs to develop these virtues in order to counteract the extremes of either a lack of attention to others that is due, or an over-interest that can result in nagging behavior, manipulation, or inappropriate meddling. A woman's motherly heart is what makes her able to sympathize. She is made to go out to any life in need. Society needs her to provide forgiveness and love with her very femininity.⁶⁶ Stein calls this virtue empathy, the ability to put oneself in the place of the other and feel what the other is feeling. This virtue means that she can do this, not from any vain or selfish motive, but from the motive of serving God's will or of simply being reasonable. Although warm by nature, a woman's soul needs the heavenly fire of divine love to keep it pure and constant, so that she can provide warmth, healing, and illumination for others.⁶⁷ When this virtue is refined in her she can become the companion that she is meant to be, as well as a loving mother, and she will find that her feminine influence will be much greater.⁶⁸

C. *KINDNESS*

When her sensitivity is developed by grace and her intuition is regulated by the virtue of prudence, a woman can provide a loving kindness and healing for others that is supernatural. Kindness makes a person present a loving appearance and do benevolent deeds for those who

64 Sheen, *Life is Worth Living*, 252.

65 Stein, *Essays on Woman*, 71.

66 Sheen, *Life is Worth Living*, 253.

67 Maas, "A Shelter for Unfolding Souls," 170.

68 Maas, "A Shelter for Unfolding Souls," 176.

are quarrelsome, “in the hope that they will come to see themselves as they are and amend their ways.⁶⁹ It is notable that this kindness does not reject the truth, but sees the person through the eyes of God. St. Thomas Aquinas says that this oil of kindness enlightens erring sinners⁷⁰ through good example, and it salves and heals through comforting words and deeds those whose hearts are wounded, grieved, or embittered.⁷¹ Kindness must not be harmed by jealousy or disfavor.⁷² Kindness is the antidote for jealousy, which plagues most women, and it will heal in her a judgmental attitude that is not informed by truth. A woman whose sensitivity is guided by virtue will not be critical and quick to condemn. Instead, she will have a heart that is compassionate, kind, and tender toward the sinner, for, St. Thomas says, kindness depends on the heart rather than the deed.⁷³

D. GENTLENESS

another virtue that is a flower of charity is gentleness.⁷⁴ Gentleness tempers and informs conduct rather than initiating it.⁷⁵ Opposed to gentleness are the vices of unwillingness to forgive and readiness to criticize, both typically feminine faults.⁷⁶ In particular, gentleness is the virtue that regulates immoderate anger.⁷⁷ Although not referring to women specifically, Aristotle examines the virtue of gentleness in the context of virtues according to its mean or middle position with

69 John Ruusbroec, *The Spiritual Espousals and Other Works* (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), 58.

70 “We ought to do our brethren the kindness of correcting them, with the hope of God’s help.” Cfr., Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, II-II, 33, 2, ad. 1.

71 “Kindness helps us to cure those evils, and goodness to forgive them.” Cfr., Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I-II, 70, 4.

72 Ruusbroec, *Spiritual Espousals*, 58-9.

73 Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, II-II, 106, 3, ad. 5.

74 James Alberione, *Living Our Commitment: Cardinal and Moral Virtues for Religious* (Boston: St. Paul Editions, 1968), 164.

75 David Goodall, “Gentleness [Endangered Virtues, 5],” *The Tablet* (April 5, 2000): 512.

76 Goodall, “Gentleness,” 513.

77 Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I-II, 66, 4, ad.2.

regard to the passions. He says that gentleness is the mean between the extremes of irascibility and lack of feeling.⁷⁸

The irascible person gets angry with everyone in all circumstances, and this is in excess of the mean. The insensible person lacks the ability to be angry when it is reasonable to be angry, and this is blameworthy and considered to be in defect of the mean.⁷⁹ We can easily imagine how odious is the woman who tends toward irrational anger or toward coldness and insensitivity.⁸⁰ This takes some work on her part to overcome her emotions, especially when they are irrational, and to grow in a gentle disposition. If she never thinks about it, or never strives for this virtue, it will not happen. This is not just a mild temperament. It is a product of prayer, of being close to God.⁸¹ “True gentleness is never a temperament, because it is always accompanied by a loving attitude and by what it implies—a perception of the value of others as persons and a corresponding response... It also involves the will to be gentle.”⁸² It is a moral attitude, a moral virtue, a freely chosen interior act that manifests itself in repeated action.

It is imperative that the virtuous woman concentrate on the good of another, not her own, and on the truth of that good. Without denying the need for seeing one’s fault and mending one’s ways, the virtuous woman points to the truth with the attitude of healing rather than correcting. Forgiveness and understanding of human frailty are part of a gentleness that is truly virtuous. This is the example of Christ and the attitude of one who has spent time with him. A kind and gentle person suffers with Christ in his passion; then she has compassion on herself and all of her own faults and failings. Finally, she has compassion on others, on the countless afflictions that weigh upon human nature, and concern for their salvation, for a woman usually looks upon others the

78 Aristotle, *Eudemian Ethics*, II, 2 (1221a1).

79 Aristotle, *Magna Moralia*, I, 22 (1191b24-37).

80 “If she endures them (sufferings and trials) with patience and gentleness, she will rule her home with ease; otherwise, not so easily.” Cfr., Aristotle, *Economics*, III, 1:

81 Goodall, “Gentleness,” 512.

82 Dietrich von Hildebrand, *In Defense of Purity* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1945), 51.

same way she looks upon herself. When this attitude is virtuous, she desires to do what she is able to do to alleviate their suffering. And this bears fruit in the next virtue—generosity.

E. *GENEROSITY*

If true generosity is founded on compassion,⁸³ then there is a double reason for women to excel in this virtue. A woman is disposed toward the virtues of compassion and generosity by nature. “Generosity is the bountiful flowing forth of a heart which is moved by charity and compassion. This virtue adorns and affects all the others. All that lies within her, and all that she feels, flow forth as a gift.”⁸⁴ Dom Marmion says that a woman in love applies her memory, intelligence, heart, will, all her powers, all her activity in the service of the beloved, to know him better, love him more, and make him known and loved by others.⁸⁵ Even if the infidelities of other souls wound her, she is stimulated to so much more ardor and generosity for his sake. Devotion is found in her, that prompt, cheerful, tranquil movement of the generous soul, which causes her to forget herself in the interests of her spouse and those around her.⁸⁶ By this loving generosity, she is an example to man, who needs her help. “She is to help man achieve the deepest and most authentic meaning of life; namely, that of being a gift which is fully realized in the giving of self.”⁸⁷ Pope John Paul II called this the genius of women: “Necessary emphasis should be placed on the ‘genius of women,’ not only by considering great and famous women of the past or present, but also those ordinary women who reveal the gift of their womanhood by placing themselves at the service of others in their everyday lives.”⁸⁸

83 Ruysbroeck, *Spiritual Espousals*, 61.

84 Ruysbroeck, *Spiritual Espousals*, 61.

85 Bl. Columba Marmion, *Sponsa Verbi: The Virgin Consecrated to Christ* (trans. Francis Izard; St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1925), 62.

86 Marmion, *Sponsa Verbi*, 63.

87 Wenderski, “The Beauty of a Virtuous Woman’s Heart,” 17.

88 John Paul II, *Letter to Women*, 12.

St. Thomas calls this virtue “*liberality*,” which is the virtue that disposes us to use well anything that could be used ill, not only goods or capabilities of soul and body, but also things outside of us.⁸⁹ The “*liberal*” man commendably spends more on others than on himself,⁹⁰ so long as this is regulated by prudence and a right motive. Aristotle describes the illiberal man to be a “*cheese-parer*,” a “*lover of base gain*,” and “*petty*”;⁹¹ the diseases are multiform.⁹² In women, greed is especially ugly, not only causing attachment to simple things, but also to her own gifts, her own opinions, her time, and her attention. Indeed, with anything that she should use well for others, she can fall into the trap of using it in a manner that is selfish or petty.

For all women, “authentic Christian womanhood inspires courage, honor and goodness in men and children alike and brings about the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace in the home, the Church, the community, and the world.”⁹³ Jesus has a right to expect us to “be enkindled with zeal for the glory of the Father; in consequence, rich in good works and fruits of sanctity.”⁹⁴ Feminine generosity, perfected by virtue, leads to a kind of divine fecundity, or spiritual motherhood, where all of the feminine virtues come together.

F. SPIRITUAL MOTHERHOOD

Edith Stein says, “The function of motherhood structures a typology informed by the sense of self in relation to others.”⁹⁵ Because a woman has the ability to be a mother, she “has a more sensitive faculty of empathy.”⁹⁶ Stein wrote her dissertation on *The Problem of Empathy*,

89 Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, II-II, 117, 1.

90 Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, II-II, 117, 1, ad. 1.

91 Aristotle, *Magna Moralia*, I, 24 (1192a10).

92 Aristotle, *Magna Moralia*, I, 24 (1192a10).

93 Amy Love, “The Vocation of Holy Womanhood,” *Canticle* vol.12 (Spring 2001), 16.

94 Marmion, *Sponsa Verbi*, 55.

95 Brenner, “Edith Stein,” 217.

96 Stein, *Essays on Woman*, 207.

and she regarded a woman's empathetic gift as her primary relation to all others, not only her own children.⁹⁷ It enables her to relate to all people and to understand the special, individual destiny of every living being. It assigns her the task of nurturer and educator of her own children, as well as a kind of universal nurturer and educator of all humankind.⁹⁸ She takes this care for the whole individual person with her wherever she goes. In this way, she is called to be an agent of healing in all places, all professions, and all circumstances.

Women have a kind of "*maternal thinking*" that does not separate intellectual activity from the disciplines of the emotional realm.⁹⁹ She cannot help but impart moral sensibility with intellectual teaching for her children. She herself must have self-restraint and unselfish love so that she can transcend her own interests so as to give the detached love that helps another to grow. Her gift of empathy helps her both to react to the other and to gain self-knowledge, in order to care for the other with a truly loving attention that does not seek self but rather desires the other's growth in holiness. Stein insists that a woman's maternal attitude toward others is necessary for them to develop not only in one area, e.g., the intellectual, but to reach their full human potential.¹⁰⁰ This is the woman who is able to perceive the true needs of the other in her presence and to react with unselfish love and attention. She does not need to be asked for a drink of water, like the woman at the well; she sees the need and freely gives the water while recognizing herself for who she really is.

This wonderful fecundity,¹⁰¹ a result of her loving union with one man (or with Christ), involves all the powers of her soul. When she reaches the point of spiritual motherhood, she should have an interior freedom that springs from virtue and makes her relationships grace filled. While

97 Brenner, "*Edith Stein*," 219.

98 Brenner, "*Edith Stein*," 219.

99 Brenner, "*Edith Stein*," 219.

100 Brenner, "*Edith Stein*," 220.

101 Marmion, *Sponsa Verbi*, 22.

the fecundity of nature is limited, the fecundity of virtue is unlimited.¹⁰² There is a divine virtue that goes out from her to touch souls, obtain their pardon, console, strengthen, raise, tranquilize, gladden, and make them show forth the glory of Christ.¹⁰³ Spiritual motherhood is marked by poverty, is receptive toward reality, and is transparent.¹⁰⁴ One of the greatest contributions that women can bring to humanity today is certainly that of revealing, by their lives more than by their words, the possibility of a true dedication to and openness toward others, in sharing their joys, in being faithful and constant in love, without thought of domination or exclusiveness.¹⁰⁵ Interiorly and exteriorly a woman is meant to be a true gift to others, which is her natural desire. "*Spousal love always involves a special readiness to be poured out for the sake of those who come within one's range of activity,*"¹⁰⁶ first family, and then all others. This spiritual maternity is a mark, indeed a real fruit, of spousal communion. The virtuous woman also experiences a kind of "*intellectual fecundity,*"¹⁰⁷ that is not exactly knowledge itself, but a capacity for judgment, counsel, or decision. This is what the Lord can do with her natural gift of intuition. Just as "*sin obscures sight,*" as St. Augustine says, a purified intellect is more able to grasp the truth. According to the will of God and the woman's ability to receive truth, Jesus gives her his own wisdom, which is meant first for the ordering of her own life, and then for others according to his prompting. This is not to say that she becomes more intelligent, but that her intelligence can be used as God would direct it to be used.

The world needs joyful, whole, and valiant women who relish being women as God intends women to be.¹⁰⁸ One woman's virtue has an

102 Marmion, *Sponsa Verbi*, 88.

103 Marmion, *Sponsa Verbi*, 88.

104 Stöckl, *Mary, Model and Mother of Consecrated Life*, 211.

105 Andrew Apostoli, *When God Asks for an Undivided Heart: Choosing Celibacy in Love and Freedom* (Boston: Pauline Books & Media, 1995), 196-7.

106 MD, § 21.

107 Sheen, *The World's First Love*, 147.

108 Love, "The Vocation of Holy Womanhood," 17.

immeasurable effect on society, as experience attests. Like holy Mother Church, a woman personifies the sacred mysteries of life as the obedient and fruitful spouse.¹⁰⁹ She is aware that God entrusts these souls to her, each in a special way.¹¹⁰ *“Living in the truth illumined by wisdom, she knows that the Divine Spouse works within her; full of humility like the Blessed Virgin who conceived the Divine Word in her immaculate womb, the virtuous woman makes redound to the glory of God all she has received from him, all that by his grace and love she has conceived through him.”*¹¹¹ And it causes her, along with the greatest woman who ever lived, to magnify the Lord.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. ARTICLES

Brenner, Rachel Feldhay. “Edith Stein: A Reading of Her Feminist Thought,” in *Contemplating Edith Stein*. Edited by Joyce Avrech Berkman. Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006, 212-225.

Gormley, Joan. “Edith Stein on the Interplay of Nature and Grace in the Formation of Women.” *FCS Quarterly* (Fa111999): 6-14.

Goodall, David. “Gentleness [Endangered Virtues, 5].” *The Tablet* (April15, 2000): 512-513.

Little, Joyce A. “Redemptoris Mater: The Significance of Mary for Women.” *Marian Studies* 39 (1988): 136-158.

Love, Amy. “The Vocation of Holy Womanhood.” *Canticle*, vol.12 (Spring 2001): 13-16.

Maas, Robin. “A Shelter for Unfolding Souls: Edith Stein on the Vocation of Women.” *Anthropotes* 15 (1999): 163-180.

McAlister, Linda Lopez. “Edith Stein: Essential Differences,” in

109 Maas, “A Shelter for Unfolding Souls,” 178.

110 MD, § 30.

111 Marmion, *Sponsa Verbi*, 83.

Contemplating Edith Stein. Edited by Joyce Avrech Berkman. Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006, 201-21 L

Meconi, David Vincent. "Theology of the Body and Purity of Heart." *Homiletic & Pastoral Review* (April 2001): 3-8.

Oben, Freda Mary. "Edith Stein: Holiness in the Twentieth Century." *Spirituality Today*, vol. 35, no.2 (Summer 1983): 141-154.

Wenderski, Robert. "The Beauty of a Virtuous Woman's Heart." *The Catholic Faith*, 3, vol. 7 (May/June 2001): 14-18.

West, Christopher. "A Great 'Nuptial Mystery'." *Inside the Vatican* (August-September 1999): 70-73.

"John Paul's Distinctive Contribution: A 20th Anniversary Reflection on John Paul II's 'Theology of the Body.'" *Inside the Vatican* (November 1998): 43- 48.

BOOKS

Alberione, James. *Living Our Commitment: Cardinal and Moral Virtues for Religious*. Boston: St. Paul Editions, 1968.

Apostoli, Andrew. *When God Asks for an Undivided Heart: Choosing Celibacy in Love and Freedom*. Boston: Pauline Books & Media, 1995.

Aquinas, St. Thomas. *Selected Writings*. London: Penguin Classics, 1998.

--- *Summa Theologica*. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. 5 vols.

Allen, Texas: Christian Classics, 1948.

Aristotle. *Economics*. Vol. II of *The Complete Works of Aristotle*. Edited by Jonathon Barnes. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984.

--- *Eudemian Ethics*. Vol. II of *The Complete Works of Aristotle*. Edited by Jonathon Barnes. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984.

--- *Magna Moralia*. Vol. II of *The Complete Works of Aristotle*. Edited by Jonathon Barnes. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Sr. Mary Angelica Neenan, O.P.

- *Nicomachean Ethics*. Vol. II of *The Complete Works of Aristotle*. Edited by Jonathon Barnes. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Berkman, Joyce Avrech, ed. *Contemplating Edith Stein*. Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006.
- Hildebrand, Dietrich von. *In Defense of Purity*. London: Sheed & Ward, 1945.
- Lubich, Chiara. *Mary, Heart of Humanity*. Manila: New City Press, 1988.
- Mankowski, Paul V. "Mulieris Dignitatem." Pages 238-241 in *The Thought of Pope John Paul II: A Collection of Essays and Studies*. Roma: Editrice Pontificia Universita Gregoriana, 1993.
- Marmion, Columba. *Sponsa Verbi: The Virgin Consecrated to Christ*. Translated by Francis Izard. St.Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1925.
- Ruusbroec, John. *The Spiritual Espousals and Other Works*. New York: Paulist Press, 1985.
- Saward, John. *The Beauty of Holiness and the Holiness of Beauty: Art, Sanctity, and the Truth of Catholicism*. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997.
- Sheen, Fulton. *Life is Worth Living*. New York: Garden City Publishers, 1953.
- *The World's First Love*. New York: Garden City Publishers, 1953.
- Stein, Edith. *Essays on Woman*. Washington, D.C: ICS Publications, 1987.
- *The Science of the Cross: A Study of St. John of the Cross*. Edited by L. Gelber and Romaeus Leuven. Translated by Hilda Graef. Chicago: Hemy Regnery Company, 1960.
- Stöckl, Fidelis. *Mary, Model and Mother of Consecrated Life: A Marian Synthesis of Theology of Consecrated Life Based on the Teachings of Pope John Paul II*. Quezon City, Manila: ICLA Publications, 2003.
- Wadell, Paul J. *The Primacy of Love*. New York: Paulist Press, 1992.

MAGISTERIAL SOURCES

Pope John Paul II. *The Theology of the Body: Human Love in the Divine Plan.*

Boston: Pauline Books and Media (Reprinted with permission from *L'Osservatore Romano*, English ed.), 1997.

--- *Letter to Women.* Boston: Pauline Books & Media, June 29, 1995.

--- *Mulieris Dignitatem: Apostolic Letter on the Dignity and Vocation of Women.* Boston: St. Paul Books & Media, August 15, 1988.

AARON J. KELLY, PHL

AS THE PERSON GOES,
SO GOES THE WHOLE WORLD

On November 30, 1986, on the occasion of his Apostolic Visit to Australia, Pope St. John Paul II said, “As the family goes, so goes the nation, and so goes the whole world in which we live.”¹ Now, thirty-four years later the same statement rings true in the minds of many. In the United States, there is a push for increased access to late-term abortions, gender identity has become a subjective choice, and traditional family values are viewed as a threat to personal freedom. Today, relativism and secularism are pillars of American culture and any claim to objective truth is viewed suspiciously. The question must be asked whether there is something more fundamental that is causing the breakdown in society today, especially in a society that does not recognize the true meaning of family. I propose that an addition must be made to St. John Paul’s statement, namely, “As the *human person* goes, so goes the family, so goes the nation, and so goes the whole world in which we live.” In this paper, I will argue that the breakdown of society results from a misunderstanding of what it means to be a human person and that to reach a proper understanding of family and society, a proper view of the human person must be held.

¹ John Paul II, “Homily of John Paul II,” Vatican Website, November 30, 1986, sec. 4, accessed November 5, 2017, https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/homilies/1986/documents/hf_jp-ii_hom_19861130_perth-australia.html.

PERSONS AS RELATIONAL

The breakdown in the understanding of what it means to be a human person, I posit, results from an overemphasis on individualism and the self. In order to fully understand the nature of personhood, the person must be considered in light of the other. When the person is viewed in terms of self-sufficiency and not interdependence, egoism results and the meaning of personhood is automatically skewed. In book two of the *Politics*, Aristotle writes, “Man is by nature a political animal.”² Man by nature is relational and meant to be in association with the other. Aristotle points out that this is what distinguishes man from other animals, for example, the bees. Unlike other animals, humans have the power of speech which allows for the sense of good and evil, just and unjust, and the relationships that ultimately form the family and society.³ The very fact that man is able to communicate, rather than simply make sound, indicates that the nature of man is oriented towards relationship. Aristotle writes, “A social instinct is implanted in all men by nature.”⁴ Aristotle establishes that this basic desire for relationship results in the unification of man and woman, the creation of the family, the creation of the village, and ultimately the creation of the state. The goal of the family, village, and state, then, is to perfect man’s political, relational nature.

Two thinkers on whom I will draw to emphasize the importance of relationship in the nature of the human person are Martin Buber (1878–1965) and Emmanuel Mounier (1905–1950). Both Buber and Mounier are personalist philosophers of the twentieth century. Buber wrote a work entitled *I and Thou* in 1923 and Mounier wrote *Personalism* in 1946. I will begin by discussing Buber. In Buber’s dialogical philosophy, especially that found in *I and Thou*, his concern is to examine how the

2 Aristotle, *Politics*, trans. B. Jowett, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1253a2-3. All subsequent uses of Aristotle’s *Politics* are from the B. Jowett translation.

3 Aristotle, *Politics*, 1253a7-18.

4 Aristotle, *Politics*, 1253a30.

person stands in relation to the world. Buber posits that there are two basic ways the individual, the "I", can stand in relation to the world, each forming a word pair: either "I-It", or "I-You". Buber writes, "The world as experience belongs to the basic word I-It. The basic word I-You establishes the world of relation."⁵ When the world is engaged as "I-It," the other is viewed as being detached and the subject of an experience, rather than a dynamic other. In this type of relationship, the focus is on the self and how the other can best serve individual interests. Buber explains, "The capricious man does not believe and encounter. He does not know association; he only knows the feverish world out there and his feverish desire to use it."⁶ When the "I-It" relationship is dominant, people are viewed as objects, and relationships begin to break down. Instead, other persons need to be viewed as a "You."

The second way the "I" can stand in relation to the world is expressed in the basic word pair, "I-You." In this second type of relationship, the other is not viewed simply as a he, she, or it, but rather as a "You," as another person. Martin Buber explains,

When I confront a human being as my You and speak the basic word I-You to him, then he is no thing among things nor does he consist of things. He is no longer He or She, limited by other Hes and Shes, a dot in the world grid of space and time, nor a condition that can be experienced and described, a loose bundle of named qualities . . . I do not find the human being to whom I say You in any Sometime and Somewhere. I can place him there and have to do this again and again, but immediately he becomes a He or a She, an It, and no longer remains my You . . . The human being to whom I say You I do not experience. But I stand in relation to him, in the sacred basic word.⁷

In this relationship, the "I" views the person before him as if the other was the only person in the world. The "I-You" relationship is the desire of every person and is the type of relationship that fully actualizes the self. Without truly authentic "I-You" relationships, a person does not

5 Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, trans. Walter Kaufmann, (New York: Touchstone by Simon and Schuster, 1996), 56.

6 Buber, *I and Thou*, 109.

7 Buber, 59-60.

fully realize their nature and remains at the level of individual. Buber writes, "The basic word I-You can be spoken only with one's whole being. . . I require a You to become, becoming I, I say You. All actual life is encounter."⁸ This type of relationship involves the entire person and is not easy. In "I-You," the "I" is left open and vulnerable to the "You," however, if the relationship is achieved, love abounds. Love binds the "I" to the "You." Thus, according to Buber, the nature of the person seeks relationship with the other; in other words, persons by nature have an innate desire for love.

In the thought of Emmanuel Mounier, love plays an essential role in the nature of the human person. In his book *Personalism*, Mounier notes that love is one of the defining features of personhood as opposed to other creatures. He writes, "Love is the surest certainty that man knows; the one irrefutable, existential *cogito*: I love, therefore I am; therefore being is, and life has value (is worth the pain of loving). Love does not reassure me simply as a state of being in which I find myself, for it gives me to someone else."⁹ Mounier replaces the Cartesian existential *cogito* with love. For persons, it is loving that points to real existence, a real existence that is not just wrapped up in the self but is oriented towards the other. Mounier distinguishes between individuals and persons. An individual is a singular, self-sufficient *ego* that does not interfere with other self-sufficient *egos*; persons, on the other hand, overcome the isolation of the *ego* and enter into relationship.¹⁰ Entering into relationship and being for the other moves a being beyond individualism into personalism and leads to the full expression of nature. Mounier writes, "The person only exists thus towards others, it only knows itself in knowing others, only finds itself in being known by them."¹¹ It is through relationship and the experience of another person that the individual comes to know their deepest, truest identity as person. The ability for human persons

8 Ibid., 62.

9 Emmanuel Mounier, *Personalism*, trans. Philip Mairet (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), 23.

10 Mounier, *Personalism*, 18-9.

11 Mounier, 20.

to enter into meaningful relationships distinguishes man from other animals, who interact for the sole purpose of reproduction, not personal flourishing.

Mounier explicates five actions that are original to man and are not found anywhere else in the universe. These five actions are what allow men to communicate and enter into a community of persons not simply a collection of singular *egos*. The five actions are: going out of the self, understanding, taking upon oneself or sharing, giving, and faithfulness. First, the person is able to overcome self-love and egoism in order to become available to the other. Mounier writes, "In the personalist tradition (in Christianity especially) the ascetic of self-dispossession is the central ascetic of the personal life."¹² By overcoming individualism, a person is able to enter into a relationship with the other. Second, in understanding, the person is able to view himself from the perspective of others, not just his own perspective, and is able to view others as unique singularities like the self.¹³ Third, the person is able to empathize with others, i.e. taking the joys and sorrows of the other upon the self.¹⁴ Fourth, the person is capable of giving, namely giving freely to others without measure or hope of reward.¹⁵ Finally, the person is capable of fidelity, or prolonged devotion to another person in friendship, or other various types of relationships.¹⁶ These five distinctly human characteristics allow for persons to enter into relationships that permit the flourishing of the self. When persons live in this way, not only is the individual capable of succeeding, but society as a whole is able to advance. Mounier writes, "If every man *is* nothing but what he *makes himself*, there can be no humanity, no history and no community (which is indeed the conclusion that certain existentialists end by accepting)."¹⁷ Persons are marked by the necessity for interpersonal relationship,

12 Mounier, 21.

13 Ibid., 21.

14 Ibid., 21-2.

15 Ibid., 22.

16 Ibid., 22.

17 Ibid., 30.

without relationships the full actualization of the self is not possible, and thus, history and community are not possible.

One theologian who I propose offers a synthesis of these two views and offers a further dimension in light of man's innate desire for God is Dietrich von Hildebrand. In his book *Man and Woman*, von Hildebrand discusses the nature of love and how it helps a person become more alive; in other words, to experience love is to fully actualize the nature of the person. He writes, "In loving and in giving of oneself to the beloved, there is no consciousness of renouncing one's character as an individual. Rather, the act of giving makes one to be more truly oneself. One becomes more totally and authentically alive. One's very own life becomes more awakened, fuller in the existential sense."¹⁸ When a person is stuck in egoism and individualism there is a limitation on the ability to live fully. Fullness of life is achieved by losing oneself in self-gift to the other. Von Hildebrand continues, "Love alone brings a human being to full awareness of personal existence. For it is in love alone that man finds room enough to be what it is."¹⁹ Influenced by Buber and other personalist thinkers, Von Hildebrand recognizes that it is only through the "Thou" that a person becomes truly an "I." If a person were to have no relationship with others and was completely closed in on himself, there would be an arrested development and the individual would not become the person he was created to be. When this understanding of love and relationship is lacking, there is no possibility of authentic relationships and communities forming.

Yet, Dietrich von Hildebrand proceeds a step further. In order to fully actualize personhood, there needs to be a relationship with the ultimate "Thou," namely God. Rather than preventing a man from entering into relationship with others, communion between man and God enhances relationship with others. Von Hildebrand writes, "It is not true that the highest 'I-and-Thou-communion' with Christ destroys communion with

18 Dietrich von Hildebrand, *Man and Woman: Love & the Meaning of Intimacy*, (Manchester: Sophia Institute Press, 1966), 23.

19 Von Hildebrand, *Man and Woman*, 23-4.

other men, causing us to forget others, to have no more place for them in our hearts. On the contrary, to the extent that we love Jesus . . . we reach that final point of depth where alone the ultimate, personally achieved communion can be formed.”²⁰ Through relationship with Christ, a person learns how to love and becomes fully an “I”. In Christ, one finds the perfect example self-sacrificial love to which all men are called, and which gives true identity. Von Hildebrand notes that any authentic community and relationship between persons that arises outside of Christ is inauthentic and superficial.²¹ Thus, authentic personality and lasting communities can only arise from relationship with Christ. Any other foundation will crumble. For example, the Church, with Christ as her head, is a community that has lasted over two thousand years; yet, human institutions that do not have Christ at the center are short lived and fleeting.

PERSONS AND SOCIETY

Having established that relationships are fundamental to the nature of the person, I will turn now to a discussion of the interdependence of the human person and society. In the *Politics*, Aristotle discusses how the family is formed in order to help meet man’s natural, everyday needs. Aristotle then notes that the *polis* is formed when families come together and seek to govern the common life of its members and guarantee their freedom. The need of the person for a community is at the level of nature and has been recognized by many after Aristotle. For sake of brevity, I will not give a complete treatment of this topic but will turn to the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* and *Gaudium et Spes* to show the interdependence between persons and societies. The *Catechism of the Catholic Church* says, “The human person needs to live in society. Society is not for him an extraneous addition but a requirement of his nature. Through the exchange with others, mutual service and dialogue

20 Dietrich von Hildebrand, *Liturgy & Personality*, (Steubenville: Hildebrand Project, 1966), 26.

21 Von Hildebrand, *Liturgy & Personality*, 32.

with his brethren, man develops his potential; he thus responds to his vocation.”²² The Catechism is pointing out the essential link between society and persons. Societies bind together persons who are seeking community because of their nature. *Gaudium et Spes* considers the interdependence between the human person and society and shows that there exists a mutual necessity. The document reads, “Man’s social nature makes it evident that the progress of the human person and the advance of society itself hinge on one another. For the beginning, the subject and goal of all social institutions is and must be the human person which for its part and by its very nature stands completely in need of social life.”²³ Human persons need society and community to actualize their full potential. The end of society is to aid individual persons in meeting their needs. *Gaudium et Spes* again says, “Among those social ties which man needs for his development some, like the family and political community, relate with greater immediacy to his innermost nature.”²⁴ Thus, when persons do not recognize their natural need for community and become overly individualistic, society begins to crumble.

Similarly, if society does not seek to help the person to flourish, then it does not actualize its nature. Society has a responsibility to its members to provide an environment in which they can flourish. Persons at the most fundamental level belong to a family, whose task is to provide for their basic needs. In addition, families are members of a political community which seeks to ensure the flourishing of families by offering protection and support. The *Catechism of the Catholic Church* says, “The state has a responsibility for its citizens’ well-being.”²⁵ This responsibility of the state can be described in terms of the common good.

22 Catechism of the Catholic Church, para. 1879.

23 Second Vatican Council, *Gaudium et Spes* [On the Church in the Modern World], Vatican Website, December 7, 1965, sec. 25, accessed February 8, 2019, http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html.

24 Ibid.

25 Catechism of the Catholic Church, para. 2372.

The state, and society in general, must work for the common good, the flourishing of individual members, so that they can achieve a life of happiness. In order for societies to function properly, members must be taught to be good citizens, a lesson that is learned from a young age within the family. In the family, the person learns how to interact with others and how to work for a common good. John Paul II writes, “It is from the family that citizens come to birth and it is within the family that they find the first school of the social virtues that are the animating principle of the existence and development of society itself.”²⁶ Families are the first school of the common good and provide the lessons that are necessary for an individual to be a productive member of society. If a person cannot work for the common good of the family and does not develop the virtues that are necessary for interpersonal relationships, then it will prove difficult to integrate into larger communities.

If the family does not live out its mission in forming virtuous citizens, society will not be well functioning. On the other hand, if the family fulfills its natural role, it serves as a beacon of hope in the midst of tumultuous societies and cultures. John Paul II writes,

Consequently, faced with a society that is running the risk of becoming more and more depersonalized and standardized and therefore inhuman and dehumanizing, with the negative results of many forms of escapism—such as alcoholism, drugs and even terrorism—he family possesses and continues still to release formidable energies capable of taking man out of his anonymity, keeping him conscious of his personal dignity, enriching him with deep humanity and actively placing him, in his uniqueness and unrepeatability, within the fabric of society.²⁷

The family teaches the individual what it means to be a human, what it means to be a person, namely a person in relation. As I have pointed out, a person does not fully actualize their nature until they enter into

26 John Paul II, *Familiaris Consortio* [On the Role of the Christian Family in the Modern World], Vatican Website, November 22, 1981, sec. 42, accessed September 16, 2017, http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_jp-ii_exh_19811122_familiaris-consortio.html.

27 John Paul II, *Familiaris Consortio*, sec. 43.

relationship with another. Yet, families cannot form unless men and women enter into relationships of love. Relationships that remain on the level of utility and pleasure restrain the individual and prevent him from becoming what he is intended to be. And thus, families and societies break down and are prevented from flourishing.

The thought of Pope St. John Paul II in 1986, namely that, “as the family goes, so goes the nation, and so goes the whole world in which we live,” echoes true even till the present day. I have proposed in this paper that a slight addition can be made to John Paul’s thought, namely, that more fundamental than the breakdown of the family is the breakdown in the meaning of the human person. In a culture that is relativistic and individualistic, the notion of the necessity of interpersonal relationships rooted in love is beginning to be lost. Divorce rates are rising, families are being broken up, and many people are foregoing marriage altogether. Yet, persons do not fully actualize their nature until they are in a relationship with the other. Aristotle, Martin Buber, Emmanuel Mounier, and Dietrich Von Hildebrand have each illustrated that personhood is essentially rooted in relationship. When this fundamental truth is lost, everything crumbles. If families are not formed and properly ordered, then society will crumble, and the rest of the world around it. Today, more than ever, the dignity of the person needs to be taught with fervor, and healthy, committed relationships need to be encouraged. Only then, can we begin to reverse the damage and begin to build up the family, society, and the entire world.

ALEXANDER J. WYVILL, PHL

BEING IN THE RIGHT

NORMATIVITY IN HEIDEGGER'S CONCEPTION OF TRUTH

INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS A TRUTH THAT MATTERS

Why does truth matter? Why can it change our minds, move us to tears, completely redirect our sense of what is and is not significant in life?

It is apparent that truth and mattering go hand-in-hand. Otherwise, “what is given” and “what means something” would stand alien to one another. Clearly, this is not the case. If it is *given* that I have scheduled a picnic for tomorrow, certain things *mean* something to me: the weather forecast, my grocery list, where I left my picnic basket. However we choose to define it, truth must yoke givenness and meaning together.

For most of philosophical history, this link was easy to explain. In ancient and medieval thought, truth was usually defined as the correspondence of a judgement to reality. Today, this is called the *correspondence theory of truth*. This definition seemed adequate to the Aristotelian mind, because the domain of givenness included objects of sense perception. I could know truths that *meant* something: houses are for dwelling, dogs have four legs, the heavenly spheres move regularly. To ancients and medievals, givenness and meaning collide in the true assertion.

At the dawn of modernity, Descartes threw a wrench into the Aristotelian world. He claimed that anything subject to doubt cannot be a given. If we accept this, all objects of sense perception come suddenly under fire. Things in the world—houses, dogs, the heavens—can no longer give us truth. The only givens are my thoughts, from whose air-tight confines we are asked to deduce all reality.

Trapped in this bleak epistemic condition, Hermann Lotze re-defined truth as the logical validity of a proposition. This is called the *logical theory of truth*. According to this definition, statements like “if all A are B and C is A, then C is B” are true if they follow the *a priori* rules of logic. But this definition eliminates an essential feature of truth: reality. The true proposition, though logically valid, hovers as a free-floating abstraction; I could be indifferent to it. Logical validity—if not grounded in reality—means nothing. Ungrounded propositions have no capacity to make me care about anything (say, the weather) as does planning a picnic. Lotze’s logical theory relies on the ungrounded assumption that logic means something on its own; thus, it fails to link givenness to meaning. If truth is mere validity, it does not *matter*.

Critical theorists veered to the opposite extreme, punting on truth altogether and turning instead to history. To the historicist, truth is nothing but a worldview: an opinion of reality. This seems a step forward: unlike the free-floating logical statement, my opinions are relevant to my concerns. But opinions can also ignore given evidence, like a stubborn uncle too set in his ways. The historical dodge thus fails to link givenness to meaning. If truth is mere history, it does not *matter*.

Philosophy had thus come to a fork in the road. One path was scientific, certain, yet meaningless. The other was historical, meaningful, yet arbitrary. Neither could ground the possibility of genuine truth. This was the philosophical landscape of Martin Heidegger’s early career. Seeing both paths as untenable, Heidegger appropriated the phenomenological method to articulate the structure of “mattering” not as a detached, Cartesian *ego*, but as we are, as a being in the world. In doing so, Heidegger attempts to rescue what we knew from the beginning: that truth matters.

THE BIG IDEA: THE NORMATIVE COMMITMENT MAKES TRUTH MATTER

I argue that Heidegger’s account of truth succeeds because it interprets

matter in *normative* terms.¹ The normative is what appears to follow rules, rules which govern what *ought* to happen. This strategy is anticipated by Kant, but unlike Kant, it assumes no distinction between what things *are* (*noumena*) and how they *appear* (*phenomena*). From this perspective, we discover that our world (not just abstract thought) shows up as normative, governed by rules that make sense of everything—from playing the violin to philosophical articulation.

For Heidegger, the world shows up as normative because humans are *committed* to make sense of it. The normative commitment—the distinctive mark of the human² person—is our commitment to respond meaningfully to everything given. This relationship between commitment and responsiveness is clearest in the case of games: If I commit to being a chess player, I will consistently respond to rooks and bishops, legal and illegal moves, openers and tactics. It also works with broader identities: to commit to being a student is to consistently respond to classes and teachers, good and bad study practices, essential and skim-able readings. Were I not committed to classes, readings and study, I would not be much of a student.

The normative commitment erases any hard-and-fast distinction between objective givenness and subjective meaning. It is only within the commitment of “learning chess” that given figurines mean “rooks” and “bishops.” It is only within the commitment of “being a student” that given texts mean “the canon of Western thought.” These meanings are not *merely* objective: in another world, other figurines could have meant “rook,” other books could have meant “canon.” Neither are they *merely* subjective: I would face consequences if I moved a rook like a bishop, or if I replaced *The Republic* with *Captain Underpants* in my

1 Haugeland, John. “Truth and Rule Following.” *Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (1998), 317.

2 Heidegger draws a distinction between being human and being-in-the-world (*Dasein*). The former is a taxonomical classification of what sort of entity we are, the latter is the existential classification of having-a-world. It is conceivable that another taxonomical class of entity could have a world, but it is inconceivable that our existence could be anything other than *Dasein*.

philosophy curriculum. So long as we commit to making sense of things, the objective and the subjective, the given and the meant, show up as one and the same. The normative commitment is the “glue” between givenness and meaning; it is what makes truth matter.

A BROADER SENSE OF TRUTH

I maintain (along with Heidegger) that truth is normative responsiveness³ to the given world. This is the *existential theory of truth*. So understood, truth is not a property of assertions, but a manner of being in the world. As such, the existential theory has the power to explain not just the truth of judgements—truth *in thought*—but also truth *prior to thought* (which I call *skill*) and at thought’s *horizon* (which I call *reverence*). Heidegger glosses over the latter category, a serious shortcoming in his thought that I will address in Section Three. In the three sections that follow, I will distinguish three senses of truth in Heidegger’s account by analyzing three paradigmatic “worlds:” that of the expert, the poet, and the contemplative.

Section One will analyze truth *prior to thought*, the truth of the expert. The expert’s world is the *familiar*, and his task is to *deal* with it. “Dealing” requires no explicit thought; it is “natural” in the sense of “she’s a natural at the violin.” Truth prior to thought is what I call *skill*.

Section Two will analyze truth *in thought*, the truth of the poet. The poet’s world is the *unfamiliar*, and his task is to *find words* for it. The unfamiliar is what makes no sense, what we call terrible, wonderful, strange. To make sense of such things requires explicit thought; we must pause and think about what they mean. This produces what is traditionally meant by truth: true statements. Truth in thought is what I call *articulation*.

Section Three will analyze truth at thought’s *horizon*, the truth of the

3 Heidegger does not use explicitly normative language except in rare cases. He usually defines truth as “disclosedness” or “unconcealment,” but “normative responsiveness” captures the same general idea.

contemplative. The contemplative's world is the *unfamiliar*, and his task is to *be with* it. Heidegger would draw no distinction between the poet and the contemplative; to him, they are two sides of the same coin. I disagree. The religious poet relates differently to the unfamiliar than the monk of Chartreuse, who writes not a word. The religious poet responds to God as same; the monk beholds God as Other. This beholding is a truth beyond thought, a truth that I call *reverence*.

Heidegger's thought on truth is powerful, flawed, and worthy of serious attention. By teasing out his account's existential sources, I hope to remind readers that, whether playing the violin or contemplating God, truth *matters*.

MASTERY OF THE FAMILIAR: TRUTH PRIOR TO THOUGHT

We are all experts in one way or another. Zipping up a jacket, signing a check and eating cereal are complicated tasks at which most of us are extremely competent. These competencies, however mundane, are developed skills; they do not come pre-packaged with humanity. They develop in the context of the familiar world.

Familiarity is a prerequisite for skill and for all knowledge. By analyzing the normative structure of our familiarity with the world, I will argue that the original meaning of truth is not theoretical correctness, but rather *skillful responsiveness*. First, I claim that, prior to our theoretical knowledge of things, we experience the world as in terms of "readiness-to-hand," a basic, referential *familiarity*. Second, I argue that our experience of the world as ready-to-hand points to an ever-present *normative commitment* to treat the given as meaningful. This leads to a stronger claim, that skill—normative responsiveness to the given—is the original meaning of *truth*, prior to the truth of an assertion. Third, I argue that this "finite" account of truth is nonetheless *objective*, because the meaning of "object" always emerges within a commitment to a finite domain. By grounding truth in our pre-theoretical familiarity with the world, I (along with Heidegger) claim that truth is both objective and existential, grounded both "in the world" and "within the finitude of

man.”⁴

GETTING THINGS: THE READY-TO-HAND WORLD

The familiar is what makes sense, what we “get.” But what exactly *is* it that we “get?” Our tendency is to conceive of “getting” and theoretical knowledge as the same idea. To “get” a pencil would entail theoretical knowledge of its essential features: that it contains graphite, that it has an eraser, that it is for writing. But “getting” something requires no theoretical knowledge at all. “Getting” a pencil is nothing more than being able to *deal* with it. “Getting” is not theoretical knowledge, but know-how.⁵ To be familiar with something is to “know how” to deal with it.

The familiar rarely sticks out in everyday life; it tends to recede into the background. But the familiar makes up the vast majority of human life. Even as I write these words, my fingers know exactly where to press the keyboard such that tiny pixels light up on a screen, pixels that represent letters, words, and ideas. For this to occur, I must know how to deal with many inter-related norms. I must know how to press keys with the appropriate amount of pressure, how to correlate certain keys with certain letters, how to spell words, how to look at the relevant part of the screen. I actualize all of these “know-hows” without ever offering a theory of them.

Heidegger calls this familiar access to the world *circumspection*. Circumspection is the way experts relate to their domain of mastery. Anything that shows up within circumspection can be dealt with immediately. But this “immediacy” is no mere automatic response;

4 Heidegger, Martin. *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*, trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1995), 30.

5 The German language has two words for these two senses of “knowledge,” which makes the distinction clearer. The first, *wissen*, is the stem of *Wissenschaft* (science) and signifies factual or abstract knowledge. The second, *kennen*, is the stem of *Erkenntnis* (recognition) and signifies interpersonal and experiential knowledge.

Stephen Curry, for example, does not just “end up” sinking three-pointers. Rather, circumspection allows for complex, overlapping performances to be executed seamlessly without thinking through the steps. Pressing keys, correlating them with letters, and looking at the screen becomes “typing.” Gripping the ball, planting one’s feet, and releasing properly becomes “shooting the three-pointer.” Circumspection is our experience of the world “at our disposal,” ready to be used, handy.

Of course, we do not always experience the world as “at our disposal.” I am no Stephen Curry, and my shooting form is haphazard at best. When I attempt a shot, I *must* think through the individual steps: grip the ball, plant the feet, release. I experience shooting the basketball as difficult and unwieldy. Heidegger calls this unfamiliar access to the world *obtrusiveness*. Obtrusiveness is the way novices relate to a new craft. Because everything in their craft is new, dealing with it requires great focus.

Circumspection and obtrusiveness demonstrate that our *experience* of the world dictates our ability to *deal* with it. If we experience the world as familiar, we can deal with it readily. If we experience it as unfamiliar, we can deal with it only clumsily. Note that the *world*—not us—sets the standards to which we must respond. I cannot simply *decide* to experience basketball as circumspect; I have to *achieve* it. This is one difference between know-how (skill) and theory. A theory can be understood in a flash (like a “Eureka!” moment); a skill can only be developed over steady practice.

Familiarity is not just a way of experiencing the *world*, but also a way of experiencing *things* within it. When a thing shows up within the world as *familiar*, we need not theorize it. We need not attend to it all; it is simply available for use. Heidegger terms such things *ready-to-hand*.

The *ready-to-hand* signifies a broad set of phenomena. The most obvious is equipment, but signs and paraphernalia are also included. Equipment is anything wielded or donned. Hammers, socks and cars are all equipment. The hammer is Heidegger’s paradigmatic case of equipment because it “does nothing” except hammer things. A hammer

“shows up” when I need to hammer something, and almost never otherwise. When the hammer does “show up,” it is not as “a certain shaped of metal with a handle and claw,” but rather as “what I need to drive these nails.” The essence of equipment is its readiness for use, not the sum of its definite properties.

Signs also fall under the ready-to-hand. Road maps, theater marquees, and gestures are all signs. They “do nothing” but indicate something beyond them. I might look at a *painting* of country roads because the *painting* means something to me, but I look at a *map* of country roads because *roads* mean something to me. The same idea applies for gestures: if you point at something for a human, they look at the thing. If you point at something for a dog, it looks at your finger; dogs literally “miss the point.” Signs pick out things beyond themselves, which requires a ready-to-hand access to their referential significance.

Paraphernalia are yet another sort of ready-to-hand entity. Paraphernalia is Heidegger’s term for functionally-assigned entities that do not attach themselves to a definite object. It is whatever cannot be defined—even theoretically—except with respect to human significance. Exercise, the Internet, and *Crime and Punishment* are all instances of paraphernalia. Exercise is not just physical activity; it is physical activity *assigned* as maintaining fitness. “Getting your exercise” would be unintelligible to a primitive, agrarian society, because fitness would not be an explicit functional assignment for them. The Internet is not just the largest public network protocol, but the one *assigned* to contain all of the interesting websites. A billionaire could create a larger network with no content, but that would not make it the Internet. *Crime and Punishment* is not just the 1866 novel about Raskolnikov, but that novel *assigned* as written by Dostoevsky. We could translate, digitize or abridge the novel, but it would still be *Crime and Punishment*. Paraphernalia defies explanation in abstract terms; it must be understood with respect to concrete, human concerns.

These three phenomena—equipment, sign, paraphernalia—populate the familiar world, the “background” of life. They remind us of the

difference between *being* in the world and *reflecting* on it. In both cases, objects still appear and matter to us. But in the former case, they matter as *ready-to-hand*, assigned to a function or in reference to a function. Because the ready-to-hand is necessarily related to our human concerns, it *matters* to us. Because it matters, the ready-to-hand presupposes a normative commitment.

SKILL AND THE ORIGINAL SENSE OF TRUTH

Normative commitment is what makes truth matter. It connects the ways things are given with a meaning. Within a normative commitment to some domain, truth is a skillful responsiveness to the familiar. In phenomenological terms, it is *disclosedness*, a circumspective access to things as ready-to-hand.

This notion of truth is broader than the traditional account, because it shift's truth's "center of gravity"⁶ from the correct proposition to a manner of being in the world. It therefore includes truths accessed prior to thought, which I call *skills*. Skills cannot be put into words, but they still "get things right" and thus count as true. One of the chief criticisms of the correspondence theory of truth is that it cannot explain why skills are achievements.

Skills are achievements because they distinguish consistent responsiveness (like Stephen Curry's shooting form) from haphazard or inconsistent responsiveness (like my shooting form). But this alone does not demonstrate that skills are *true*. For something to be *true*, is has to respond *normatively* ("as one ought"), not just *consistently*. I can *consistently* lie to my dentist about my flossing habits, but that does not make my response *true*. This is Ernst Tugendhat's criticism of Heidegger's account: if a definition of truth cannot account for falsity, then it eliminates the normative meaning of truth.

The normative commitment—the commitment to respond meaningfully

6 Dahlstrom, Daniel. *Heidegger's Concept of Truth* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001), 170.

to everything given—is the key to distinguishing *consistent* performance from *normative* performance. The difference is extremely subtle, however, and best explained with an example. There is a clever card game called *Mao* in which the players are told only one rule: *end the game with the fewest cards*. The person teaching the game secretly knows that *Mao* is nothing other than the familiar game *Uno*, except the game ends when the draw pile runs out. As the players flounder to make sense of the game, the teacher referees the game by “penalizing” players who move illegally, giving them an extra card from the pile.

After a few rounds, the referee introduces a twist to the game, which is where the fun begins. The referee tells the players that *they also* may penalize each other, but that these penalties may be rejected (and the penalty given instead to the accuser) by majority vote of the players. Eventually, the cards run out and somebody wins the round. For the next round, the referee adds a new secret rule and the process restarts.

In my experience of playing *Mao*, two different strategies emerge. In the first strategy, the players attempt to honestly figure out the rules of the game. Over the course of the round, each player might receive a few penalties from the referee, and maybe a few from players who think they have figured out the rules. Eventually, the rules “click” for one player, who wins the round quickly. The “figure-out-the-rules” strategy is *normative*. You can expect first place.

The second strategy is much trickier. The game begins as above, but once one player figures out the rules, two or three players team up and exploit the “inter-player penalty” mechanic to avoid losing. They penalize the rule-following player with fifteen cards, for no reason. Because they constitute a majority, the gang of penalizers cannot be held accountable by vote. The rule-follower is effectively eliminated from the game, and one of the penalizers inevitably wins. The “gang-of-penalizers” strategy is *consistent*, but not *normative*. You will never get last place, but you cannot expect to win every game.

Now somebody might object: if you are playing *Mao* with a gang of penalizers, you cannot expect to win with the “figure-out-the-rules”

strategy. As soon as you figure out the rules, you will be penalized into last place. But this is not the case. A shrewd player committed to the norm of “figuring-out-the-rules” *knows* to watch out for the gang of penalizers, because the gang of penalizers shows up as *a new rule* to be figured out. Because the shrewd player’s strategy is *normative*—responsive to his commitment to win the game—he can adapt to this new game phenomenon by changing his tactical approach. He might join the gang of penalizers, pretend to “play dumb” until the draw deck runs low, or convince a gang member to reform. Because the shrewd player’s strategy lets him respond to *all* the dynamics of the game (even if they change or evolve), he is rightly called *skilled*. He “gets” *Mao*.

The gang members, however, are stuck with a merely *consistent* strategy. Like the shrewd player, they commit to a norm: if any player appears to figure out the rules, one must team up with allies and penalize the shrewd player with fifteen cards. But this commitment, though legal within the game, only serves to *avoid losing* the game. It ignores the broadest commitment—*winning* the game—and therefore the “gang of penalizers” strategy is a *false* one. Thus, unless the gang of penalizers attempts to respond to what *matters*—figuring out the rules—they cannot be called *skilled*. They do not “get” *Mao*, even if they are playing it legally.

Both consistency and normativity are types of responsiveness to commitments; the latter can distinguish between truth and falsity, while the former cannot. *Consistent* responses adhere to *any* conceivable commitment within a given domain. If I am a chess player, I could commit to only moving my knights the entire game, and I could do so consistently (though I certainly would not win). *Normative* responses are *consistent* responses of a privileged sort. They adhere only to the *broadest* commitment within a given domain. In chess, *Mao*, and any other game, the broadest commitment is to play to win. Insofar as you are playing a game, responsiveness that helps you win is *true*, responsiveness that does not help you win is *false*.

What equips the broadest (or normative) commitment to tell true

from false? The normative commitment is whatever makes a domain intelligible in the first place, what makes the phenomena within it meaningful. All the *Mao* players, good and bad, were committed to interpreting game phenomena: penalties, majority votes, cards played, referee feedback. But the gang of penalizers chose to privilege certain phenomena over others: penalties and majority votes took center stage, while the cards and the referee feedback fell into the background. On the other hand, the shrewd player accepted *all* game phenomena as meaningful, including the “gang of penalizers,” because he responded only to the broadest commitment: playing to win. It was only because of this commitment that the shrewd player was able to *adapt* his play style and continue to win.

Another distinguishing feature of the normative commitment is that it holds skills and game phenomena in *precarious equilibrium*.⁷ The shrewd player has a strategy, but that strategy does not exclude the possibility of unfamiliar, surprising, or mysterious phenomena. It does not require that such things *actually* happen, only that they could *conceivably* happen. Precarious equilibrium is something like intellectual honesty: if an expert were to usher significant evidence against some established scientific or philosophical model, it would be *dishonest* to ignore that evidence on the grounds that it does not fit the model. To be a skilled scientist, one must be able to *adapt* the model if it cannot accommodate legitimate evidence. This is what distinguishes a *skill* (which emerges from normative responses) from a *habit* (which emerges from merely consistent responses). Skills are consistent responses that adapt to new circumstances, while habits do not necessarily adapt to new circumstances. Accordingly, skills are always achievements, while habits are *not* always achievements.

OBJECTS EMERGE IN FINITE DOMAINS

Normativity, and therefore skill, is inconceivable apart from a committed

7 Haugeland (1998), 334.

domain. Chess skill is determined within the chess world; I cannot develop chess ability without respect to rooks and bishops, legal and illegal moves. All of our life skills—zipping jackets, signing checks, eating soup—are likewise inconceivable apart from the world to which we are committed. The world, thus understood, is not the sum total of every entity in the universe. It is instead the “network of references” that constitute the way things show up.

Everyday language clarifies this existential definition of “world:” when we say that somebody “lives in their own little world,” we are not claiming that the physical universe has fewer entities from their perspective. Rather, we are claiming that they do not “see” the bigger picture, that they see things only in terms of short-sighted desires and goals. When we say that “it’s a small world,” we are not claiming that the Earth is a physically small entity. Rather, we are claiming that people share many common points of reference (friends, gadgets, idioms) even when they live far away. We access these points of references (which we call *objects*) through a normative commitment, and it is only through that commitment that objects can show up as *meaningful*.

If the *chess* world determines how rooks and bishops show up, then *the* world—our broadest referential context—determines how *everything* shows up. But the world is quite complex, and involves our relationship not just to the actual, but to the possible. For example, if I were seven feet tall, nearly everything would show up as “too short for me,” even if I never *actually* hit my head on anything. If I were exceedingly paranoid, nearly *everything* would show up as “out to get me,” even if nothing *actually* gets me. Our comportment towards the possible, which Heidegger calls our *disposedness*, is the “atmosphere” or “mood” of life out of which we interpret everything.

Disposedness affects more than just *us*, however; it also affects the world itself. When we speak with a sulky person, a “dark cloud” hangs over *the room*, not just the person. When we eat dinner with an easily-offended person, *everyone* feels tense, as if “walking on eggshells.” Disposedness does not just “color the data” of our *own* perception. It rather changes

the *world*, in a publicly-accessible way.

Disposedness toward the world is inescapable, but it does not preclude the possibility of skillful access to the world, the possibility of truth. If the normative commitment is to meaningfully respond to *everything* given, even tall and paranoid people can learn to deal with their disposedness skillfully. Their disposedness is not the last word, but rather the starting point for skillfully “getting” the truth of things. Special Olympics athletes, though disposed to find certain sports especially difficult, are still able to become experts in the sports world. They can still “play by the rules,” even if basketball, skiing and sprinting “handle differently” for them.

This analysis of world and disposedness re-casts traditional objectivity in terms of finite worlds or contexts. But, as our examples show, a finite account of objectivity does not render objects arbitrary or relative to opinions and feelings. Rather, it narrows the scope of “object” from a transcendent (but meaningless) other to an “en-worlded” (but meaningful) familiar. The objective “rook” is neither in some definite set of properties nor in my mind as mere opinion; rather, the “rook” is in the *world of chess*, as understood by those committed to playing it.

This reinterpretation of objectivity distinguishes Heidegger’s existential realism from its historical alternatives: subjective idealism, objective idealism, and traditional realism. Subjective idealists (like Berkeley and Lotze) suggest that the “real” is *internal* to thought. Objective idealists (like Plato) suggest that the “real” is *external* to thought but *inaccessible* via sense perception. Traditional realists (like Aristotle and Aquinas) suggest that the “real” is *external* to thought and *accessible* via sense perception. This last option comes closest to Heidegger’s view, but omits normative commitment in favor of “forms” impressed upon us via external objects.

It is tempting to cling to traditional realism for its “common sense” approach to knowledge. But this account struggles to explain the world of the familiar—the world of the expert. The expert’s skill involves no predication or theory, only a circumspective access to the world as

ready-to-hand. Does the expert explicitly “know” natures? Or rather, do they implicitly “know-how” to access things as they appear in their context of possibilities; namely, how to be in the world?

Existential realism—Heidegger’s view—reconciles the “common sense” of traditional realism with the phenomenon of pre-theoretical knowledge. In this account, the objective-subjective distinction is erased in favor of normative commitment. It is within the normative commitment that meanings—including pre-theoretical meanings—first show up. So understood, the “real” is neither external existence nor internal mental content, but a domain (*world*) constituted in the relation between entities and thought. Objects are not mere mental representations, but neither can they be discovered apart from a committed domain. As John Haugeland puts it, objects are *independent* of thought, but not *alien* to it.⁸ Objects need not play by our “rules,” but objects’ “rules” *must* show up in the context of our thought.

Rules prior to theory appear in the “as-structure” of interpretation. The tall person’s world is given “*as-too-short*,” and the paranoid person’s world “*as-out-to-get-me*.” This is the *hermeneutic* sense of truth. It is the immediate manner by which objects entail continuity with their referential context. Edmund Husserl clarifies this “continuity” in his phenomenology of perceptive entailment.⁹ When something is “given,” we receive it as one aspect of a larger whole, taking in a sliver that gives us *enough* to interpret what is *supposed* to be “there” as a thing. The given indicates a range of possible determinations through the suggestion of similarity and contiguity. When we perceive the front of a cup, it immediately seems similar to other cups. Only when so taken “as a cup” does the front side of the cup imply a typical or “contiguous” back side and inside.

8 Haugeland (1998), 347.

9 Crowell, Stephen. *Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013), 124.

CONCLUSION

In this section, we began with a description of the pre-theoretical world, the world of the expert. The expert “gets” things without offering a theory of them. We interpreted this “getting” as skill. We then turned to normative commitment as the explanation for this original access to things. We named this original access *truth*, or normative responsiveness.

In the second half of the section, we explored the implications of the fact that original truth is discovered only within the context of normative commitment. Normative commitment shapes our every interpretation of everything. Through disposedness and entailment, normative commitment makes things show up “as” such-and-such a way. These structures reveal that our access to objects is necessarily *finite*. There is no “view from nowhere,” no view without a hermeneutic sense. This triggered our re-evaluation of the original meaning of “objectivity” from the perspective of human finitude. This objectivity is not *alien* to thought. On the other hand, it is *independent* of thought, and thus standardizes the “rules of the game,” normative entailments.

Through this normative reading of Heidegger’s early thought, we have interpreted truth as both objective and finite, given through our normative relationship with the *familiar* world. In the next two sections, we will apply this normative analysis to the *unfamiliar* world.

ARTICULATING THE UNFAMILIAR: TRUTH WITHIN THOUGHT

Why do we behold things? We behold the beautiful: sunrises, works of art, fine poetry. But we also behold the terrible: suffering, disasters, death. These things share certain features; they are surprising, sublime, mysterious—in a word, *unfamiliar*.

The unfamiliar gives us pause. We cannot simply *deal* with it, like the expert deals with their domain of skill. When faced with the unfamiliar, we rather try to make *sense* of it, to *find words* for it. This is the task of the poet: to make sense of the unfamiliar through explicit articulation.

Unlike the expert, the poet does not merely *deal* with his world; rather, he *pauses* and *thinks* about his world. In this context of thought, I argue that truth is the *articulation* of the unfamiliar.

In this section, I will unpack (in normative terms) the processes by which we articulate the unfamiliar. First, I argue that the experience of unfamiliar phenomena triggers a response of existential “listening,” in which we pause and explicitly think about their meaning. Second, I distinguish two types of “listening,” authenticity and forgetfulness. Third, I map these two manners of “listening” onto existential truth and falsity, respectively. Lastly, I offer a normative account of Heidegger’s “formal indication,” which grounds articulated thought in this authentic “listening.” Through this analysis, I argue that true and false thought presupposes a commitment to normative, authentic existence.

MAKING SENSE THROUGH LISTENING

The unfamiliar unsettles us. We cannot figure it out; we cannot deal with it. When we see an incredible feat, witness a terrible event, or gaze into the eyes of a loved one, our world changes. The common idiom for this is “broadening one’s horizons,” expanding the boundaries of what once seemed possible.

When faced with the unfamiliar, we immediately scramble to *appropriate* it into the familiar. We attempt to “make sense of it.” As a child, I recall having a fear of the dark; every hidden corner seemed able to harbor some monster or threat. I would “make sense” of this uncanny experience by physically “checking out” my room. I checked under the bed, in the closet, and behind the door. Once I had seen with my own eyes that no monsters were present, the uncanny feeling lessened. I had “made sense” or “seen for myself” that the unfamiliar was, in fact, familiar. The dark harbored no monsters after all; it was safe.

In order to make sense of the unfamiliar, we must pause and pay attention to it. We cannot just carry on as if nothing had happened. A child afraid of the dark does not just *refuse* to sleep; they *cannot* sleep.

No matter how hard they try, they cannot shake the sense that they are in danger until they get out of bed and make sense of the situation. Likewise, an artist who experiences a beautiful landscape cannot “shake” its impression. The artist is *moved* to paint the landscape. In rendering it on canvas, the artist realizes (literally “makes real”) their experience of it. The unfamiliar pulls us beyond what we already know by demanding that we make sense of it.

Heidegger maintains that genuine thought begins in an experience of unfamiliarity (*ἀπορία*), which moves us—like the painter—to render the unfamiliar in a meaningful medium. With poetry and philosophy, the rendering is not in brush strokes, but words. The rendering is descriptive, not merely speculative: my words should be responsive to the given experience. But it also cannot be arbitrary; I must pick out what is *essential* to the experience. Philosophical and poetical articulation is thus “describing the essence” of things, interpreting the indefinite as definite through the medium of words.

The difference between articulation and skill (discussed in the previous section) is akin to the difference between listening and hearing. I can hear something without listening to it, and I can even *understand* something without listening to it. When a child hurts himself on the playground and shouts “Mom,” only *one* mother turns her head. She was not actively listening for her child, but immediately *heard* a voice and *understood* it as her child’s. The mother is *skilled* at recognizing her child’s voice.

Listening, on the other hand, is triggered when something unfamiliar demands our attention. If a class topic is difficult, the good student does not just *hear* the teacher, but *listens* to him. If I think somebody said my name, I *listen* to hear it again. If something goes bump in the night, I *listen* to determine whether it is a burglar. In each case, I have an indeterminate experience (like the unintelligible class material, the name possibly called, the potentially dangerous robber) which moves me from mere hearing to active listening. Only in listening can I possibly articulate these experiences and know how to respond to them.

Language is the medium of articulation. Heidegger calls language “the house of Being.”¹⁰ In a domain of skillful dealings with things, we “have a home” among the familiar. But amidst the unfamiliar, we do not “have a home.” This is expressed in the German word *unheimlich*, which is usually rendered “unfamiliar” or “uncanny” but literally means “un-home-ly.” When faced with the unfamiliar, we no longer possess the words to make sense of our world, and thus we cannot deal with it skillfully. The *only* way to deal with the unfamiliar is to attempt to find words for it, to make a “home” for it. We achieve this by listening.

LETTING THINGS BE

To what do we listen? Heidegger offers two possibilities, one authentic, one inauthentic. Authentic listening listens to the *given*. It aims to do the experience justice, without reducing it to an easy or ready-made description. Inauthentic listening does not discipline itself to the *given*, but settles for easy description and functional adequacy. My mother—an illustrator by trade—once told me that, when drawing a tree, many beginners start by drawing an outline. She asks them, “Where did you see an outline?” to which the student has no answer. Trees do not have “lines” around their edges, but the novice artist settles for their pre-conceived notion of a tree’s shape and features. The novice draws *inauthentically*, without aiming to capture the tree as it is given.

When my mother draws a tree, the opposite is true. She always begins by looking at the tree. After squinting at it for a few moments, she sketches the “gesture” of the tree, some faint lines that suggest the tree’s “reach” and “motion” with respect to her. She then adds the darkest shadows and brightest highlights, which, in relation to one another, draw the eye across the composition just as her own eyes are drawn across the tree. Ironically, the tree looks like *the* tree (the particular experience) well before it looks like *a* tree (the pre-conceived notion of “tree”). By the

10 Heidegger, Martin. “Letter on Humanism.” Translated by Frank Capuzzi, J. Glenn Gray and David Farrell Krell. *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*. Edited by David Farrell Krell, revised edition. New York: HarperCollins (1993), 217.

end, of course, the drawing looks intelligible as both *a* tree and *the* tree, but this was only possible by first “listening” to the particularities of *the* tree. This is the stuff of *authentic* articulation.

Authenticity requires ownership, “listening” to the particularities of *this* experience without reducing it to something already familiar (like a pre-conceived notion of “tree”). To draw the tree authentically, one must *own* it. Owning means taking up something as belonging to oneself. This does not entail being its creator, however: although the artist *owns* the tree by drawing it, she does not claim to have created the bark, leaves and branches. Rather, she articulates the bark, leaves and branches *as only she can*, that is, as responsive to her *own* experience. By allowing the tree to “speak for itself” without interference from pre-conceived notions of trees, the authentic artist “lets the tree be.”

In everyday life, we cannot always “let things be.” Eventually, we all slip from “letting things be” into “getting things,” as the expert “gets” with their field of expertise (say, basketball or violin-playing). This tendency to move from active “listening” to simple “hearing” is very similar to Heidegger’s notion of *falling* (sometimes translated “ruinance”). Notwithstanding its misleading connotations with original sin (“The Fall” or “man’s fallen nature”), falling is rather our tendency to slip from authentic interpretation to inauthentic, blind acceptance of pre-conceived notions. We gradually “fall” as we become comfortable with things: manners of speaking, skills, other people. My mother experienced this when she became a professional illustrator; after a while, she “knew how” to draw certain types of things (drapery, metal cans, glass bottles), and would not need to look at a particular thing to draw it convincingly. As a professional, she could get by with a “general sense” of drapery, cans and bottles. She could “fall” into a certain rhythm or familiarity in dealing with these objects.

Falling is neither immoral nor impractical, but it can lead to a *forgetfulness* of particularity and nuance. Forgetfulness is our tendency to privilege certain interpretations of a given phenomena over others, to “filter” reality through our familiar ways of thinking. We “take things for

granted” without going through the steps of verifying their meaning.

Heidegger’s classic example of forgetfulness is social conformity. When we conform to social expectations, we allow ourselves to assimilate into *das Man*, literally “the one.” I do not what “I” do (say, eating impolitely or interrupting others in conversation), but what “one” does (say, eating with manners or waiting my turn in conversation). I allow my own initiatives and opinions to conform to the general cultural consensus.

In socially-determined contexts (like politeness and etiquette), conformity is perfectly appropriate, since the very point of politeness and etiquette is to communicate respect by doing “what one does.” But in normative contexts (like poetry or philosophy), conformity can only serve as a starting point. If poets and philosophers accepted everything prior to them as true by default, then all poetry and philosophy would reduce to mere consensus and become meaningless and arbitrary. Instead, these disciplines succeed by their responsiveness to reality, their capacity to articulate the way things show up *in their particularity*. Homer’s epithet “the rosy-fingered dawn” is good poetry because it describes the morning sky “as it is,” not just “as skies are described.” Good poetry succeeds by getting at something *essential*, not merely *typical*. By pausing and articulating the particularity of a thing, good poetry reaches beyond mere conformity into truth. Poetry lets things be.

BEING IN THE RIGHT

“Letting things be” only makes sense to those committed to having the truth of things. If we are content to settle for easy answers, we will *forget* the project of articulating reality. This forgetfulness is inauthentic (in Heidegger’s coinage), but it is possible and occurs all around us. For example, most news media outlets act according to two commitments: truthful reporting (the normative commitment) and getting good ratings (a non-normative commitment). Sometimes these commitments conflict, since most consumers prefer to hear complex political issues in terms with which they already agree. Because it is a difficult task to articulate complex issues in their complexity, many news outlets

forget their normative commitment and settle for simplistic, inauthentic reporting. This *forgetfulness* is widespread and accepted (in part) by all of us.

Forgetfulness is not truth because it does not respond to the normative commitment. Thus, forgetful ways of dealing with the world *cannot* respond consistently to unfamiliar or surprising phenomena, while true ways of dealing with the world can respond consistently to *all* phenomena. Oftentimes, the forgetful person attempts to *eliminate* or *hide* troublesome phenomena from their life, because dealing with it would require an enormous shift in the way the person thinks. Polarization in political discourse is one example of this: whenever people disagree with each other on sensitive issues, it is common practice to hide each other's words on social media, to stop buying each other's newspapers, to ban each other from speaking at their institutions. If forgetful partisan commitments override the normative commitment to the common good, then political discourse becomes *unable to listen* beyond the party's insider language. Public, normative arguments for certain policies become private, "inside baseball" between people who already agree with each other.

The only way to prevent this inability to listen is to hold forgetful commitments—including skills—in *precarious equilibrium* with the unfamiliar. Just as experts can *adapt* their skills to new game phenomena, our own forgetful ways of thinking must be *flexible*, able to accommodate the unfamiliar. This does not mean that we can never settle into certain habits and patterns of thought; that would be impossible. Familiarity and flexibility hold each other in tension, but the two are not contradictory. It is appropriate to form political parties, maintain philosophical commitments, or write poetry according to certain traditional forms and structures. It is *not* appropriate to cling to parties, commitments or structures if, in doing so, I find myself ignoring or downplaying evidence with which I do not agree. If our commitments do not remain open to revision or even abandonment, they cannot be normative, and they cannot claim to "listen" for truth. Truth cannot be truth without the

possibility of falsity.

But how, concretely, can we experience falsity? In a correspondence theory of truth, falsity is easily located in an incorrect proposition: if a dog is not brown in reality, the statement “the dog is brown” is false. In an existential theory of truth, however, falsity becomes some *way of being*, and thus is tough—maybe impossible—to pin down. For this very reason, Ernst Tugendhat charges Heidegger with “forfeiting” the meaning of falsity outright.¹¹ If the domain of truth is constrained to a finite “world,” without comparison to a transcendent “reality,” how can we ever know whether we are right or wrong? Without recourse to some transcendent sense of truth (such as the rules of logic, inherent formal natures, or divine revelation), “being wrong” seems impossible to explain.

We can dodge Tugendhat’s critique by interpreting falsity in terms of precarious equilibrium. This existential falsity occurs prior to the “incorrectness” type of falsity. I call the former type *being in the wrong* and the latter type *being wrong*. Suppose that I hear something go bump in the night and think a burglar is in my home. I get out of bed, check around the house, and discover that the sound came from a branch tapping on the window. My thought was *wrong* (there was no burglar), but I was not *in the wrong* to think it. Now suppose that, upon seeing the branch, I instead *refused* to change my mind. I continue searching around the house, insisting that a burglar is *somewhere*. In this case, my thought was *wrong*, and I was also *in the wrong* to think it. I refused to hold my interpretation (“there is a burglar in my house”) in precarious equilibrium with falsifying evidence (a branch making a similar sound). My inability to adapt to the new evidence reveals that I was committed to something other than truth; namely, a paranoid insistence on finding a burglar.

Being “in the right”—being *true*—is a meaningful responsiveness to

11 Tugendhat, Ernst. *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*. Second Edition. Berlin: de Gruyter (1970), 405.

everything, while being “in the wrong”—being *false*—is a meaningful responsiveness to only *some* things, at the exclusion of other evidence. When we say someone is “in the wrong,” we suggest that they are being dishonest with themselves, that they need to *own up* to something. Our everyday sense of the connection between “being in the wrong” and “not owning up” is no accident; it suggests a deep link between truth and authenticity. The only true world is the *whole* world, the world where *everything* is on the table, the *authentic* world.

In the *authentic* world, *everything*—even what we take for granted—is open to revision and adaptation in the face of new, unfamiliar phenomena. This is not an easy way to be, since it must allow for *everything* to be a stake. Heidegger calls this experience of letting everything be at stake *anxiety* (*Angst*). Our English word suggests a nervous, tightly-wound disposition, but these connotations do not capture Heidegger’s idea. Anxiety is closer to Kierkegaard’s “fear and trembling,” a resolute, determined acceptance of whatever may follow from our normative commitment.

This “whatever may follow” must include what Heidegger calls *death*. Again, death is a rather dramatic term that bears unhelpful connotations. Death does not here mean the biological end of a human life, but rather the end of our referential “world.” Death is the experience of nothing making sense, where nothing is as it once seemed. William Blattner uses the experience of major depression as a concrete experience of this “existential death.”¹² The severely depressed person does not know how to act, not because he lacks the requisite familiarity with things to carry out the mundane tasks of life, but rather because these familiar things no longer *seem* familiar. Things “lose their grasp” on him, and everything appears meaningless. To the depressed person, *absolutely nothing* seems familiar, and *everything* seems unfamiliar.

The depressed person experiences unfamiliarity differently than a poet or artist. The poet allows *something* to speak to her; she “listens to” some

12 Blattner, William. *Heidegger’s Being and Time*. London: Continuum (2006), 147.

particular experience. The depressed person has no choice but to allow *everything* to speak to him; he must “listen to” everything. Recall that, in “listening,” we pause and suspend our everyday “falling,” our taking things for granted. Only in existential death, then, can we radically “listen” to everything, taking nothing for granted. This extreme condition allows for the *most authentic*—the “ownmost”—choices, because no possibility is taken “off the table.” The only commitment to which we can answer is the normative commitment, the commitment to respond to the given as if it mattered.

The above portrait may seem quite bleak—rightly so. But luckily, we need not *actually* experience existential death (or major depression) to live authentically. Authentic living must merely allow for the *possibility* of death; death must be “on the table.” Ironically, the precondition for “being in the *right*”—being *true*—is an openness to the possibility of “being *wrong*.” The truest scientists are those willing to throw out their entire life’s work if their models fail. Death, the total rupture of familiarity, is what is ultimately at stake in the “precarious equilibrium.”

ARTICULATION “LETS THINGS MAKE SENSE”

So far, we have established the preconditions for truth in the domain of unfamiliarity: authentic listening in the face of existential death. But we have not yet established the “stuff” of articulated truth, the good poet’s ultimate product. Heidegger calls this articulated truth *formal indication*. Formal indication is a non-traditional manner of speaking that signals a “re-enacting of what ‘to be’ means.”¹³ It is articulation that gives us pause, speech that makes us *listen* to something rather than take it for granted.

Formal indication is opposed to *idle talk*, speech that takes things for granted and re-cycles preconceived interpretations of the world. Like “falling,” idle talk cannot be avoided entirely; we always speak out of

13 Daniel Dahlstrom, *Heidegger’s Concept of Truth* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001), 244.

a tradition from which we are disposed. Nor is idle talk meaningless or without value, for it can establish common points of reference between speakers. When meeting someone for the first time, it would be clumsy to delve into philosophical articulation with them without first exchanging introductions and pleasantries. The introductions and pleasantries establish a space of *common meanings*, carving out a “world we share,” in which deeper articulations can occur. This is why debate opponents often share a meal before stepping onto the floor together. Idle talk is *possible* within authentic life.

On the other hand, formal indication is *necessary* for authentic life. While idle talk establishes common meanings with others, formal indication re-establishes the truth of those meanings, their responsiveness to reality. Formal indication “tills the soil of reality” in which our world grows. It ensures that our experience of reality is *fertile*, able to bring the given into fuller articulation. Formal indication shelters and nurtures truth (a normative responsiveness to the given) by re-establishing contact with the given. If language is the “house of being,” formal indication is the “house of truth.”

Formal indication is borne in three “moments:” *understanding*, *retrieval* and *articulation*. Understanding is the moment of identifying what we “hear” in something, what makes sense about it. Even when faced with the unfamiliar, we can always point to *something* intelligible about it, a “loose sense” of it. We might not know *perfectly* what we are talking about (say, the beauty of a striking sunrise over the ocean), but we can still normatively respond to it. If I see a mysterious figure in the fog, I may not know what it is; but I can gesture to it, call it a “that” and hone in my gaze upon it. This is the first moment of formal articulation, which serves its “reference-constraining” function.¹⁴ It delimits *what it is* about which we are speaking.

Retrieval is the moment in which I pause and “listen” to something authentically. I suspend my pre-conceived notions about the thing and

14 Dahlstrom (2001), 244.

let it speak for itself. This is the moment where poetry is born, where the poet stops thinking of the sunrise as “a sunrise.” The experience is not yet articulated; we have not yet framed it in words like Homer’s “rosy-fingered dawn” or Shakespeare’s “sovereign eye.” This open experience is a dense *expression* of sheer givenness without intended meaning. Such experiences of retrieval are concretely possible; they are neither arbitrary nor mystical. Whenever we find something surprising or striking, whenever we are swept off our feet, we are experiencing the retrieval of raw, open expression. We are finding, discovering and beholding the world, not interpreting, deducing or grasping it. Retrieval is our “point of contact” with reality; it grounds us in something *given*.

Once we have understood something and retrieved it, we immediately move into *articulation*. This is the moment where we “find the words” for the given. If understanding is looking at “a sunset” and retrieval is beholding it authentically, articulation is the description of the *retrieved* experience, not my familiar concept of “a sunset.” Because of this, articulated descriptions are always fresh and immediate, akin to poetry. They are not mere definitions, which are usually stiff and functional. This distinction is evident when we compare an analytic articulation of a sunrise (“the time when the sun appears on the horizon”) to literary articulations (“the rosy-fingered dawn” or “the sovereign eye”).

Articulations are not truth, properly speaking. They are called “true” in a founded or derivative sense because they “let” us respond authentically to things. An articulation “clears a space” for truth. It stabilizes the raw, expressive experience of retrieval into something solid, communicable and public. The *given* becomes the λόγος, the articulated given. Heidegger interprets λόγος as “gathering” because the word collects an expression of manifold appearances into one container. As I behold the sunrise, I see a manifold of colors gleam and reflect over a prolonged stretch of time. But I “gather” this manifold into the word “sunrise” (or, if I am really paying attention, “the rosy fingered dawn”). By interpreting the given with a word, I have assimilated the unfamiliar, striking experience into my familiar world. By naming the sunrise “sunrise,” I “gather up”

its meaning, and thus uncover a normative response for dealing with it.

CONCLUSION

In this section, we began with a description of the unfamiliar world, the world of the poet. The poet makes sense of unfamiliar things by finding words for them. This requires that we “pause” and “listen” to things, suspending our pre-conceived notions of them so that they can “speak to us.” We interpreted this “listening” in terms of authenticity, a willingness to hold our forgetful conceptions in precarious equilibrium with the possibility of surprising new evidence. This requires that we “own up” to the normative commitment.

In the second half of the section, I argued that authentic being deserves the name of “truth” because it alone grounds the concrete experience of falsity. Only in the context of “existential truth” (being in the right) can we concretely experience falsity (being wrong, as in being incorrect). Propositional truth and falsity presuppose an authentic normative commitment to the given.

I concluded our analysis by breaking apart the structural moments of *formal indication*, the process of “finding words” for the unfamiliar. Through these three moments—understanding, retrieval and articulation—we move from a directed listening to a real, received expression of the given, finally to a stable “word” or λόγος in which the given is “gathered” into the familiar world. Through the λόγος, things are “allowed to make sense.”

This existential interpretation of language captures an essential link between the given, mysterious world and the apparent fact of predicative knowledge. It grounds predicative knowledge in the normative meaning of authentic life. But it also implies an immanent world, a world constrained to the domain of linguistic expressibility. In the final section, we will call into question Heidegger’s apparent assumption that *all* givens are “gathered” into something familiar.

BEING WITH THE UNFAMILIAR: TRUTH BEYOND THOUGHT

Why does love move people to do extraordinary things? Why do people quit jobs, change life-long habits, even die out of love for another person? What grounds the strange, powerful logic of love?

I think the answer lies in the Other.¹⁵ Other is our name for the *expressive* given, what is ever-new and never “figured out.” The Other is similar to the “unfamiliar” discussed in the last section: strange, striking, and surprising. But the Other is different than the unfamiliar in one key respect: it transcends articulation. Recall in the previous section that *expressed* (given) experience is “gathered” into a λόγος, an identifiable meaning for the manifold experience of, say, a sunrise. The raw sunrise experience is named “a sunrise,” and thus the experience can appear as familiar. But that name cannot capture the full potential of the experience—the phenomena can always surprise us and cause us to change our mind. There is something Other in every phenomenon, some manner of intelligibility that cannot be articulated.

This is a negative definition, and thus may seem vague and meaningless. Heidegger seems to think so, for his treatment of alterity (the technical term for Otherness) is always in terms of its potency towards meaning. To Heidegger, deep alterity—the profoundly irreducible Other—is a meaningless concept. But this cannot be the case, for Others mean a great deal to us. We *deal* with things, we *find* words for things, but we reserve *love* for Others.

In this section, I will attempt to explain love (in the strict sense of *agape* or charity) in terms of reverence for the Other. First, I argue that alterity has positive content, that it “shows up” in our lives and calls for a normative response. Second, I claim that reverence is the normative response to alterity, and that it constitutes the *relational* sense of truth. Third, I locate the originary phenomena of alterity in the expression of other persons,

15 I choose to capitalize “Other” to differentiate ontological otherness (non-finite beings, e.g. “be kind to Others”) from the everyday sort of otherness (a mere alternative, e.g. “the other book”).

which Emmanuel Levinas calls the *breach of totality*. Fourth, I move that this experience of alterity signifies an absolute Other, whose trace we behold in the alterity of the world. Finally, I argue that reverence for the absolute Other grounds the intelligibility of ethics and contemplative life. By unpacking these aspects of our relationship with Otherness, I claim that reverence is the *relational* sense of truth, which grounds the possibility of love.

LETTING OTHERS BE

In the previous section, I described our access to the world in terms of hearing and listening. To hear is to access things as familiar, to have them passively as ready-to-hand. This is the expert's access to the world: always ready to deal with anything that might happen.

Listening is the task of the poet. To listen is to access things as unfamiliar, to pause and pay attention to them. If done authentically—owning up to our normative commitment—this “listening” reverses our forgetful manner of thinking about things. Instead, it “lets things be.”

In “letting things be,” things are given as *expressive*, as “speaking” to us. This is concretely possible, albeit rare. Powerful experiences of beauty, boredom, love, and depression all have a way of pulling us “out of the world” and into a new, sometimes frightening perspective on things. In these extreme states, we take nothing for granted; nothing is as it once seemed. We “take our hands off the wheel” and experience things as beyond us, yet inbound or *expressive* towards us. This is why we call such experiences “striking,” “life-changing,” “other-worldly:” the experience shapes our way of thinking, not the other way around.

This expressive quality of things is called *alterity*, “Other-ness.” Alterity can only be encountered if we “let it be” through authentic listening. If we are absolutely sure of ourselves, we close off the possibility of listening to the Other. Stubborn friends are frustrating for this very reason; they are so “set in their ways” that they cannot be convinced of anything new. Even if they are given good reasons to consider an

issue differently, they refuse to budge. They are more committed to their way of thinking (a non-normative commitment) than to the truth of the matter (the normative commitment), so they close off the possibility of anything “Other.” Alterity cannot be given without the normative commitment.

Alterity can lead us to two possibilities: articulation or deeper alterity. In the previous section, we discussed the former case, in which we “find words” for the Other that “gather” it into a λόγος. We encounter this in experiences of beautiful, wonderful or terrible things: sunrises, striking works of art, experiences of fear. But we also encounter the latter possibility, in which no λόγος emerges that can “gather” the phenomenon. We experience this when we gaze into the eyes of someone we love, when we experience gratitude for a gift received, when we worship God. In each of these examples, no definite meaning of gaze, gratitude and worship is “contained” by their respective words. These words are *meaningless* unless we can experience what they signify. In contrast, I can describe a sunrise, a work of art, or an experience of fear in familiar terms; I can convey the “gist” of a sunrise even if you have never seen one. Λόγοι can define the possibilities of things, but not of Others. The Other can be referenced, but never articulated. The only thing definite about Others is that they are indefinite, that they always surprise us.

Alterity thus hovers in a strange tension: on the one hand, it is meaningless without an openness to experiencing it. On the other hand, its only λόγος is “that which is not defined.” How, then, can alterity be discussed in non-circular terms? Why should we “let Others be” rather than figure them out?

REVERENCE IS THE RELATIONAL SENSE OF TRUTH

The simple answer—to borrow from Emmanuel Levinas—is that *no reason* can be given for “letting Others be.” “Letting Others be” is a choice made entirely prior to thought. He writes: “The surpassing of phenomenal or inward existence does not consist of receiving the

recognition of the Other, but in offering him one's being."¹⁶ "Offering the Other one's being" is not a type of knowledge, but rather a commitment: the normative commitment. To "let the Other be" is to remain committed to it through authentic life, leaving all possibilities "on the table," including the possibility of existential death. Truth and openness to the Other are two sides of the same coin.

Of course, the Other is not identical to the true. Rather, the true is a manner of relating to the given according to the normative commitment. The given includes the *same* (what discloses a λόγος) and the *Other* (what does not disclose a λόγος). If authentic existence—"being in the right"—gives us a world with Others, then we can neither ignore them nor "figure them out." We must answer to them truthfully through some form of normative response, even though we cannot assimilate them into the familiar.

I argue (taking a cue from Levinas) that the truthful response to the Other is *reverence*. When we cannot figure something (or someone) out, we must maintain *reverence* for it. This is the only normative response to alterity, for any other response (dealing with it or articulating it) would do violence to the Other's essential indeterminacy. It *reduces* the Other to the merely same.

Note that this reductionism only applies to deep alterity, not to the "shallow alterity" of the poet. While the poet's authentic experience can never be exhausted, it can at least be fittingly *articulated* through formal indication. But the experience of deep alterity cannot even be *articulated*, let alone exhausted, without doing violence to what the Other is.

At the same time, there is no purely phenomenological distinction between the alterity of a "thing" and the alterity of an "Other." The poet's words fit the "thing" (the sunrise, for example) precisely because she first *retrieved* it in its Otherness. The sunrise had to strike her before she could write poetry about it. Thus, reverence for the Other is neither

16 Levinas, Emmanuel. *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, translated by Alphonso Lingis. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff (1979), 183.

purely positive nor purely negative, neither a presence nor an absence. As Walter Benjamin writes: “We penetrate the mystery only to the degree that we recognize it in the everyday world, by virtue of a dialectical optic that perceives the everyday as impenetrable, the impenetrable as everyday.”¹⁷ Reverence cannot be some content-free mysticism; rather, it is an openness to let the Other be, an interplay between the thing’s λόγος and its expressive, volcanic Otherness.

PERSONS: THE FACE OF THE OTHER

The term *person* is perhaps our most concrete attempt to name the Other. It is no accident that, in the pre-scientific world, “person” described a broad range of unfamiliar phenomena: emotions, cosmological patterns, human beings. As scientists began to model these phenomena, emotions and the cosmos dropped out of the “person” category and into the “familiar.” Human beings remained. Science has articulated many the great mysteries of the world, but the greatest—the person—remains forever beyond its reach.

How do we find persons, if we cannot articulate their essential features? Levinas’ answer—which I find convincing—is in the human face. More precisely, the person is found in the face’s *expression*. The facial is *always* expressing, always giving more of the person. The face stops expressing only when person leaves the face, that is, when they die. So long as the person is expressed through the face, the Other is signified there.

Because the face is always expressing, the only normative response to it is *reverence*. Recall that retrieved “expression” is only possible when we are “listening.” In the same way, the expression of the Other is only disclosed when we are “listening” to the Other, when we revere it. When the face’s expression is merely “heard” as something familiar, we are not responding normatively to the person. To “hear” but not “listen” to

17 Benjamin, Walter. “Surrealism: The Last Snapshot of the European Intelligentsia.” *Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings* 2.1, edited by Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eiland and Gary Smith. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (1999), 216.

the person is to treat them as a familiar thing, not as an Other.

The face of an Other points to something beyond the mere phenomena of a face. Just as a sign points to something beyond itself, the face of an Other—raw, immediate expression—points to the possibility of transcendence, of something standing completely beyond my horizons. The face manifests the transcendent Other, but it is not itself transcendent. To this point, Levinas writes: “The absolute exteriority of the exterior is not purely and simply lost as a result of its manifestation; it ‘absolves’ itself of the relation in which it presents itself.”¹⁸ The Other can show itself in the expression of a face, but the expression alone does not constitute the Other. The Other’s essence is absolutely covered, never disclosed but only signified.

Levinas calls the moment of discovering the possibility of a transcendent Other the *breach of totality*, the realization that I do not access all that is. The Other has something that I never access, something to itself. We articulate this separation through metaphors of “inner” and “outer:” “get *outside* of yourself,” “she’s lost *in* her head,” “he seems cold, but he is kind *inside*.” We implicitly understand the radical separation of “I” from “thou,” that “thou” transcends (literally “stands beyond”) me.

FORGETTING GOD

Reverence for the Other (through authentic life) is the beginning of knowledge; indeed, it is the condition of possibility for genuine knowing and for truth. But we can interpret the Other in two ways: as *actually transcendent* (“absolutely beyond me”) or only *ecstatic* (“on my horizons”). Heidegger’s fatal mistake is to choose the latter interpretation.

In his *Discourse on Thinking*, Heidegger asks (in the context of an imagined dialogue) whether the question of man’s essence points to man, or rather beyond man. The speakers agree that thought—the nature

18 Levinas (1979), 50.

of human questioning—points beyond us. The question then emerges: what is it that stands beyond us? Heidegger answers: “*die Gegnet*.” This is an old form of the German word for “region,” which blurs the noun with its gerund form, “regioning.” Literally, it means “The it-regions” or “that-which-regions.” It means something like “the Other” of which we have been speaking.

Heidegger describes our relation to that-which-regions as a passive “moving into nearness.”¹⁹ The transcendent Other, apparently so separate from us, appropriates us into itself. To Heidegger, the essential character of knowledge is that we “let” the Other make sense to us. By obeying it, by “playing by its rules,” Heidegger’s Other inevitably becomes the familiar same, even though we are not in control of the process.

Levinas sharply criticizes this position, for it obliterates the *separateness* of the “I” from the “thou.” Although Heidegger appreciates the givenness of the Other—its independence of us—he fails to recognize our relation to the Other *qua* Other. To Heidegger, reverence (which he interprets as the *call of conscience*) is a summons “back to our roots,” a return to origins that, prior to thought, remained hidden. To Levinas, reverence is a summons “to God,” not the *potential* disclosure of the way we are, but the *actual* Other with whom we have a relationship. Again, this relationship is not meaningless or free of positivity content. However, the intelligibility of the Other must remain in tension with its absolute transcendence, lest we forget its sheer expressive manifestation.

The transcendent Other must be *actually* distinct from ourselves. Otherwise, the face of the Other is reduced from a reverent relationship to a type of knowledge, a self-discovery. But this misses the mark; when we look into another’s face, the Other that we see does not express the origin of *myself*, but rather the trace of something I am *not*—namely, God. A person’s face *qua* face might indicate “a thing like me,” but their

19 Heidegger, Martin. “Conversation on a Country Path About Thinking.” *Discourse on Thinking: A Translation of Gelassenheit*, translated by Josh M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund. New York: Harper and Row (1966), 89.

face *qua* expression indicates only “Other,” “beyond me,” “God.” If our relation to God were a mere “movement into nearness,” God would cease to be the transcendent Other, and instead become a known being. Even if this being initiated the “movement,” our obedience to it would amount to “discovering who I am” rather than “realizing who I am *not*.”

Unlike Heidegger, Levinas interprets our relation to the transcendent Other as *prior* to truth and knowing. When we encounter an Other (through their expression), their alterity is given to us as utterly transcendent and therefore unable to be fully known. To know the transcendent Other, *qua* Other, is to be open to their unknowability as such. While this openness is something thought (I must intentionally “pause and listen”), the Other stands radically beyond thought. This openness is what we understand as *reverence*, the normative response to God, whose trace we behold in the face of the Other.

ETHICS AND THE CONTEMPLATIVE’S SILENCE

The contemplative—our paradigm of reverence for the Other—proves that normative responsiveness with the Other is a concrete possibility. The contemplative monk spends his entire existence in reverence to an Other he has never directly perceived. Nonetheless, he “lets the Other be,” listening for God and waiting in silence. The monk need not “find words for God” to have a meaningful life; he is content to let the Other remain Other without assimilating it into the familiar.

The contemplative’s life is *normative*; he is living truly and “in the right.” His life is neither an arbitrary decision, nor mere self-denial, nor a quest for aesthetic beauty. It smacks rather of *relationship*, of responding to the transcendent Other through endless hours of common activity. The activity is, of course, not some willed effort, but rather a “being-with,” carried out in a perpetual “listening” through reverent silence. This is an authentic life, perhaps the most authentic life imaginable. It is a complete existential death, a subjugation of familiarity to reverence for the Other. It is a self-annihilation for God.

Reverence responds to a given, but not to *something* given. The monk is silent because he experiences a lack, an absence. Accordingly, his normative response to the Other—reverence—could be called the *relational* sense of truth, truth beyond thought. If skill is how we respond to the familiar and articulation is how we respond to the unfamiliar-becoming-familiar, reverence is how we respond to the unfamiliar-remaining-unfamiliar.

Reverence—our normative response to Others—grounds the intelligibility of ethical norms. It is what immediately and obviously follows from beholding another's expression. When I look at another, I immediately realize that I cannot kill him, I cannot lie to him, I cannot steal from him. It is no accident that a guilty person cannot look people in the face. The mark of a crooked and irreverent person is their shamelessness; they will lie to someone's face. Such a person is not just failing to respond normatively; they are *owning* their failure as if it were truth. By lying to another's face, they violently assert that "I do not experience you as an Other." These basic phenomena of human ethical life all point back to the normative experience of reverence for Others.

CONCLUSION

In this section, we interpreted reverence for alterity as the *relational* sense of truth. Heidegger dangerously mis-interprets alterity by omitting the category of absolute transcendence. In doing so, he reduces the personal relationship to a kind of knowledge. This is a perilous move that wipes away the possibility of normative ethics, allowing for the possibility of shameless, irreverent treatment of Others, as well as a total ignorance of God.

Levinas' criticisms identify an alternate path that need not abandon Heidegger's conception of existential truth. His account of alterity, discovered in the expression of the face, offers a normative basis to the idea of transcendence. The possibility of transcendence helps us to understand the truth of the contemplative life, the life of relation with the Other. The normative commitment—the commitment to

meaningfully respond to the given—submits itself to a relationship of reverent love for the Other. In light of this shift, the true is no longer a mere responsiveness to the immanent world; it is a responsiveness to the transcendent, to God.

EPILOGUE: TOWARDS A TRUTH THAT LOVES

We began our analysis with a simple question: why does truth matter? Our answer is now clear: if truth does not matter, then nothing matters. If our lives—choices, surroundings, tasks, hobbies, joys, sufferings, relationships—matter to us, then our definition of truth should explain why. Heidegger’s existential account—that truth is a responsiveness to the world—rests on the fundamental insight that we are first and foremost *committed* to the world. We treat the given as if it matters. This is the *normative* commitment, the broadest and most essential commitment of human life.

In this essay, we have interpreted existential truth as experienced in three different “worlds:” that of the expert, the poet, and the contemplative. The expert’s world contains only the familiar. This is the ready-to-hand world of equipment, signs and paraphernalia, disclosed through circumspection. To respond normatively to this world is to have *skill*.

The poet’s world contains the unfamiliar, but an unfamiliar that comes into view as intelligible. It is an “ecstatic” unfamiliarity that lies just on the horizon of familiarity. To respond normatively to this world is to *articulate* it.

The contemplative’s world contains the unfamiliar, but an unfamiliar that points beyond itself to something unintelligible. It is an *absolute* unfamiliarity, not just something “on the horizon.” To respond normatively to this world is to have *reverence*. The three truths interact with each other elegantly. The contemplative’s reverence is a foil to the poet’s articulation, which carves out a meaningful space for the expert’s skill. But the contemplative world—the world of the Other—must not be forgotten due to a misguided assumption that truth is a type of *knowing*.

This assumption is Heidegger's fatal flaw.

A normative reading of Heidegger allows us to salvage his account from his own mistake. Truth is not a knowing, but a *responsiveness* according to the normative commitment. The normative commitment is what keeps us honest; it moves us to be open to what we do not know. The fact that we cannot know the absolutely Other does not mean we can have no truth about it. The truth of the absolute Other just takes on a different form: a not-knowing, a "hands-off" response, not a "ready-to-hand" or "present-at-hand" one.

If Heidegger succeeds in shifting "truth's center of gravity" from the logical statement to the meaningful world, Levinas' critique shifts it from the meaningful world to our relation with the transcendent Other. This Other stands radically *beyond* the world, and yet penetrates it. This shift directs the normative commitment past "dealing with things" (the expert) and "being open to things" (the poet) towards "being with God" (the contemplative).

The expert's world points to the poet's, and the poet's world points to the contemplative's. There is something Other—something divine—even in the expert's skill; but the expert's skill appears trivial before the face of the Other. Many parents experience this when they hold their child for the first time: what once seemed so important—career, hobbies, vacations—is now immediately, obviously subjected to this new reverence for their child. Skill and poetry bow down to reverence; love for the Other is the most fundamental truth of all.

Heidegger's account, while able to articulate the truth of the expert and the poet, cannot explain the truth of the contemplative. Heidegger cannot make sense of the monk of Chartreuse. The monk sees something Heidegger does not: he sees that one thing, one Other, *is never known*. This simple sense of the transcendent baptizes the meaning of truth in something other than knowledge, something beyond my ability to have, possess, and cultivate the world. It grounds truth rather in a sort of *death*: not the Heideggerian death of self-discovery, but the contemplative's death of self-sacrifice, of reverence for Other, of love for God.

REV. WALTER R. OXLEY, STD

HANS URS VON BALTHASAR
AND DIALOGICAL PHILOSOPHY

CONVERGENCE AND RECIPROCITY

The Swiss theologian Hans Urs Von Balthasar describes the dialogical principle that emerged in the early twentieth century, a time in which one of the strangest phenomena of acausal contemporaneity in the history of the intellect took place.¹ The four thinkers at this time whom he credits with this convergence, whom, at the same time, he regarded as both isolated from and very different from each other, were Ferdinand Ebner, Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber, and Gabriel Marcel.² This article will provide a brief analysis of the contribution of all four of these dialogical philosophers, and how they contributed to the work of theology. Firstly, however, a slight introduction to the theological methodology that welcomes such a convergence may be useful.

METHOD

It would be difficult to argue against the fact that the movement toward a more relational notion of the person in contemporary thought may indeed be regarded as a deeper convergence with Trinitarian reality.³ The encyclical *Fides et Ratio* epistemologically validates the two ways

1 Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Theo-Drama*, 626.

2 It is worth noting that Ebner, Rosenzweig, and Buber were all Jewish. Noting that the Holocaust was the most tragic event of the 20th century and that its damaging effects produced cultural wounds that will take generations to heal, to hear from the Jewish perspective regarding relationality is perhaps the greatest philosophical font of this epoch.

3 *FR* § 13.

of coming to know God: first, through a faith that seeks to understand more, and second, through an understanding that leads to faith.⁴ While the method of Balthasar is more defined by the former, there is certainly a deep appreciation of the latter as well.⁵ Furthermore, one could argue that it is important that the encyclical places faith as a way of knowing first, because this places revelation as essentially the font of all knowledge, certainly its rightful place. However, for others the journey is a search for truth through nature so as to arrive at the ultimate truth.⁶

The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in *Donum Veritatis* describes the work of a theologian as responding to a dynamism that is found within the faith itself. If interpersonal communion is the highest form of rational response to the isolation that the human person often finds himself or herself within today, then the theologian is tasked with connecting the Trinitarian truth of Revelation with this reasoning by a way of a response to a question that is being asked. *Donum Veritatis* states, "Truth, by its nature, seeks to be communicated since man was created for the perception of truth and from the depths of his being desires knowledge of it so that he can discover himself in the truth and find there his salvation."⁷

Fides et Ratio grasps this reciprocity between Revelation and reason well when it states:

To assist reason in its effort to understand the mystery there are the signs which Revelation itself presents. These serve to lead the search for truth to new depths, enabling the mind in its autonomous exploration to penetrate within the mystery by use of reason's own methods, of which it is rightly jealous. Yet these signs also urge reason to look beyond their status as signs in order to grasp the deeper meaning which they bear. They contain a hidden truth to which the mind is drawn and which it cannot ignore without destroying the

4 FR § 16-35.

5 Larry Chapp, *The Theological Method of Hans Urs von Balthasar*.

6 FR § 27.

7 DV § 7.

very signs which it is given.⁸

One can certainly find the complementarity between the transcendental value of interpersonal communion, and the ultimate reality of the interpersonal communion of the Triune God.⁹

LANGUAGE

During the tragic events of the First World War, the German Jewish philosopher Ferdinand Ebner sought to break free from the tragedy of German idealism by an exploration of the phenomenon of language.¹⁰ The late professor and Dean of the Pontifical Gregorian University John O'Donnell S.J., a scholar of Balthasar, offered some helpful observations on the contribution of Ebner's philosophy. O'Donnell attributes Ebner with the recognition that the whole of the modern philosophical tradition represents the philosophy of the *ego* locked in upon itself.¹¹ O'Donnell observed that the Jewish philosopher approached language in a manner that regarded it as both a gift and a mystery.¹²

As human beings, we have a need to communicate and express ourselves to others. Each human person is complex. Ebner understood well the uniqueness and complexity of the human person, as Balthasar credits him with the discovery that the human person is an "absolute unique instance."¹³ One understands this quickly when one desires to communicate an idea: the idea is not understood (or not received) and then the certain negative experience of frustration and emptiness immediately follows. When we are understood, such as when an idea that we desire to communicate is received, there is the certainly positive experience of being understood, welcomed, and accepted. This dynamic

8 FR § 13.

9 John Zizioulas, *Being as Communion*.

10 John O'Donnell, *Trinity as Divine Community*.

11 John O'Donnell, *Icheinsamkeit*, 11.

12 John O'Donnell, *Icheinsamkeit*, 12.

13 Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Theo-Drama*, 645.

is a significant existential reality that determines a significant part of the daily contentment of the modern and emotionally healthy adult.

Language, therefore, is the gift that enables one to express themselves to others. Language in itself, as it requires both a giver and a receiver, as well as comprehension, illustrates clearly, from a phenomenal perspective, that as an I, I am in need of the other. Essentially, O'Donnell observed in his observations on Ebner, that I have need of the other in order to fully be myself. For if I did not have the gift of language, it would be much more difficult for me to be understood and received. Furthermore, the language that we use is neither created in the natural order, nor in an evolutionary manner by humanity itself, but it comes from outside of humanity, it is therefore transcendental.¹⁴ Ultimately, Ebner sees correspondence between the use of the human word and the divine Word.¹⁵

It is therefore only humans who, addressed by the eternal Thou, are able to enter into the depth of communication that they desire with other human beings. While Ebner was purely a philosopher, in his project, we see, with Balthasar's help, that theology is needed in order to carry the seeds of truth within the project of dialogical philosophy. While recognizing the need for theology to complete the thought of Ebner, one also sees the need for theology to shed light on the natural phenomenon of language.

THE PERSONAL NAME

When someone uses our personal name in addressing us, it is met with an experience of being affirmed, through particular language, providing the other with a sense of acceptance. The Jewish philosopher, Franz Rosenzweig, in his *The Star of Redemption*, gives a philosophical value to the personal name. Particularly, Rosenzweig's description between the *I* and the *Thou*, between Adam and God in the Garden of Eden,

14 Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Theo-Drama*, 12.

15 Ferdinand Ebner, *Parola e Amore*, 58.

captures Balthasar's attention.¹⁶ When God asks Adam *Where are you?*, Adam first hides from the question, but then comes the vocative, or the summons, and Adam is thus denied any means of an escape route, because of the fact that there is a movement from the objective to the personal.¹⁷ Rosenzweig, in his *The Star of Redemption*, contributes an illustrative narrative regarding this dialogue between God and Adam in the Garden of Eden that illustrates the gift of the name:

The indefinite Thou was merely deictic: the woman, the serpent. Its place is taken by the vocative, the direct address, and man is cut off from every retreat into hypostatization. The general concept of man can take refuge behind the woman or the serpent. Instead of this the call goes out to what cannot flee, to the utterly particular, to the nonconceptual, to something that transcends the sphere of influence of both the definite and indefinite articles, a sphere which embraces all things if only as objects of a universal. To God's "Where are you?" The man has still kept silence and blocked the Self. Now, called by his name, twice, in a supreme definiteness that could not be heard, now he answers, all unlocked, all spread apart, all ready, all soul: Here I am.¹⁸

It is here that Balthasar credits Rosenzweig with emphasizing the philosophical value of the unique name, which is how the individual is principally known and addressed by God. In fact, Balthasar describes this name as the individual's perfect definition as assigned by God.¹⁹ The personal name, he states is, "not a name personally adopted by someone of his own volition, but the name which God himself created for him; it is only personal to him because it is created as such by the Creator."²⁰

One is able to see, therefore, the depth of the phenomenon of person in both Ebner and Rosenzweig. Most notably, perhaps, from these two we have a philosophy with tremendous theological import. Appreciating the divine origin of both language and name in order to know who

16 Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Theo-Drama*, 639.

17 Genesis 3: 9-11.

18 Franz Rosenzweig, *The Star of Redemption*, 175-176.

19 Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Theo-Drama*, 645.

20 Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Theo-Drama*, 639.

the human person truly *is* and *is called to be* in relationship to the Holy Trinity is of tremendous value for the theological enterprise.

THE I AND THE THOU

The Jewish philosopher Martin Buber, in his seminal work, *I and Thou*, captures the thrust of his philosophical contribution and synthesizes the central tenants of his dialogical philosophy.²¹ Implicit within the title is the *a priori* recognition of the *Thou*. Buber states that “Egos appear by setting themselves apart from other egos. Persons appear by entering into relation with other persons.”²² Balthasar adds that for the *I* to truly be a person, there must be a *Thou*.²³ Buber philosophically introduces the necessity of the other. Buber, therefore, laments the type of meeting that is impersonal, objective, and derivative, labelling it *Erfahrung*. Such an experience, O’Donnell states, would be Kantian, limiting experience to the one who experiences, without any regard for the *Thou*.²⁴ The type of meeting that Buber desires is personal, immediate and underivable, *Begrenzung*. Buber illustrates the difference between the two types of meetings in the following manner:

Once the sentence “I see the tree” has been pronounced in such a way that it no longer expresses a relation between a human “I” and a tree “You” but the perception of the tree-object by the human consciousness, it has erected the crucial barrier between subject and object; the basic word I-It, the word of separation, has been spoken.²⁵

Like Ebner, Buber perceives the eternal *Thou*. Although it is not developed in his philosophy, the seed is there for the divine to be fully included. Balthasar understands Buber’s *I* and *Thou* to represent a special place in the transition to a theology of dialogics. Balthasar describes it as progressively filled with theological light, although

21 Joseph Chapel, *Why Confess Our Sins Out Loud?* 19.

22 Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, 112.

23 Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Theo-Drama*, 628.

24 John O’Donnell, *Trinity as Divine Community*, 14.

25 Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, 74-75.

it never becomes clear, he states, what kind of theology it is, to what extent it implies a biblical faith or a belief in a universal humanity.²⁶ One finds in Buber a power, or a transcendental grace, that enables a true encounter to unfold. Thus, something transcendent and spiritual is operative.²⁷ Balthasar finds in Buber a sober grasp of the finitude of and inherent disappointment in every relationship between human beings, manifested in the presence of the Eternal *Thou*.²⁸ Both the Eternal *Thou* and the sense of mystery are found in Buber. For example, for Buber, the human *I* in relationship to the *Thou*, however beneficial the understanding may be for understanding human relationships, is not complete unless it is understood in relationship to the Eternal *Thou*. Silence is the ultimate goal of such an encounter. For he states that “only silence before the *Thou*—silence of all tongues, silent patience in the undivided word that precedes the formed and vocal responses—leaves the *Thou* free.”²⁹

THE EXISTENTIAL APPRECIATION

Neither the influence of the German Martin Heidegger, nor the Frenchman Jean-Paul Sartre can be underestimated when considering their impact on Western philosophy. The former gives an existentialist interpretation of phenomenology and the latter gives an atheistic interpretation of phenomenology. Heidegger understood well the phenomenon of the inter-subjectivity amongst persons that define a being unto death and Sartre takes an isolated position against otherness, as he understands the other to be his original sin. Heidegger therefore justly asks the question: how do I find meaning in my existence if my existence is marked in the end only by death? Sartre grappled with the problem of death more darkly than Heidegger by asking the question: how could I understand the other as other in this tragic circumstance of

26 Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Theo-Drama*, 632.

27 John O'Donnell, *The Trinity as Divine Community*, 15.

28 Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Theo-Drama*, 629.

29 Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, 75.

being condemned to death that we find ourselves within? The inevitable conclusion that Sartre reaches is that human freedom is relegated only to the act of choosing.

The Frenchman Gabriel Marcel is among the first Catholic theologians to adequately respond to these questions. Marcel understood that Sartre's thought is best understood as viewing the world simply from the terrace of a café, as being built around individualism, keeping the other always in isolation, and as an adversary.³⁰ In response to Sartre, whose thought he describes as "eidolocentric," he suggests the metaphysic of the gift, which is no less than the gift of presence.³¹ Marcel gives credit to both Ebner and Buber with this discovery, seeing a convergence in his own metaphysical reflections with their philosophy. This convergence occurs particularly in his personal reflections on his acceptance of the other not as an object, but as a subject.³² Marcel labels this kind of freedom that Sartre describes as *freedom-as-choice*—a fatal error, he says, because in it being is equivalent to doing, reduced to an organized unit of behaviors and compartments. Marcel is acutely aware of the deep trends within modernism, where the human person falls into a functionalist or materialist mentality, which is individualistic at its root, and with which the sense of the being of the person is lacking.³³ Marcel offers an understanding of freedom, in response to Sartre, simply as being or lack of being.³⁴

For Marcel, this metaphysical approach to being-as-gift has much to do with the human interior disposition that accepts the presence of the other. Marcel desires to speak metaphysically about this interior movement, which provides the foundation for his Catholic response to the question posed by existentialism. He states that when someone, some other, comes into our lives, an influx may occur that conveys an

30 Gabriel Marcel, *The Philosophy of Existentialism*, 59.

31 Gabriel Marcel, *The Philosophy of Existentialism*, 56.

32 Gabriel Marcel, *The Existential Background of Human Dignity*, 41.

33 Gabriel Marcel, *The Philosophy of Existentialism*, 9.

34 Gabriel Marcel, *The Philosophy of Existentialism*, 86.

interior accretion, an accretion from within, that comes into being as soon as presence is effective.³⁵ As persons dispose themselves for the influx, others are no longer regarded as objects, and so the soul can no longer think in terms of *cases*, as in its eyes there are no *cases* at all.³⁶ For Marcel, the most legitimate use of the soul's freedom is the knowledge that it does not belong to itself.³⁷ He considers that the ontology of the person, the freedom of the person, is so bound with the other that the acceptance of the other-as-gift leads to an actual accretion in being. Those, therefore, who do not accept their entire life as a gift are doomed to see themselves like the men of Heidegger and Sartre, as mere victims of a cosmic catastrophe flowing into an alien universe bound by nothing.³⁸ People actually become more of who they are called to be by giving themselves to the other. For persons to give themselves to the other, they must be able to receive the other, and for Sartre, *to receive* is incompatible with *being free*.³⁹

CONCLUSION

While our current period of time is certainly beyond the modern period of time in which Balthasar was engaging with the dialogical philosophy of the twentieth century, his work is no less relevant for today. While we have passed from a postmodern period into a post-Christian or post-truth period, the human person, when grappling with the questions of truth and existence, finds himself in no less of an isolated situation—or, perhaps because of the tyranny of technology and the rise of new forms of ideological tyranny, the human person finds himself in an even more isolated situation today than ever before. With the increasing rates of suicide, chemical dependency, and mass shootings in our American culture, there needs to be a clarion call in the

35 Gabriel Marcel, *The Philosophy of Existentialism*, 38.

36 Gabriel Marcel, *The Philosophy of Existentialism*, 85.

37 Gabriel Marcel, *The Philosophy of Existentialism*, 85.

38 Gabriel Marcel, *The Philosophy of Existentialism*, 102.

39 Gabriel Marcel, *The Philosophy of Existentialism*, 82.

theological world to respond to these cries of the human heart for love and communion by presenting anew *interpersonal communion*, in all of its philosophical splendor, as the highest form of a rational response to beauty, goodness and truth. Our call as theologians is to continue to hold these philosophical principles, which bear the presence of the Spirit and reflect the Trinitarian communion, upon a lampstand for all seekers of goodwill to see.

REV. RANDY DEJESUS SOTO, STD

JESUS CHRIST: WORD, PREACHER AND LORD

MODEL OF THE NEW EVANGELIZATION

PREAMBLE: WHAT IS NEW EVANGELIZATION?

A classical definition of evangelization is contained in perhaps the most important encyclical of Saint Paul VI, namely the encyclical on evangelization, *Evangelii Nuntiandi*:

Evangelizing means bringing the Good News of Jesus into every human situation and seeking to convert individuals and society by the divine power of the Gospel itself. At its essence are the proclamation of salvation in Jesus Christ and the response of a person in faith, which are both works of the Spirit of God. Evangelization must always be directly connected to the Lord Jesus Christ [...] There is no true evangelization if the name, the teaching, the life, the promises, the Kingdom and the mystery of Jesus of Nazareth, the Son of God are not proclaimed.¹

Thus, to evangelize is not only to proclaim (*tantum esse*) the mystery of the person of Jesus Christ, that is the nature of His being (*Persona*), but also the Good News which He revealed through His *dicta et facta*. And what better way can there be to do this? I firmly believe that the most effective way to evangelize is to imitate Jesus' very own pedagogy, to bring forth the Good News to the disciples and to the World. Consequently, I have decided to meditate on Jesus' Pedagogy in the *celeberrima atque notissima narratio* of the disciples on the way to Emmaus.

The XIII Ordinary General Assembly of the Synod of Bishops gathered in 2012 at the Vatican to discuss the nature of the *New Evangelization for the*

1 EN §§ 10-11.

Transmission of the Christian Faith. The Synod began with the mediation of a preparatory document called the *Instrumentum Laboris* (henceforth *IL*). In this document the encounter of Jesus with the disciples on the way to Emmaus is presented as the model of all evangelization in the Church.

In the last apparition recounted by St. Luke, the Risen Lord summarizes this understanding by saying: "These are the words which I spoke to you, that everything written about me in the law of Moses and the prophets and the psalms must be fulfilled" (Lk 24:44). His supreme gift to his disciples will indeed "open their minds to understand the Scriptures" (Lk 24:45). Considering the depth of the Jewish people's relation to the Scriptures, Jesus reveals himself to be the new evangelizer who brings newness and fullness to the Law, Prophets and Wisdom of Israel.²

Luke's account of the disciples on the way to Emmaus enables us to reflect further on this link between the hearing of the word and the breaking of the bread (cf. *Lk* 24:13-35). Jesus approached the disciples on the first day after the Sabbath, listened as they spoke of their dashed hopes, and, joining them on their journey, "interpreted to them in all the Scriptures the things concerning himself" (24:27). The two disciples began to look at the Scriptures in a new way in the company of this traveler who seemed so surprisingly familiar with their lives. What had taken place in those days no longer appeared to them as failure, but as fulfilment and a new beginning. And yet, apparently not even these words were enough for the two disciples. The Gospel of Luke relates that "their eyes were opened, and they recognized him" (24:31) only when Jesus took the bread, said the blessing, broke it, and gave it to them, whereas earlier "their eyes were kept from recognizing him" (24:16). The presence of Jesus, first with his words and then with the act of breaking bread, made it possible for the disciples to recognize him. Now they were able to appreciate in a new way all that they had previously experienced with him: "Did not our hearts burn within us while he talked to us on the road, while he opened to us the Scriptures?"

2 *IL* § 22.

(24:32).³

The Episcopal Conference of the United States Bishops published in 2012 a fundamental document called *Preaching the Mystery of Faith: The Sunday Homily*. This document is meant to give the ministers of the Word a better understanding of the nature of the homily in the celebration of the Seven Sacraments and, in particular, of the Most Holy Eucharist. It is most noticeable that this document proposes liturgical criteria based on the Emmaus Account.⁴

METHODOLOGY

Any exegetical work needs to be delineated by concrete and well-declared hermeneutical principles. Consequently, I have chosen to use for this article the *Lectio Divina* Method. I am perfectly aware that some of my colleagues would accept not the claim of method to the millenary practice of *Lectio Divina*. In fact, many scholars consider that the only scientific exegesis possible is that one which uses exclusively the Protestant German Method, the so-called Historical-Critical Method (HCM).⁵ I do acknowledge that the HCM is important and good for studying Sacred Scripture, but I equally realize that it is not the only method that can be used and certainly it is not the only method approved by the Catholic Church.⁶ In 1993, the Pontifical Biblical Commission issued *The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church*. The first part of this document gives an analysis of the current methods used in Biblical

3 VD § 54.

4 "As Fulfilled in Your Hearing turned for inspiration to the dramatic scene of Jesus' inaugural preaching in the Gospel of Luke, so too will we turn to Luke's Gospel for our reflection on the preaching ministry of Jesus, not only in the beginning of Jesus' ministry but in the beautiful account of the disciples on the way to Emmaus that leads the Gospel to its conclusion" Cfr., USCCB, *Preaching the Mystery of Faith: The Sunday Homily*, Washington, DC, 2003.

5 Diachronic Methods, EB §§ 1275-1290.

6 Synchronic Methods EB §§ 1291-1323.

Exegesis and gives orientations on how to use them.⁷ In the second, third and fourth parts, the document delves in on how to do exegesis from a Catholic perspective.⁸

More recently, Pope Benedict XVI gave us an outstanding document called *Verbum Domini*, which encompasses the propositions of the Synodal Fathers who participated in the Synod on the role of Sacred Scripture in the New Evangelization in 2008. In paragraphs 86 and 87, Pope Benedict presents a schema of *Lectio Divina*⁹ which is most appropriate for all members of the Church. I would like here to review his schema to begin this article.

1. It opens with the reading (*Lectio*) of a text, which leads to a desire to understand its true content: what does the biblical text say in itself? Without this, there is always a risk that the text will become a pretext for never moving beyond our own ideas.
2. Next comes meditation (*Meditatio*), which asks: what does the biblical text say to us? Here, each person, individually but also as a member of the community, must let himself or herself be moved and challenged.
3. Following this, comes prayer (*Oratio*), which asks the question: what do we say to the Lord in response to his word? Prayer, as petition, intercession, thanksgiving, and praise, is the primary way by which the word transforms us.
4. Next comes contemplation (*Contemplatio*), during which we take up, as a gift from God, his own way of seeing and judging reality, and ask ourselves

7 Methods and Approaches *EB* §§ 1275-1390; that is: A. Diachronic Methods *EB* §§ 1275-1290; B. Synchronic Methods *EB* §§ 1291-1323; C. Approaches Based on Tradition *EB* §§ 1324-1342; D. Approaches Based on Human sciences *EB* §§ 1343-1359; E. Contextual Approaches *EB* §§ 1360-1380; F. Fundamentalist Reading *EB* §§ 1381-1390.

8 *EB* §§ 1391-1560.

9 "Listening together to the word of God, engaging in biblical *Lectio Divina*, letting ourselves be struck by the inexhaustible freshness of God's word which never grows old, overcoming our deafness to those words that do not fit our own opinions or prejudices, listening and studying within the communion of the believers of every age: all these things represent a way of coming to unity in faith as a response to hearing the word of God." Cfr., *VD* § 46; "Lectio divina [...] is truly capable of opening up to the faithful the treasures of God's word, but also of bringing about an encounter with Christ, the living word of God." Cfr., *VD* § 87.

what conversion of mind, heart, and life is the Lord asking of us? In the Letter to the Romans, Saint Paul tells us: “Do not be conformed to this world, but be transformed by the renewal of your mind, that you may prove what is the will of God, what is good and acceptable and perfect” (Rom 12:2). Contemplation aims at creating within us a truly wise and discerning vision of reality, as God sees it, and at forming within us “the mind of Christ” (1Cor 2:16).

5. The process of *Lectio Divina* is not concluded until it arrives at action (*Actio*), which moves the believer to make his or her life a gift for others in charity. We find the supreme synthesis and fulfilment of this process in the Mother of God. For every member of the faithful Mary is the model of docile acceptance of God’s word, for she “kept all these things, pondering them in her heart” (Lk 2:19; cf. 2:51).¹⁰

Perhaps my colleagues do not agree with me in how I use a Traditional Canonical Approach to Scripture and they most likely would object to the validity of my elucubrations by judging them to be “too pious.” But I am convinced that Sacred Scripture is a collection of books *written by men of faith to people of faith about matters of faith*.¹¹ I have no problem whatsoever to declaring that, in conscience, I find no better way to present to our seminarians the fruits of my study, research, and contemplation of Scripture other than through the method of *Lectio Divina*.

Looking at the past, I believe that there is a different way of going about doing exegesis and theology in the Catholic Church. The last two priests who were Scripture Scholars, prominent Teachers, and Preachers, who have been canonized and declared Doctors of the Church, were SS. John of the Cross and John of Avila. Both stand in perfect continuity to the great Doctors¹² from of old who taught us how to go to Revelation to encounter the Lord Jesus Christ in order to reform our lives. Their

10 VD §§ 86-87.

11 *Celeberrima verba*, passed unto me by my friend and master Fr. James Swetnam, SJ.

12 St. Ambrose, St. Jerome, St. Augustine, St. Gregory the Great, St. Athanasius, St. Basil the Great, St. Gregory of Nazianzus, St. John Chrysostom, St. Ephraem, St. Hilary, St. Cyril of Jerusalem, St. Cyril of Alexandria, St. Leo the Great, St. Peter Chrysologus, St. Isidore of Seville, St. John Damascene, St. Bede, St. Peter Damian, St. Anselm, St. Bernard of Clairvaux, St. Anthony of Padua, St. Albert the Great, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Gregory of Narek.

method has always been one that brings the hearts and minds of the faithful to a deeper appreciation of God's Revelation, to the realm where *Fides et Ratio* under God's grace may finally lead us to see Jesus face to face.

Looking at the present and at the future, a theologian of the *Nouvelle Théologie*, Karl Rahner, when speaking about the future of theology, said:

[...] Under these circumstances it is also possible to foresee another type of theology, one in which the question of hermeneutics and epistemology of theology in general will be the foreground [...] There be a swing over to a theology of contemplation, proper to the "*quiet of the land*" (Ps 35:20), of initiation into a mystical experience, of a rightly understood "*aesthetic*."¹³

THE TEXT OF LK 24:13-35

That very day two of them were going to a village named Emmaus, about seven miles from Jerusalem, and talking with each other about all these things that had happened. While they were talking and discussing together, Jesus himself drew near and went with them. But their eyes were kept from recognizing him. And he said to them, "What is this conversation which you are holding with each other as you walk?" And they stood still, looking sad. Then one of them, named Cleopas, answered him, "Are you the only visitor to Jerusalem who does not know the things that have happened there in these days?" And he said to them, "What things?" And they said to him, "Concerning Jesus of Nazareth, who was a prophet mighty in deed and word before God and all the people, and how our chief priests and rulers delivered him up to be condemned to death and crucified him. But we had hoped that he was the one to redeem Israel. Yes, and besides all this, it is now the third day since this happened. Moreover, some women of our company amazed us. They were at the tomb early in the morning and did not find his body; and they came back saying that they had even seen a vision of angels, who said that he was alive. Some of those who were with us went to the tomb and found it just as the women had said; but him they did not see." And he said to them, "O foolish men, and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken! Was it not necessary that the Christ should suffer these things and enter into his glory?" And beginning with Moses and all the prophets, he interpreted to them in all the scriptures the things concerning himself. So, they drew near

13 Cfr., Karl Rahner, "Theology," in *Sacramentum Mundi*, VI, 245.

to the village to which they were going. He appeared to be going further, but they constrained him, saying, "Stay with us, for it is toward evening and the day is now far spent." So, he went in to stay with them. When he was at table with them, he took the bread and blessed, and broke it, and gave it to them. And their eyes were opened, and they recognized him; and he vanished out of their sight. They said to each other, "Did not our hearts burn within us while he talked to us on the road, while he opened to us the scriptures?" And they rose that same hour and returned to Jerusalem; and they found the eleven gathered together and those who were with them, who said, "The Lord has risen indeed, and has appeared to Simon!" Then they told what had happened on the road, and how he was known to them in the breaking of the bread.¹⁴

THE STRUCTURE OF LK 24:13-35

We read in *Dei Verbum* 19:

The sacred authors wrote the four Gospels, selecting some things from the many which had been handed on by word of mouth or in writing, reducing some of them to a synthesis, explaining some things in view of the situation of their churches and preserving the form of proclamation but always in such fashion that they told us the honest truth about Jesus.¹⁵

From this text, it is clear that in the mind of the Magisterium of the Church we should pay attention to the *intentio auctoris* when it comes to interpret a particular passage from the Gospels. There is no doubt that Saint Luke's command of the Greek Language is the best of the New Testament. St. Luke's literary skills are comparable with that of the author to the letter to the Hebrews and that of the great Greek Classics. Thus, the intention of the author is also bound to the expertise of a writer who is cultivated and very elegant in style.

Furthermore, Luke himself tells us that he wrote the Gospel to a dignitary called Theophilus, whom Luke addresses as "most excellent." Saint Luke wrote his Gospel to ensure that his intended reader, Theophilus may solidify, that is to come to understand better and to put into practice the catechesis he had received:

¹⁴ Lk 24:13-35.

¹⁵ DV § 19.

“it seemed good to me also, having followed all things closely for some time past, to write an orderly account for you, most excellent Theophilus, that you may know (ἵνα ἐπιγνῶς) the solid foundation (τὴν ἀσφάλειαν) concerning the catechesis (κατηχήθης) of which you have received.¹⁶

Consequently, it is not difficult to see as we study this passage, that its structure and its message are closely knit together to the point of making it almost impossible to tell them apart.

The structure Luke chose for the Emmaus account is that of a *paradigmatic chiasm* or “sandwich structure.”¹⁷ This type of construction is found in many passages of the Bible, both in Hebrew and in Greek. It reflects how Semitic people think, talk, and write: they begin with one idea (called A), they move to another idea (B) and then they come back to the first idea to reiterate what they had said before (ABA). This sequence does not limit itself to a verse; it may be extended to a pericope, a section, or an entire book in the Bible. The key to appreciate the purpose of such construction is to pay close attention to the central part of the construction, that is, the part, which is not repeated, and which is to be

16 Lk 1:3-4.

17 Lausberg § 723; Cfr., Breck, John, *The Shape of Biblical Language: Chiasmus in the Scriptures and Beyond*, Crestwood, New York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1994; Lund, Nils Wilhelm, *Chiasmus in the New Testament, a study in Formgeschichte*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1942; McCoy, Brad, “Chiasmus: An Important Structural Device Commonly Found in Biblical Literature,” in *CTS Journal*, 9 (2) Fall 2003: 18–34; Roland Meynet, *Rhetorical Analysis: An Introduction to Biblical Rhetoric*, JSOTSup (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998).

considered as the “gospel” or most important part of the passage.¹⁸

The following schema is my attempt to approach the text by paying attention to the intention of the author (thus, rhetoric), but because the Gospels were inspired by God and therefore they carry the weight of Divine Authorship, I am paying attention to what God is trying to teach us from His Word. The Central idea (highlighted as letter G) is a Divine Instruction that we must obsequiously hold fast: *The angelic message is that Jesus is Alive.*

This is not the first time in which Luke presents us a doctrinal statement as divinely revealed: at the beginning of the Gospel, twice the Angel Gabriel (to Zechariah in 1:11–20 and to Mary 1:26–38) announced that the *kairós* had arrived, and with it the eon of the Messiah became incepted. Saint Luke invites us to pay heed to what God is saying, lest we risk forfeiting our salvation. With this in mind, we present the schema of our structure.¹⁹

- A. Two disciples were walking ἀπὸ Ἱερουσαλήμ from Jerusalem to Emmaus (13)
- B. They were conversing among them αὐτοὶ ὠμίλουν πρὸς ἀλλήλους (14–15)
- C. οἱ δὲ ὀφθαλμοὶ μὴ ἐπιγινῶναι αὐτόν. But their eyes did not know him (16)
- D. Jesus’ deeds: “He asks them: what are you talking about?” Τίτες οἱ

18 “In the sense that the term is used in modern technical literature, chiasmus always involves a balanced multiunit inverted parallelism which leads to and then moves away from a distinct central component (which itself can be either in the form of a single unit [as in ABCB’A’] or in the form of two parallel subunits [as in ABCC’B’A’]. A restatement of the example used above—“Winners [A] never quit [B], and therefore, perseverance is an important key to success, [C] because quitters [B’] never win [A’]”—illustrates chiasmus in this full technical sense. Worded in this way, the statement clearly revolves around the axis of the central component [C]. The chiasm, thus, explicitly states what the previous example of inverted parallelism only implied. This is accomplished by means of the corresponding components of the inverted parallelism of the chiasm (A/A’ and B/B’) building to and then moving away from the central affirmation, “perseverance is an important key to success,” as the emphatically placed, pivotal [C] proposition of the chiasm.” Cfr., Brad McCoy, “Chiasmus,” in *CTS Journal* 9 (Fall 2003) 19-20.

19 With different emphasis and minor details, the structure given in this article is practically the same as the one adopted by other biblical scholars in their studies of the Emmaus account. Cfr., Xavier Léon-Dufour, *Resurrección de Jesús*, 228-229; Benoit-Boismard, *Synopse II*, 447; José Caba, *Resucitó Cristo, mi Esperanza*, 188.

λόγοι (17–18)

E. He asks “what things:” Ποῖα; They said he was crucified ἐσταύρωσαν αὐτόν. (19–21)

F. Women went to the sepulcher and saw angels ἀγγέλων ἑωρακέναι, (22–23a)

G. Who were saying: He is alive οἱ λέγουσιν αὐτόν ζῆν. (23a)

F’ Men went to the sepulcher and did not see him αὐτόν δὲ οὐκ εἶδον (24)

E’ Jesus interprets Scriptures διερμήνευσεν ταῖς γραφαῖς τὰ περὶ ἑαυτοῦ. (25–27)

D’ Jesus’ deeds: takes, blesses, breaks and gives λαβὼν, εὐλόγησεν, κλάσας ἐπεδίδου (28–30)

C’ Eyes opened, and they knew him οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ἐπέγνωσαν αὐτόν (31)

B’ They were saying to themselves καὶ εἶπαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους (32)

A’ Two disciples went εἰς Ἱερουσαλήμ to Jerusalem and told their experience (33–35).

LECTIO FOLLOWING CLOSELY THE CHIASTIC STRUCTURE

(A-A’) ON THE WAY TO EMMAUS

The expression πορευόμενοι εἰς κώμην ἀπὸ Ἱερουσαλήμ, ἧ ὄνομα Ἐμμαοῦς, “walking from Jerusalem to a town named Emmaus,” is very significative. It means that the Church is not a static institution but rather the People of God walking on pilgrimage through the paths of life towards that encounter with the Lord Jesus when he shall come again to bring us home to Heaven. In the Acts of the Apostles, *the Way* is the first name given to the Christian Communities.²⁰ To be walking *on the way* does not mean to run away from reality, but rather to contemplate that reality and to meditate peripatetically the things (πραγμάτων) that happen to us in our reality. The pace with which we are to be on the way depends on the nature of the events. The Christian experience has

20 “In the Acts of the Apostles, Christianity is first called simply “the way” (Acts 9:2; 18:25; 24:22). Indeed, Christians are conscious of having found the true way, now revealed for the first time (Heb 9:8). This way is no longer a law, but a person, Jesus (Jn 14:6). In Him occurs the Passover and exodus of the Christians; in Him one must walk (Col 2:6), following the way of love (Ef 5:2; 1Cor 12:31); since in Him Jew and Greek, alike have access to the Father in the Spirit (Eph 2:18).” Cfr., Xavier Léon-Dufour, *Dictionary of Biblical Theology*, 648.

been marked by the joy of the Gospel: Jesus is alive. This joy impulses the community to hasten the pace and to announce boldly our Christian kerygma. Consequently, any pastoral plan in the New Evangelization must be carried out with that ardor, tenacity and joy.

O blessed town of Emmaus,²¹ your name gives witness to the Miracle of the Eucharist. Your name means *warm springs*. O Blessed *Waters*, for in them, the two disciples refreshed themselves as they learned to contemplate God's Revelation pointing to the Messiah. O Sweet Jesus, Life-giving *Water*, teach us the meaning of Moses, The Prophets and the Writings. Guides us to draw *waters* from your Font and quench, once and for all, our thirst. Most Divine Shepherd, give us to drink of that *Water*, which is your Word,²² and guide with it our intellect to make an act of Faith in You; but also, guide our hearts to experience the *warmth* of your Love in the *lustral waters* of our Baptism²³ and in the deification process whichever occurs as we receive you in the Most Holy Eucharist.²⁴

Emmaus also recalls the triumph of the children of Israel in an epic battle against the Ptolemais in the First Book of Maccabees. In 1 Macc 4:1–3 we read: "Now Gorgias took five thousand infantry and one thousand picked cavalry, and this division moved out by night to fall upon the camp of the Jews and attack them suddenly. Men from the citadel were his guides. But Judas heard of it, and he and his warriors moved out to attack the king's force in Emmaus." In the battle Judas rallied his troops by evoking those wonders God performed in Egypt during the Exodus to free his people from bondage (1 Macc 4:8–9). Now,

21 Emmaus appears only in the NT at our passage of Lk 24:13; Ἐμμαούς in Greek, *Emmaous* in Latin; אַמְאוּס *Emmaus* in Hebrew and عمواس, *Imwas* in Arabic. The word Emmaus means "warm wells or hot springs," Cfr., K.W. Clark, "Emmaus" in *IDB*, II, 97-98.

22 "In the Midrashic Tradition the well represents the gift of Torah, the life-giving water of the Law, Divine Revelation and wisdom (Gn 21:22-31; 29:2)." Cfr. Elena Bosetti, *Yhwh: Shepherd of the People*, Middlegreen UK: St. Paul's, 1993, 29-30.

23 "By the mystery of this consecrated water lead those baptized to a new and spiritual birth." RCIA, # 222, E.

24 "Per huius aquæ et vini mystérium eius efficiámur divinitátis consórtes, qui humanitátis nostræ fieri dignátus est párticeps." Missale Romanum, Editio Tertia, § 24.

in an even more striking fashion, Judas prophesizes that Yhwh is the one saving his people: “Then all the Gentiles will know that there is one who redeems and saves Israel” (1 Macc 4:11). “Yhwh-saves” is precisely the meaning of our Lord’s name, the name the Angel revealed to Mary at the Incarnation: “Behold, you will conceive in your womb and bear a son, and you shall name him Jesus” (Lk 1:31).²⁵ In the outcome of the battle, Judas returns to Jerusalem praising God for having delivered Israel from its enemies: “on their return they sang hymns and praises to Heaven—‘For he is good, for his mercy endures forever’” (1 Macc 4:24).

O Marvelous Design of your Divine Will, for it pleases you to reveal yourself to the world and the Master Plan by which in the power of your Son’s Agape you have saved us. For if blessed was the promise, infinitely more blessed is the fulfillment of the promise!

Judas Maccabee, in fact, under your inspiration went into battle with three thousand poorly armed men (1 Macc 4:6) in order to restore the honor to your Most Holy Name and came out triumphantly singing your praises. O Divine Typology, Judas’s *Laudes* were just a mere shadow of the true *Sacrificium Laudis* offered by your Only Begotten Son, Our Lord, High-Priest and King (Heb 4:14-16; 5:7; 8:1ff). Once and for all, Jesus offered himself alone as the *Unblemished Lamb* (Heb 7:26) and as the *Scapegoat* (Heb 7:27; 9:12, 14, 25) to free us, to sanctify us and to enable us to give you latria-worship (Heb 9:14).

On the way to Emmaus, you met your brothers, and *on the way back from Emmaus*, your brothers came back full of joy, with you in their hearts. How can they forget, O Lord, whom they saw at the breaking of the bread and heard while explaining to them the Scriptures? How can they not but to sing your praises? For He who went into battle as the Lamb of God came back as the Great Shepherd leading our souls to your Heavenly Sanctuary. May you lead us thus, as Saint Paul pleads: “Now may the God of peace, who brought back from the dead our Lord Jesus,

25 The Hebrew word יְשׁוּעָה – Yēšūā‘ meaning Yhwh-Saves and its common alternative form יְהוֹשֻׁעַ -Yehošūā‘ or Joshua correspond to the Greek Ἰησοῦς and the Latin Iesus.

the great shepherd of the sheep, by the blood of the eternal covenant” (Heb 13:20).

With Saint Anselm, we pray that you may come to walk on the way with us, and teach us to believe in you:

O Lord, I am bowed down low, and cannot look up; raise me, that I may lift mine eyes on high [...] Rescue me, unburden me; ‘let not the pit shut her mouth upon me’ (Ps. lxxviii. 16). Be it mine to see Thy light from afar, even from the depth. Teach me to seek Thee; and when I seek, show Thyself; for I can neither seek Thee unless Thou teach me, nor find Thee unless Thou show Thyself to me. Let me seek Thee by desiring, and desire Thee in seeking; let me find Thee by loving and love Thee in finding.²⁶

(B-B’) THEY WERE CONVERSING TO EACH OTHER AND JESUS JOINS THEM

While on their way, Jesus appears to them and engages them in conversation. They do not recognize him for the physical appearance of the Christ has changed during the Paschal Mystery. It is worth noting that Cleopas,²⁷ Saint Joseph’s brother is unable to recognize the Risen Christ. Luke reveals to us the same data offered by the other Gospels and Paul when they say that the Resurrection is a historical and a real event. Christ is risen with a real body, somewhat distinct from our earthly dwelling, but a real one indeed.

Apart from this Christological confession, Luke is presenting Jesus as the model of all evangelizers. We cannot wait in the sacristy for the people to come. We must go out to encounter the people and to meet them where they are. The New Evangelization must use “THE WAY” as the *new Areopagus* and the new *modus operandi* of our preaching. We

26 San Anselm’s, *Book of Mediations and Prayers*, London: Burns & Gates, 1872, 124.

27 According to Saint Jerome, Cleopas is Joseph’s brother and the husband of Mary, the mother of James, Simon, Judas and Joseth. He says: “*The only conclusion is that the Mary who is described as the mother of James the less was the wife of Alphæus and sister of Mary the Lord’s mother, the one who is called by John the Evangelist “Mary of Clopas.”*” Cfr., Saint Jerome, *Sermon on the Perpetual Virginity of Blessed Mary*, 15-16 (Philip Schaff: NPNF2-06).

must meet the people where they are, at their level. And like Jesus, we must take the time to walk with them, to listen to them in their reality. Only then, having gained their trust can we engage in the process of Evangelization. And then, once the community has been evangelized, she cannot contain to herself the joy of the Gospel. She must go out (*missio ad gentes*) and go back to their own (*pastoral care*) day in and day out in order to joyfully announce the Good News of Jesus Christ (*New Evangelization*).²⁸

O Blessed Body of Christ, you appeared in a different form to the disciples on the Way to Emmaus. Your love for People made you present yourself to them, in order that their faith and ours may be confirmed. Every time we profess the Creed we say: *I believe in the Resurrection of the Body and Life Everlasting*.²⁹ You showed yourself in your Risen Flesh so that we may have hope in our own Resurrection through the gift of your Paschal Mystery. The resurrection of the Body is not a dream of an everlasting utopia, no, not at all. On the contrary, it is a manifestation of your Glory and Power, the realization of your Death and Resurrection, and for those who believe in you it has become the occasion of great joy. For indeed, you became Incarnate in order to redeem us in your Most Precious Blood,³⁰ because only with the most pure and innocent Blood (Heb 9:14), which you inherited from your Most Excellent Mother, you achieved the work of our redemption on the *Ara Crucis*. O Most Excellent Sacrifice, in which you redeemed our flesh from sin and death and gave

28 SRM § 34.

29 "*Credo in carnis resurrectionem, vitam æternam. Amen.*" *Missale Romanum*, Editio Tertia, § 19.

30 "*Si autem non salvetur haec (= caro terrena), videlicet nec Dominus sanguine suo (visibili) redemit nos [...] Sanguis enim non est nisi a venis et carnibus et a reliqua quae est secundum hominem substantia, quae vere factum Verbum Dei sanguine suo redemit nos. Quemadmodum et Apostolus ejus ait (Ef 1,7): "In quo habemus redemptionem per sanguinem ejus, remissionem peccatorum."* Irenæus, *Adv. Haer.* V, 2,2,21s 25s; Cfr., Antonio Orbe, "Adversarios Anónimos de la Salus Carnis (Irenæus, *Adv. Haer.* V, 2ss)" in *Gregorianum*. Vol. 60. No. 1 (1979), 9-53.

us the chance to join you in Heaven with our resurrected bodies.³¹

O Divine Homily, in which you came down to encounter your sheep to converse with us about the Master Plan of your Father in Heaven. O Most Perspicacious *Synkatabasis*, in which you pretended not to know what had happened on Good Friday in order to engage your disciples in loving conversation. And what irony is this? That while already been Glorified through the Mystery of the Resurrection, you decided, to humble yourself once again to come to meet us in our confusion and lack of understanding. And what irony again? That instead of correcting us not with punishments, you chose to correct us by lovingly conversing with us as you explained the meaning of Scriptures.³² Oh! Who could understand the profundity of your Love? For you did not meet us *on the way* to Emmaus with the *Sapientia Divina* but with a conspicuous display of *Docta Ignorantia*. O Divine *Kenotic* Action of True Agape Love by which you teach us the way of humility, grant us, O Lord, such humility and such thirst for souls in order to rescue all those who ignore or do not understand the designs of your love. Amen.

(C-C') *CHRIST IS THE ONLY LIGHT THAT CAN OPEN OUR HEARTS*

We read in the Gospel of John that the Logos is the Light, but that his people did not recognize him as the Light and that they chose the darkness instead:

In him was life, and the life was the light of men. The light shines in the darkness, and the darkness has not overcome it. There was a man sent from God, whose name was John. He came for testimony, to bear witness to the

31 "Now, God gives it a body as he has chosen, and to each kind of seed its own body;" "ὁ δὲ θεὸς δίδωσιν αὐτῷ σῶμα καθὼς ἠθέλησεν, καὶ ἐκάστῳ τῶν σπερμάτων ἴδιον σῶμα." 1Cor 15:38.

32 "Oh! wonderful way of fighting the Lord has adopted, says that Holy Prophecy! (Jdg 5:8). For it is no longer by a deluge, nor with fire from heaven, but with the sweet talk of peace and love He has conquered hearts; not by killing, but by dying, not by spilling blood, but by offering His own for all on the cross." Cfr., Saint John of Ávila, *Treatise on the Love of God*, ch.14, 31.

light, that all might believe through him. He was not the light but came to bear witness to the light. The true light that enlightens every man was coming into the world. He was in the world, and the world was made through him, yet the world knew him not. He came to his own home, and his own people received him not. But to all who received him, who believed in his name, he gave power to become children of God. (Jn 1:4-12)

The Word of God is Jesus Incarnate; He is the Light of the Nations, yet how many times we find ourselves living in the darkness of our own daily toils. He is there walking with us, but our eyes are not able to see him. Lk 24:16 uses a powerful construction: οἱ δὲ ὀφθαλμοὶ αὐτῶν ἐκρατοῦντο τοῦ μὴ ἐπιγῶναι αὐτόν *but their eyes were incapable (did not have the power) to recognize him completely*. Human reason can recognize and grasp the nature of God; we call that Natural Revelation. However, in order to have Faith in God, we need the illumination of God's Grace, so that we may come to know Him personally, so that the Lord may reveal to us who He really is. Luke teaches this fundamental truth by allocating in the chiasmic structure an antithetic parallelism, which consists of a play-on-words with the expressions: *C eyes were incapable to recognize him*; and, *C' their eyes were opened, and they recognize him*.

Following this schema, it is crucial that the New Evangelization makes it clear that, today more than ever, there must be a complimentary relationship between Faith and Reason. Our faith needs to be explained in terms that are reasonable for people to understand, but we must remind them that an honest believer is he who learns to rely on the grace of God to enter more fully into the mystery of faith. We can deduce from this passage that grace comes to us in various ways. Primarily, it comes through the reception of the sacraments, especially the Eucharist: *When he was at table with them, he took the bread and blessed, and broke it, and gave it to them. And their eyes were opened, and they recognized him; and he vanished out of their sight.*

There is also a great irony of this text: many disciples, like many Israelites, were longing for a Messiah to redeem them from Roman oppression, but then, when Christ the true Messiah had come, their longing became anguish for he did not redeem Israel from Rome. Many thought he had

failed them and were left with just the memory of his words and deeds. They could not recognize the magnitude of his sacrifice on Calvary. They did not understand that his mission was to die for us, in order to wipe out all our offenses and sins in his precious blood. Obviously, they did not understand the true nature of the mission of Christ. In the same manner, many Christians do not understand the role of the Church today (*Sacramentum Mundi*), they reject her mission and oppose her precepts and teachings.

O Divine Light, come and dispel the darkness from our eyes! Kindle in our hearts the fire of your Truth so may come to see you and be attracted by the beauty of your Word. I desire to be enlightened: by the intercession of Saint Henry Newman, be my light:

Jesus the Light of the Soul, *Mane nobiscum, Domine, quoniam advesperascit*. Stay with us, because it is towards evening. I Adore Thee, O my God, as the true and only Light! From Eternity to Eternity, before any creature was, when Thou wast alone, alone but not solitary, for Thou hast ever been Three in One, Thou wast the Infinite Light. There was none to see Thee but Thyself [...] I am utterly dark, as dark as hell, without Thee. [...] Thou comest and goest at Thy will. O my God, I cannot keep Thee! I can only beg of Thee to stay. "*Mane nobiscum, Domine, quoniam advesperascit*." Remain till morning, and then go not without giving me a blessing. Remain with me till death in this dark valley, when the darkness will end. Remain, O Light of my soul, *jam advesperascit!* The gloom, which is not Thine, falls over me. I am nothing. I have little command of myself. I cannot do what I would. I am disconsolate and sad. I want something, I know not what. It is Thou that I want, though I so little understand this. I say it and take it on faith; I partially understand it, but very poorly. Shine on me, O *Ignis semper ardens et nunquam deficiens!*—"O fire ever burning and never failing"—and I shall begin, through and in Thy Light, to see Light, and to recognize Thee truly, as the Source of Light. *Mane nobiscum*; stay, sweet Jesus, stay forever. In this decay of nature, give more grace. Stay with me, and then I shall begin to shine as Thou shinest: so, to shine as to be a light to others. [...] Teach me to show forth Thy praise, Thy truth, Thy will. Make me preach Thee without preaching—not by words, but by my example and by the catching force, the sympathetic influence, of what I do—by my visible resemblance to Thy saints, and the evident fulness of the love which my heart bears to Thee.³³

33 Saint John Henry Newman, "Jesus the Light of my Soul," in *Meditations and Devotions*, VII:3, 351-353.

(D-D') *DICTA IESU (WORDS) ET FACTA IESU (ACTIONS)*

In His goodness and wisdom God chose to reveal Himself and to make known to us the hidden purpose of His will (Eph. 1:9) by which through Christ, the Word made flesh, man might in the Holy Spirit have access to the Father and come to share in the divine nature (Eph. 2:18; 2 Peter 1:4). Through this revelation, therefore, the invisible God (Col. 1:15, 1 Tim. 1:17) out of the abundance of His love speaks to men as friends (see Ex. 33:11; John 15:14-15) and lives among them (Bar. 3:38), so that He may invite and take them into fellowship with Himself. This plan of revelation is realized by *deeds and words* having an inner unity: *the deeds* wrought by God in the history of salvation manifest and confirm the teaching and realities signified by *the words*, while *the words* proclaim *the deeds* and clarify the mystery contained in them. By this revelation then, the deepest truth about God and the salvation of man shines out for our sake in Christ, who is both the mediator and the fullness of all revelation.³⁴

1. *DICTA IESU ARE POWERFUL AND AUTHORITATIVE*

Sacred Scripture is unanimous in teaching us that the Word of God is authoritative and powerful. The fourth word of Genesis 1:1 is the particle (אֵת) 'et, which is never translated into English because in Hebrew, it is a particle marking that the following words are the direct object of a transitive verb. Despite this grammatical function, (אֵת) is a word that begins with *aleph* and ends with *taw*: the first and the last letters of the Hebrew alphabet. *Per viam* this oxymoron³⁵ it can be said that in the beginning God created the whole Alphabet, that is the words which are construed by the combinations and sounds of letters. In the New Testament, Saint John understood this biblical pun when he wrote the exordium of his Gospel: *In the Beginning was the Word and the Word was with God, and the Word was God* (Jn 1:1); or when in the Apocalypse he

34 DV § 2.

35 "Oxymoron is the yoking of two terms that are ordinarily contradictory [...] There is display in this figure, as in most metaphorical language, what Aristotle considered a special mark of genius: the ability to see similarities." Cfr., Corbett-Connors, *Classical Rhetoric*, 407; Lausberg § 807.

gives to Jesus Christ the title of *Alpha and Omega*.³⁶

O Most Excellent Pantocrator! at the mere uttering of you word, you have created *ex nihilo* everything there is in the Heavens and on earth. With *exousia* (authority) and *dynamis* (power) made every work of your Creation. (וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים) “and God said:” (יְהִי) “let there be” ten times and there they were (וַיְהִי).³⁷ The number ten speaks of your divine perfection.³⁸

O Divine Rhetoric! With which you teach us that your own way of creating is to pronounce an effective words containing in themselves the authority and power to bring out of nothing that which they signify.

O Magnanimous Pedagogy! On seven occasions, you contemplated your own creative works: (וַיִּרְאֵ אֱלֹהִים) “and God saw” and seven times it was reputed to be good (כִּי־טוֹב) and the last one is said to very good (וַהֲגִידָה־טוֹב מְאֹד).³⁹

O Holy Gematry, for the number seven speaks of your Divine Perfection! Indeed, everything happened in perfect timing according to your Divine Perfection; it all happen in a primeval Kairós of seven days which are named singularly (יּוֹם).⁴⁰ And the seventh day is mentioned three times (בַּיּוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי; אֶת־יּוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי).⁴¹ Seven plus three is ten denoting again the whole of Creation, made by the “authority” *exousía* and the *dynamis* “power” of your Word.

O *Gratia gratis data*, which springs forth from your loving *splágchna*! You made man and woman in your image and likeness (Gen 1:27). Blessed and Extolled be your Son, the Model and Artist of such beauty and perfection! He who is the refulgence of your Glory (Heb 1:3) left

36 “La formula ‘alfa e omega’ come espressione comprensiva di un tutto è attestata anche nella tardiva letteratura giudaica, dove l’espressione tradizionale ‘osservare la Torah da alef a taw’ (osia, א e ת, prima e ultima lettera dell’alfabeto ebraico), significa osservare tutta la Torah. Cfr., Alessandro Belano, *Apocalisse*, 62.

37 Gen 1: 3.7.9.11.15.24.30.

38 Gen 1:3.6.9.11.14.20.24.26.28.29.

39 Gen 1:4.10.12.18.21.25.31.

40 Gen 1:5.8.13.19.23.31; 2:2.

41 Gen 2: 2a.2b.3.

imprinted in our very flesh traces of your divinity.

O *Sacra Dignitas* you deem to bestow on your sons and daughters! We carry forever the imprint of your Being; and even though sin boasted of wanting to erase such dignity, your love was so great and so profound that in Christ that divine imprint was recreated in your adopted children.

O Mystical Presence! Your Lord Word has been manifested to us since the beginning of time and has always been with us. Your wisdom (Sir 1:1ss; 24:1) has been the architect of the whole Creation, and through it, you have made yourself present amid your People. On different occasions and in different ways you spoke to us through the prophets (Heb 1:1), and with powerful signs such as fire (Ex 13:21), the cloud (Ex 14:19), or thunder (Ps 29; 77). But because of your infinite Wisdom, in these last times You are pleased to speak to us through your Son, Jesus Christ our Lord (Heb 1:2).

O Holy Economy of Salvation! O *Panis Angelicus, fit panis hominum!* O magnanimous exchange! By which you became one of us, in order to transform us in your true brethren! *Tantum ergo Sacramentum, veneremur cernui!* The Word made flesh, Jesus Christ Our Lord utters powerful and authoritative words in order to make the Bread to become his Body, and the Wine his precious Blood. The author of Creation is also the architect of the New Creation; that by his will the Bread is true food and the wine true drink. What a portentous sign! O *Sacra Transubstantiatio!* In which your Son transformed bread into his Body and wine into his Blood, and so he instituted the Eucharist, Sacrament and Sacrifice of the New Covenant. *Eternal Father, I offer you the Body, Blood, Soul, and Divinity of your beloved Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, as a propitiation of our sins and those of the whole world. Amen.*

2. *ICTA IESU ARE SPOKEN WITH MAIEUTICA*

The maieutic method is a pedagogical method based on the idea that the truth is latent in the mind of every human being due to innate reason but must be “given birth” by answering intelligently to proposed questions.

This method has been employed by the best teachers of all times: Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Ben Sirach, Cicero, Jesus, Paul, Augustine, Thomas, etc.

The unique distinction of Christian maieutic consists of the *mode* rather than the *form*.

Like Christ, we are called to engage in mission using the *agape mode*. Love is the *modus operandi* with which we are to relate to others. It is only with love that confidence builds up. Only love can attract the other to the beauty of the Gospel. When we study the Catechism, it is important to remember that Q&A is the way Jesus engaged the disciples on the way to Emmaus. Consequently, the style of the *Compendium of the Catechism of the Catholic Church* and the *YouCat* are excellent allies for the New Evangelization. Let our questions be simple and always made with love so that those being catechized feel welcome and attracted to learn more about their faith.

In the last fifty years, due to the influence of some modern pedagogies, many parishes have move away from the maieutic pedagogy, leaving the memory (*anamnesis*) out of the picture. In my view, the New Evangelization should rescue this Q&A method and should energize it with newer technologies such as Internet, audiovisuals, applied poetry, arts, etc. The maieutic method builds trust and personal relationship between Jesus and his disciples. Resulting from this relationship, Jesus becomes an authentic event of evangelization leading the audience to the reception of the sacraments: “so he went in to stay with them. When he was at table with them, he took the bread and blessed, and broke it, and gave it to them.” In our text, the sacrament is the Eucharist. Later, in a parallel passage, Luke insists on the same theme when Deacon Philip teaches the Scriptures to the Ethiopian Eunuch and the Eunuch asks to be baptized (Acts 8:29–40).

O Divine dialogue with Adam and his children! In which it pleased you to reveal to us your divine plan of Salvation and some aspects of

the essence of your Being.⁴² Blessed are you God Almighty and All Knowing! Since the beginning of time, you wished to initiate a dialogue with us using our own human language, in order to communicate to us your divine love.

O tidings of Divine Compassion and Wisdom! You loved us first so that we could respond to you with our human language of love. Then, in Paradise, you deemed Adam and Eve not just mere creatures, but your beloved friends. You created Adam and placed him in the Garden of Eden to be the steward of your Creation (Gen 2:15). In your profound and inscrutable wisdom, you commanded Adam to obey your decrees in order to live and not die (Gen 2:16–17).

But, behold the ever-cunning serpent tempted Adam and Eve to disobey your decrees, and so they ate of the forbidden fruit. Alas! What a tragedy! That we should suffer the loss of your friendship, O Lord! Ever since the fall, there entered into our world a force that made it impossible for us see you face to face. What an irony! Instead of listening to you we listened to the deceiving serpent saying: “You will not die. For God knows that when you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil.”⁴³ And, behold, we contemplated to our detriment that our eyes were indeed wide open, only to see our own nakedness, and not your Immense Glory: “Then the eyes of both were opened, and they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together and made themselves aprons. And they heard the sound of the Lord God walking in the garden in the cool of the day, and the man and his wife hid themselves from the presence of the Lord God among the trees of the garden.”⁴⁴

42 *“Placuit Deo in sua bonitate et sapientia Seipsum revelare et notum facere sacramentum voluntatis suae (cf. Eph 1,9), quo homines per Christum, Verbum carnem factum, in Spiritu Sancto accessum habent ad Patrem et divinae naturae consortes efficiuntur [...] Intima autem per hanc revelationem tam de Deo quam de hominis salute veritas nobis in Christo illucescit, qui mediator simul et plenitudo totius revelationis existit (2).”* Cfr., DV § 2.

43 Gen 3:4.

44 Gn 3:7-8.

But you, O Lord, are merciful and true to your heart, for you never abandoned us to our mercy and began in that very instant, a plan to bring us back to you in Christ Jesus.⁴⁵ What an immense joy we experience today as we contemplate the Emmaus Story!

O blessed *Hora Nona* in which the Creator walks once again with humanity (Gn 3:8 and Lk 24:29) "*Mane nobiscum, quoniam advesperascit.*" Today, like in the Garden of Eden you take a stroll to walk with the sons of Adam and Eve. In the Garden of Eden, you questioned us: "Where are you? Who told you that you were naked? Have you eaten of the tree of which I commanded you not to eat?" "What is this that you have done?"⁴⁶

Today you question us again: but this time, your questions are not condemnatory at all, but rather maieutic, that is, engaging and comforting: "What is this conversation which you are holding with each other as you walk? What things? Was it not necessary that the Christ should suffer these things and enter into his glory?"⁴⁷

Today unlike then, the serpent is not in the way for it has been destroyed forever by the energy of the Resurrection. Without its lies we can listen to your catechesis loud and clear, and we can experience the energy of your love *burning in our hearts* (Lk 24:32) compelling us to obey your divine will.

Today we do not have to hide ourselves from you, out of shame. On the contrary, you have walked with us on the journey to Emmaus. You

45 "*You formed man in your own image and entrusted the whole world to his care, so that in serving you alone, the Creator, he might have dominion over all creatures. And when through disobedience he had lost your friendship, you did not abandon him to the domain of death. For you came in mercy to the aid of all, so that those who seek might find you. Time and again you offered them covenants and through the prophets taught them to look forward to salvation. And you so loved the world, Father most holy, that in the fullness of time you sent your Only Begotten Son to be our Saviour.*" Cfr., "Eucharistic Prayer IV," *Roman Missal*, Editio Tertia, § 117.

46 Gn 3:10-13.

47 Lk 24:17.19.26.

have instructed us on the way, so now that the day is almost spent, we feel confident to invite you in to dine with us. And as you take the bread and bless, and break it, and give it to us, our eyes are opened again, but this time to recognize you⁴⁸ in your Sacramental Presence of the Most Holy Eucharist.

Finally, today we can truly contemplate the fruition of your promise of redemption in the garden of Eden (Gen 3:15) O Divine *Synkatábasis!* You planned all along that we would be fully restored through the mediation of Christ Jesus, Your Beloved Son.

(E-E') JESUS TEACHES "THE THINGS:" THERE IS AN INSEPARABLE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENT: CHRIST IS THE JUNCTURE

Soon after Jesus makes his maieutic questions and uses some rhetorical tactics, he begins to break open the Scriptures to the disciples. The content of the subject is none other than the (Logos) Word of God. Jesus, the Catechist, teaches them to read that everything contained in the Law and the Prophets points to Jesus: "And beginning with Moses and all the prophets, he interpreted to them in all the scriptures the things concerning himself." It is worth noting that the main verb of this sentence (διερμήνευσεν) which means "to interpret," is conjugated in the aorist tense, thus it is rendered as "interpreted." The force of the aorist tense in Greek means that Jesus did the action of interpreting at once. He needs not to explain it over and over; once is enough. He is the Interpreter of the Father and his is an authentic and authoritative interpretation.

O Divine Hermeneutics! With which you teach us to interpret Sacred Scripture: *Novum Testamentum in Vetere latet, Vetus in Novo patet.*⁴⁹ "These are my words that I spoke to you while I was still with you—that everything written about me in the Law of Moses, the Prophets, and the

48 Lk 24: 30-31.

49 Sancti Augustini, *Quaestiones in Heptateuchum* (CCSL 33) 2, 73; Cfr., DV § 16.

Psalms must (*dei*) be fulfilled."⁵⁰ We confess that you are the Word of God and that you alone can teach us how to interpret and understand the meaning of your divine message of Salvation. You have given us the merciful possibility of redemption and the start of a new life in You. Make us O Lord, to acknowledge that the root of sin lies in the refusal to pay heed to your word as interpreted Jesus, the *Verbum Dei*. But also, to accept the gratuitous gift of your forgiveness, in order to receive salvation.⁵¹

(F-F') FAITH ENTERS NOT THROUGH SIGHT BUT THROUGH LISTENING

In the Fourth Gospel, Saint John teaches that faith does not depend on the sense of sight, but rather on trusting in God's Word: Jesus said to him, "Have you believed because you have seen me? Blessed are those who have not seen and yet believe."⁵² We hear the same teaching in the Letter of Saint Paul to the Romans: "*faith* comes from hearing, and hearing through the word of Christ."⁵³ This utterance is of chief importance to all Catholics and non-Catholics as well, for it teaches that we must pay heed to the words of Jesus in order to acquire the gift of Faith within our hearts. "Now, faith, as a virtue, is a great boon of divine grace and goodness; nevertheless, the objects themselves to which faith is to be applied are scarcely known in any other way than through the hearing. How shall they believe Him of whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher? Faith then cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of Christ (Rm 10:14,17)."⁵⁴

Saint Luke teaches the same principle *per viam* of Christ's actions on the

50 Lk 24:44.

51 "We are thus offered the merciful possibility of redemption and the start of a new life in Christ. For this reason, it is important that the faithful be taught to acknowledge that the root of sin lies in the refusal to hear the word of the Lord, and to accept in Jesus, the Word of God, the forgiveness which opens us to salvation." VD § 26.

52 Jn 20:29.

53 Rom 10:17.

54 *Sapientiae Christianae* § 15.

way to Emmaus episode. The disciples explained to Jesus the events of the last three days: in concrete, that both women and disciples came up to the tomb early on the first day of the week, in order that they could see him, but they did not see him. The irony of this episode is that Cleopas and his companion were seeing and talking to the Risen Lord, but they were not able to recognize him; furthermore, the disciples were so fixed on their need to see Christ that they disregarded the message or divine revelation of the angels who testified that He is alive: "Moreover, some women of our company amazed us. They were at the tomb early in the morning and did not find his body; and they came back saying that they had even seen a vision of angels, who said that he was alive. Some of those who were with us went to the tomb and found it just as the women had said; but him they did not see."⁵⁵ Like the Jews then, most humans today tend to believe only after they have seen. The New Evangelization needs to re-catechize the faithful so that they learn to believe by listening to the Word of God. A new methodology is needed to teach them how to love Sacred Scripture in order create a culture of religious obedience to God's Word that would lead them into the real vision of God, which is none other than the Beatific Vision.

O Divine Whistle⁵⁶ with which you call us to listen to your Word and to receive your grace and virtues as amorous gales. Your Divine Whistle, as soon as it is perceived by our ears, it becomes a most sublime and sweet knowledge (*Fides*) of your Presence and your attributes. O Highest delight to possess substantial intelligence of your existence, O Lord!

In the manner of Prophet Elijah who came to know you in the delicate whisper of the air, which he heard on the mount at the mouth of the cave (1Kgs 19:12), we too, would like to come to know you not in the thunder or the hurricane, but in a delicate whistle whisper. That whisper is your Word, O Lord. Instruct us, Lord, and let us pay heed to your delicate

55 Lk 24: 22-24.

56 The imagery of this prayer is inspired in the 14-15 (A/B) Cantic of the "*Cántico Espiritual*" of Saint John of the Cross. Cfr. San Juan de la Cruz, *Obras Completas*, BAC: Madrid, 2009, 795-799.

whistle, by which you whisper in our ears the gift of Faith.

(G) *THE GOSPEL OF THE NEW EVANGELIZATION IS THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS*

The vortex chiasm is this statement which we have called letter G: (ἀγγέλων ἑωρακέναι, οἱ λέγουσιν αὐτὸν ζῆν) *saw angels, they were saying that he is alive* (Lk 24:23). As a Church, we have this principle and source of hope—Jesus Christ, who was Crucified and is now Risen, living among us through his Spirit, who allows us to experience God. Nevertheless, we oftentimes seem to be unable to make this hope concrete, or “make it our own,” or make it a life-giving word for ourselves and the people we encounter today, or make it the basis for life in the Church and our pastoral activity.⁵⁷ The New Evangelization means giving the reason for our faith, communicating the Logos of hope to a world which seeks salvation. People need hope so they can really live the present moment. For this reason, the Church is essentially missionary and offers a revelation of the face of God in Jesus Christ, who assumed a human face and loved us to the end. The words of eternal life, which have been given to us in our encountering Jesus Christ, are destined for everyone and each individual. Every person in our time, whether he is aware of it or not, needs to hear this proclamation.⁵⁸

Therefore, we can approach the New Evangelization with enthusiasm, and hope. We learn the delightful and comforting joy of evangelizing, even when it seems the proclamation of the Gospel might be a sowing in tears (cf. Ps. 126:6).⁵⁹

The Eucological texts of Easter Sunday and of the Octave of Easter (*Lex Orandi, Lex Credendi*) teach us that we must celebrate with *joy* Christ’s triumph over Sin and Death. Moreover, the *Sequentia Paschalis*, the so-

57 *IL* 166.

58 *IL* 167.

59 *IL* 168.

called *Victimae Paschali Laudes*⁶⁰ is a historical monument which makes evident the Faith of the Church in the Mystery of Redemption and the Joy of the Resurrection.

Forth to the Paschal Victim, / bring your sacrifice of praise; / The Lamb redeems the sheep; / and Christ, the sinless one, / has to the Father sinners reconciled. // Together, death and life / in a strange conflict strove; / the Prince of Life, / who died, now lives and reigns. / What thou saw, May, say, as thou went on the way. // I saw the tomb wherein / the living One had lain; / I saw his glory as he rose again; / Napkin and linen clothes, / and Angels twain. // Yea, Christ is risen, my hope, / and he will go before you into Galilee. // We know that Christ indeed has risen from the grave. / Hail, thou King of Victory, have mercy, Lord, and save. / Amen. / Hallelujah.

O Risen Christ! The Church contemplates you and gives thanks to the Father, for you have been faithful to his Sovereign Will. And now you bless us with the life-giving Light of the Resurrection:

O truly blessed night, worthy alone to know the time and hour when Christ rose from the underworld! This is the night of which it is written: The night shall be as bright as day, dazzling is the night for me, and full of gladness. The sanctifying power of this night dispels wickedness, washes faults away, restores innocence to the fallen, and joy to mourners, drives out hatred, fosters concord, and brings down the mighty [...] O truly blessed night, when things of heaven are wed to those of earth, and divine to the human!⁶¹

O Risen Christ! Kindle the warmth of our faith and hope, so that during we may grow in charity. We give you thanks for coming to our rescue, for meeting us on the way and for teaching us to interpret Scripture. You know us very well, you know that we are easy targets of despondency and of discouragement, and because of these, it is very hard for us to recognize you. Illumine our hearts and minds so that we may always discover you and grow closer to you in peace and love.

60 "*Victimae paschali laudes, immolent Christiani. // Agnus redemit oves: Christus innocens Patri reconciliavit peccatores. // Mors et vita duello conflixere mirando: Dux vitae mortuus, regnat vivus. // Dic nobis Maria, quid vidisti in via? // Sepulcrum Christi viventis, et gloriam vidi resurgentis: // Angelicos testes, sudarium, et vestes. // Surrexit Christus spes mea: praecedet suos in Galilaeam. // Scimus Christum surrexisse a mortuis vere: // Tu nobis, victor Rex, miserere! Amen.*" Cfr., *Liber Usualis*, Desclée: Romae 1962, 780.

61 Cfr., "Exultet," *Liber Usualis*, 776.

Jesus Christ: Word, Preacher and Lord

Mane semper nobiscum Domine! Because we confess you to be alive and walking with us on our way to the Emmaus of Heaven, manifest to us your Divine Presence in the Most Holy Eucharist. How Wondrous is your Name! How Powerful are your designs! What a blessing that you come to walk with us in the shores of our daily life! Our hearts rejoice and exult in songs of joy! We are not alone for you are always the Emmanuel in our midst! The joy we experience compel us to go into the World to proclaim that you are our Lord, and God. The Living and True God of our Redemption. In you we Trust! And for this reason, we ask you to strengthen our Faith, Hope, and Love.

REV. ADAM Y. PARK

HOMILY FOR THE MASS

ON THE MEMORIAL OF

THE PASSION OF ST. JOHN THE BAPTIST

If you have not noticed already, there are a lot of inscriptions throughout the seminary building. In his chapel tour, Fr. Hurley explained some of the inscriptions pertaining to our main chapel. All these inscriptions are very poignant and relevant, but the one I like the most is actually the newest inscription on the seminary building. On the new tower at the highest point of the building, there is the inscription: “*Resonare Christum Corde Romano*”—Echo Christ with a Roman heart. Echoing, resounding, filling an entire place with Christ is a responsibility that every baptized person has, but in a particular way this inscription reminds all of us why we are here. I live in Rome, and for the next four to five years this place is my home. Why? So that my heart will be formed in the heart of the Church to better serve the people of God.

The Church honors John the Baptist today, especially by praising him for the witness of his love for the Lamb of God. John the Baptist shows us what it means to echo Christ with a Roman heart. We can even say from the moment of his conception that was what he had: leaping for joy in Elizabeth’s womb at the presence of Jesus, always pointing the way to him. It was all about Christ, and never about John himself.

Like John the Baptist, a Roman heart loves God above all else and keeps sacred the relationship he has with the Church. Rome is the heart of the Church, and it is here that we can fall deeper in love with Christ’s

Church. When we can hear words from the successor of St. Peter, like we did this past Sunday at the *Angelus* urging us to fidelity to Christ and to his Church, that our vocation must be built on these pillars, that is an experience of our heart being formed.

John the Baptist never failed to point the way to Jesus Christ. “He must increase, I must decrease.” People-pleasing or worry about how he came across to others were not his preoccupations. He wanted to proclaim the Truth, never to water it down, compromise his work, or forget what he was all about. Even in the face of death, he shows his fidelity and love.

A Roman heart is formed by that kind of witness, John the Baptist and the countless saints we encounter in this city, a Roman heart that is formed by these heroic witnesses.

In these initial weeks of your time at the seminary and in Rome, all of you have already allowed your heart to be formed in this way. Allowing the Spirit to stir your heart with such excitement, gratitude, and amazement during this transition: Mass by the tomb of St. Peter, making a visit to St. Monica on her feast day, for those who spent a month in Assisi to pray at the tomb of St. Francis and St. Clare, or St. Catherine of Siena for those who studied in Siena. To experience the Church in a very real way that will form our hearts.

But it is also being attentive to those other movements that can enter our heart during this time of transition: you are intimidated, having feelings of insecurity, or feeling incapable because everyone else seems to have it all put together. It is easy in times of transition for the devil to influence our hearts, and it is especially in those moments that we should be encouraged by the words of John the Baptist.

1. He must increase, I must decrease. It is not about me, or needing to put on a good show, or have to be perfect in every possible way. I am here because of Jesus Christ who called me, and to give praise to him, not me.
2. I am not the Christ. When asked who he was by the Jews, John the Baptist responded, “I am not the Christ.” When it seems like

Homily for the Mass of the Passion of St. John the Baptist

so many today in society think they are the Christ, the savior, the one in control and no one else can tell me what is right or wrong, it is an easy temptation to want the same thing. But we are not the Christ. Like the Baptist, all we are called to do is prepare the way to Jesus.

3. Behold the Lamb of God who takes away the sins of the world. Words that we hear every day at Mass that remind us the extent of God's love for us, that as unworthy and undeserving as all of us are, he calls us to Himself.

Starting out your time here at the North American College, keep in mind these words of John the Baptist, and always cooperating with the Spirit and everything that is offered here at the seminary and Rome, allow yourself to be formed so that you will know how to echo Christ with a Roman heart.

FR. JOSEPH LARACY

LOGOS, CREATION AND SCIENCE:

INSIGHTS FROM BENEDICT XVI

Joseph Ratzinger–Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI is well known for his Christocentric theology. In particular, his emphasis on the primacy of the *Logos* Himself, the source of all rationality, meaning, and purpose in the universe, is particularly evident. Benedict’s writings, especially on the theology of creation, offer a Biblically-rooted, metaphysical cosmology completely compatible with our contemporary understanding of cosmic origins from the point of view of physical cosmology. His call in the Regensburg Lecture for scientists to accept the full breadth of human reason, greatly facilitates a harmonious relationship between Christian faith and modern science.

HARMONIOUS OR INCOMPATIBLE?

In his 1986 book, *Chesterton, A Seer of Science*,¹ the Hungarian-American priest and physics professor, Stanley Jaki, OSB, explored the contributions of the well-known British author in the philosophy of science. While not trained formally as a scientist, Chesterton’s penetrating analysis of the problems associated with modern scientism represents a real contribution to the dialogue of science and theology. Regrettably, the presumed conflict between the principles and methods of the empirical sciences and the doctrines of the Christian faith—the doctrine of creation in particular—remains a persistent evangelical problem. Perhaps another “seer of science” has emerged in the person

1 Stanley L. Jaki, *Chesterton, a Seer of Science* (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1986).

of our Pope Emeritus, Benedict XVI.

Before explicating the particular contributions of Benedict to the theology-science dialogue, it is helpful to summarize the fundamentals of physical cosmology to which some materialists who claim the mantle of science make appeal. Given its scope, contemporary physical cosmology is an ideal discipline to consider in relation to the theology of creation. The leading physical theory and associated cosmological model originated in the early twentieth century with the Belgian priest-scientist, Georges Lemaître (1894–1966). Lemaître, an accomplished mathematical physicist, challenged the prevailing view of his colleagues, including Albert Einstein, who promoted a static, eternal model of the universe. Lemaître's model was novel in that it described a dynamic universe with a beginning. Lemaître explains the basis for his theory in this way:

We must have a fireworks theory of evolution. The fireworks are over and just the smoke is left. Cosmology must try to picture the splendor of the fireworks. If the Earth were a hundred billion years old, or if the universe were that old, all the nebulae would be out of range of our telescopes and all the radium would be exhausted. ... The universe is a great number of energy packets that continuously divided themselves. Go back to it all and energy must have existed in one packet. ... We know that the volume of space is increasing. We know a type of evolution that gives a zero radius. ... But we must go even beyond that. That takes us to inter-nebular space, where we should expect to find the story of the primeval fireworks that preceded the formation of the expanding universe. In that library of inter-nebular space, we find the story, the characters of which are the writings of cosmic rays. ... Cosmic rays are the birth cries of the universe still lingering with us.²

In a Big Bang cosmology, as time moves forward, the universe expands, temperature drops, density decreases, asymmetry increases, and

2 Hubert Vecchierello, *Einstein and Relativity; Lemaitre and the Expanding Universe* (Paterson: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1934), 19-22.

stability increases. The Friedmann-Lemaître³ non-linear, first order, ordinary differential equation⁴ for cosmic expansion is:

$$\dot{R}^2 = \frac{C}{R} + \frac{1}{3}\Lambda R^2 - k$$

R is the scale factor for cosmic expansion which is proportional to the radius of the universe when that radius has meaning; $C > 0$ and proportional to the average present-day density of non-relativistic matter in the universe; cosmological constant, $-\infty < \Lambda < \infty$, which serves to create a cosmic repulsion that keeps galaxies from being drawn together by gravity when it is positive and adds to the attractive force of gravity when it is negative; and spatial curvature, $k = -1, 0, +1$. Lemaître solved the equation for $k = +1$ and $\Lambda > \Lambda_c$ to describe a big bang model. The significance of these assumptions is that Λ is greater than the critical value of the cosmological constant, Λ_c , so the universe expands forever. Also, $k = +1$ implies a spherical geometry and a closed, finite universe ($k = 0$ is a flat, unbounded, and infinite universe while $k = -1$ is a saddle shaped, open, unbounded, and infinite universe). Modern observation indicates that the curvature is very near zero. However, the intrinsically inaccurate nature of measurement means that we may never know if the universe is actually flat, spherical, or saddle shaped.⁵

Our present knowledge of physical cosmology is the fruit of

3 The classical solution of Einstein's field equations that describes a homogeneous and isotropic universe is called the Friedmann-Lemaître-Robertson-Walker metric, or FLRW. Georges Lemaître, Howard P. Robertson and Arthur Geoffrey Walker, who worked on the problem in 1920s and 30s independently of the Soviet scientist, Alexander Friedmann.

4 The Friedmann-Lemaître can be solved, in general, with elliptic functions or particular solutions can be found with numerical analysis. Certain subcases (for particular values of the parameters) can be solved with elementary functions. For details, see Peter T. Landsberg and David A. Evans, *Mathematical Cosmology: An Introduction* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1979).

5 Ray D'Inverno, *Introducing Einstein's Relativity* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 331-41.

observational data, our knowledge of the laws of physics, and the application of mathematical techniques such as Einstein's field equations and simulation modeling. A key assumption is that the current laws of physics were valid at the earliest moments of the universe, notwithstanding the fact that our present models cannot probe deeper than before 10^{-43} seconds—the Planck epoch. During the Planck epoch, it is very likely that the quantum effects of gravity were substantial and because there is no unified theory of quantum gravity, the physics of the Planck epoch are uncertain. Inquiry into distances shorter than one Planck length, the distance light travels in one Planck time, 1.616×10^{-35} meters, is similarly uncertain.⁶

Shortly after Lemaître's groundbreaking 1927 paper was published, observational data emerged that strongly confirmed his primeval atom hypothesis. The American astronomer, Edwin Hubble (1889–1953), observed the recession of galaxies and noted that cosmic expansion was well governed by the laws of general relativity. Hubble's continued research of extra-galactic evolution led him to realize that galaxies were moving away from the Earth at velocities directly proportional to their distance, a fact now known as the Hubble-Lemaître Law.⁷ All of these observations were consistent with Lemaître's hypothesis.

It should be noted that in the 1920s, Albert Einstein's model of the universe included a cosmological constant which permitted a static, finite universe, closed but not bounded. The Dutch mathematician Willem de Sitter (1872–1934) developed a mathematically interesting model that involved expansion, but did not match Hubble's observations. It was also physically impossible because it implied that the universe had zero

6 Edward W. Kolb and Michael S. Turner, *The Early Universe* (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 447.

7 "International Astronomical Union," Press Release, *IAU Members Vote to Recommend Renaming the Hubble Law as the Hubble-Lemaître Law*, last modified October 29, 2019, accessed May 13, 2019, <https://www.iau.org/news/pressreleases/detail/iau1812/>. Hubble's famous paper is Edwin Hubble, "A Relation between Distance and Radial Velocity among Extra-Galactic Nebulae," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 15 (1929): 168-73.

density for matter everywhere. Independently of Monsignor Georges Lemaître, the Soviet mathematician and meteorologist Alexander Friedmann (1888–1925) formulated a dynamic model by taking particular solutions to Einstein’s equations which defined a spatially homogeneous, isotropic universe with a finite radius varying with time.⁸ For this reason, the standard model of contemporary cosmology is sometimes called the Friedmann–Lemaître Model.

After Hubble’s Law, the development of a realistic estimate for the relative abundance of fundamental elements in the universe turned out to be the second major confirmation of the Big Bang hypothesis. It was found that the universe was composed of ~72% hydrogen, ~25% helium, and ~3% other elements. In 1948, the Russian-American physicist George Gamow (1904–1968) and his doctoral student Ralph Alpher (1921–2007) published a paper proposing a theory of nucleocosmogenesis, i.e., a process by which atomic nuclei were created from pre-existing nucleons.⁹ This theory, now often referred to as Big Bang nucleosynthesis, explained the initial formation and current abundance of hydrogen and helium (with their respective isotopes) in the universe. According to Big Bang nucleosynthesis, in three minutes the universe was “cooked,” i.e., the low mass nuclei were created. Gamow’s hypothesis also accounted for the hydrogen and helium that serve as fuel for stars that give birth to larger elements through stellar nucleosynthesis.¹⁰

The discovery of the cosmic microwave background radiation (CMBR) in 1965 was the third major confirmation of Lemaître’s hypothesis. Remarkably, Arno A. Penzias and Robert W. Wilson discovered the CMBR completely by accident. Employed by Bell Labs in Holmdel, New Jersey, the two physicists were building a receiver for use in radio astronomy. When it was completed, they immediately detected

8 Paul A.M. Dirac, *The Scientific Work of Georges Lemaitre*, vol. 36 (Vatican: Pontificia Academia Scientiarum, 1968), 6.

9 Ralph A. Alpher, Hans Bethe, and George Gamow, “The Origin of Chemical Elements,” *Physical Review* 73, no. 7 (803-04).

10 Paul Haffner, *Creazione e Creatività Scientifica* (Leominster: Gracewing, 2009), 209.

an unexpected, low power, isotropic radiation source. This radiation presented a thermal black body spectrum at a temperature of $\sim 2.7\text{K}$ (or -454°F).¹¹ After Penzias and Wilson ruled out white noise from New York City, built-up guano on the antenna, and other potential noise sources, an explanation for the observed excess noise temperature was given by Robert Dicke (1916–1997), Jim Peebles (1935–), Peter Roll (1932–), and David T. Wilkinson (1935–2002): background radiation from the Big Bang.¹²

According to Big Bang theory, for the first few thousand years, matter and energy were continuously being converted. Later, as matter and energy began to separate, differences in the matter-energy density was speculated to account for the creation of galaxies and the emergence of inter-galactic structure.¹³ The echoes of these density gradients were detected by the COsmic Background Explorer (COBE) satellite in 1992 as a faint anisotropy in the cosmic background radiation which otherwise was a near-perfect black-body spectrum. Launched on November 18, 1989 aboard a Delta 5000 rocket, this NASA satellite developed at the Goddard Space Flight Center provided a fourth key confirmation of Big Bang theory.¹⁴ As a result of their significant contribution to cosmology, the 2006 Nobel Prize in Physics was jointly awarded to John C. Mather (1946) and George F. Smoot (1945) “for their discovery of the blackbody form and anisotropy of the cosmic microwave background radiation.”¹⁵

A fifth major confirmation of Lemaître’s general theory was announced

11 Arnold Penzias and Robert Wilson, “A Measurement of Excess Antenna Temperature at 4080 Mc/S,” *Astrophysical Journal* 142, no. 7 (July 1965): 419-21.

12 Robert Dicke et al., “Cosmic Black-Body Radiation,” *Astrophysical Journal* 142, no. 7 (1965): 414-19.

13 Haffner, 213.

14 The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, *Cosmology and the Cosmic Background Radiation* (3 October 2006). http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/2006/advanced-physicsprize2006.pdf (accessed 24 January 2013).

15 The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, *The Nobel Prize in Physics 2006*, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/2006/ (accessed 24 January 13).

on March 17, 2014. In what may be a Nobel Prize-winning discovery, a team of astronomers revealed the detection of the effects of the primordial inflationary gravitational waves in the B-mode power spectrum of the CMBR. It is believed that these gravitational waves played a decisive role in the formation of the very early universe. Without an inflationary hypothesis in Big Bang cosmology, it is unclear why the universe is statistically homogeneous and isotropic. For example, two exceedingly distant regions of the observable universe could not have equilibrated, as has been observed, because the regions move apart faster than the speed of light.¹⁶

In 1979, the American physicist, Alan Guth (1947–), provided a solution with cosmic inflation theory that is colloquially called the “bang” in the “Big Bang.” According to Guth, as a result of the very high energies present in the earliest moments of the universe, there would have existed forms of matter that create *repulsive* gravity. Guth hypothesized that less than a trillionth of a second after the Big Bang, the universe would have expanded faster than the speed of light as a result of negative vacuum pressure coming from the repulsive form of gravity. The violent gravitational waves would have compressed space in one direction and expanded it in another, producing the observable “twists” or “ripples” in the expanding energy field. This phenomenon ultimately played a critical role in generating the large-scale structures of the cosmos.¹⁷ Hubble’s Law, Big Bang nucleosynthesis, the detection of the CMBR, the discovery of the blackbody form and anisotropy of the CMBR, and now the detection of the B-mode polarization of the CMBR confirm and develop the fundamental theory of physical cosmology proposed by Monsignor Georges Lemaître.

16 Dennis Overbye, “Space Ripples Reveal Big Bang’s Smoking Gun,” *The New York Times* (17 March 2014): http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/18/science/space/detection-of-waves-in-space-butresses-landmark-theory-of-big-bang.html?_r=0 (accessed 20 March 14).

17 Ibid.

REFLECTIONS ON BIBLICAL COSMOLOGY
IN THE THOUGHT OF BENEDICT XVI

An appropriate starting point for a study of Biblical cosmology is to distinguish the *physical* cosmology of the ancient Israelites from the *metaphysical*. Like some of the other cultures of the ancient Middle East, the Israelites believed in a three-tiered cosmology in which the Earth was a flat disc that floated over the waters. The heavens where God dwelled were naturally “over” the Earth and the subterranean world “below” was the place of death, *sheol*.¹⁸ Obviously, twenty-first century Christians do not accept the ancient Israelite physical cosmology. But that does not mean that there are not significant theological insights in the metaphysical Biblical cosmology. Therefore, Christians must distinguish with prudence the physical elements and the metaphysical elements in the Sacred Scriptures because God inspired the spiritual truths expressed in the Biblical cosmology for the sake of man’s salvation.¹⁹ While the sacred writers presumed the physical cosmology of their era, their primary intention was not to communicate this cosmology, but rather metaphysical, i.e., spiritual truths.²⁰

The first book of the Bible offers the beautiful story of the creation of the world. This story teaches many important lessons about God, His creation, and in particular His creation *par excellence*, man. For this reason, the Church believes that the Book of Genesis does not purport to refute the aforementioned modern astronomical insights. The quest for ultimate metaphysical meaning can only be satisfied when one personally encounters the God of infinite *agape*, while the quest for

18 David E. Aune, *The Westminster Dictionary of New Testament and Early Christian Literature and Rhetoric* (London: Westminster John Knox Press, 2003), 118-19.

19 Second Vatican Council, *Dei Verbum* (1965), 11.

20 It would be unreasonable to expect that the sacred writers would have a knowledge of twentieth century physical cosmology. This however does not imply that the Bible contains error. Rather, their description of the natural world was the result of their simple observation of the world around them, unaided by contemporary instrumentation and theory.

scientific truth is satisfied when one understands the physical origins, evolution, structure, and destiny—*logos*—of the material universe. The Christian does not exclude either of these quests from his life because as St. Augustine famously said: “All truth is God’s truth.”²¹

The rationality of creation continues to be a source of marvel for all who contemplate its structure, complexity, and beauty. Even a physicist of such ambiguous religious belief as Albert Einstein once remarked that in the laws of nature “there is revealed such a superior Reason that everything significant which has arisen out of human thought and arrangement is, in comparison with it, the merest empty reflection.”²² At an exceedingly authentic human level, every person yearns for transcendence from his finite, temporal existence. When one contemplates the beauty of nature, from the structure of a single cell, to the immensity of the world’s oceans, to the seemingly boundless limits of space, the human mind is lifted up from the postmodern malaise that no longer seeks the Infinite.

Ratzinger reminds us that, contrary to the atheist narrative, “the universe is not the product of darkness and unreason. It comes from intelligence, freedom, and from the beauty that is identical with love.”²³ While agnostic and atheist scholars may try to deconstruct and marginalize the meaning of the Biblical accounts of creation through the application of social praxis, history, literary criticism, linguistic analysis, or aesthetics, the significance of the symbolic elements in the text is enduring.

It is important to acknowledge that the Biblical narratives of creation do not communicate in the same way as modern prose. Rather, they communicate their timeless truths through stories, metaphors, and Jewish numerology. Through these devices, the Bible tells the reader

21 Common English paraphrase from St. Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana* (397), II, 75.

22 Albert Einstein, *Mein Weltbild* (Vienna: Europa-Verl, 1953), 21. Translation by Boniface Ramsey, O.P. found in *In the Beginning* by Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger.

23 Joseph Ratzinger, *In the Beginning...: A Catholic Understanding of the Story of Creation and the Fall*, trans. Boniface Ramsey (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1995), 25.

that God is One, that God is good, and that God created the world out of love. They express the nature of creation, the extraordinary dignity of the human person in creation, and man's sacred dominion over the land, air, water, plants, and animals. Finally, as Benedict points out, the Scriptures convey the abiding truth that "creation is oriented to the Sabbath, which is the sign of the covenant between God and humankind."²⁴

The universe was created to give glory to God and although He has no need of man's worship, it is man's greatest act. In particular, Sabbath worship is supremely pleasing to the Lord. Ratzinger highlights that in the Biblical stories of creation, the Sabbath is revealed as the day when man, "in the freedom of worship, participates in God's freedom, in God's rest, and thus in God's peace. To celebrate the Sabbath means to celebrate the covenant. It means to return to the source and to sweep away all the defilement that our work has brought with it."²⁵ He goes on to point out how the Mosaic Law's precept of observing the Sabbath is linked with this notion of authentic human flourishing and freedom. Not only does every seventh day bring about universal equality among God's people, but every seventh year is also offered so that the land and the people may rest. Every seven-times-seven Sabbath year was to be a Great Sabbath in which "all debts are remitted and all purchases and sales annulled."²⁶ Unfortunately, the new life and rebirth for both the land and its people that were offered by this precept were not realized as the Israelites apparently never carried it out.

The Biblical theology of creation also answers questions about who man is. In Genesis 2:7 (RSV), it states that "the Lord God formed man of dust from the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul." Ratzinger describes this fact as both "humbling and consoling."²⁷ It diffuses any temptations for men to believe that they are gods as it clearly reveals their temporal, limited, and

24 *Ibid.*, 27.

25 *Ibid.*, 30-31.

26 *Ibid.*, 31.

27 *Ibid.*, 42.

created nature. The awareness, often painful, of human mortality can be a healthy reminder that “you are dust, and to dust you shall return.”²⁸ Only God is eternal *ipsum esse subsistens*. The Book of Genesis also reminds humanity that despite the evil of which man is capable, he was “fashioned from God’s good Earth,”²⁹ in God’s image and likeness.³⁰ Man was not created by Satan. Despite his occasional cooperation with the Murder-Accuser-Liar, God desires man’s supernatural end to be eternal communion with his Creator, made possible after the Fall by the atoning sacrifice of Christ.

The story of creation in Genesis also inspires an acknowledgment of the divinely instituted brotherhood of man. As descendants of the first man, Adam, every man is a part of the one family of humanity. Notwithstanding the differences in physical appearance, language, culture, and even religion, all men share the same origin and are called to the same end. Ratzinger is very strong in his rebuke of any assertion of different categories of human persons with varying degrees of value: “We are all from only *one* Earth. There are not different kinds of ‘blood and soil,’ to use a Nazi slogan.”³¹ The Scriptures are clear: human division, e.g., racism, comes not from God but from the Evil One.

It is very striking to consider that in all of creation, it is only in man that God offers a share of his very Spirit, the “breath of life”³² itself. The Earth, Moon, and stars are not a pantheistic emanation from God. The animals and plants are not recipients of an immortal soul. It is only to Adam and Eve that a share in the Divine life is given. Therefore it is no surprise that God commands man: “Thou shall not kill.” Every human person has a soul that is created directly by God and therefore his dignity far surpasses all the rest of creation. It is for this reason that the Church proclaims the dignity of all human life from the moment

28 Genesis 3:19 (RSV)

29 Ratzinger, 43.

30 See Genesis 1:26

31 Ratzinger.

32 Genesis 2:7 (RSV)

of natural conception until death. Ratzinger reminds us that no illness, disfigurement, handicap, or decision by another can ever diminish the God-given value of a human being.³³

THE LOGOS OF FAITH AND SCIENCE IN THE THOUGHT OF BENEDICT XVI

The contributions of Joseph Ratzinger-Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI to the compatibility of the theology of creation and the natural sciences is established upon a very fundamental insight: the primacy of the *Logos* Himself—Jesus, the Eternal Son of the Father—who is the source of all rationality, meaning, and purpose in the universe. During his Apostolic Journey to München, Altötting, and Regensburg in 2006, Benedict was invited to address the scientific community of the University of Regensburg in the *aula magna*. The Pope’s lecture was entitled “Glaube, Vernunft und Universität — Erinnerungen und Reflexionen” (Faith, Reason, and the University—Memories and Reflections) and further elaborated his thought on the centrality of the *Logos*.

The intelligibility of nature, and indeed of divine revelation itself, rests on man’s ability to share in the *logos* in creation. Benedict points out that while the Church has always taught that there is an infinite gap between the eternal wisdom of the “Creator Spirit and our created reason, there exists a real analogy, in which—as the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 stated—unlikeness remains infinitely greater than likeness, yet not to the point of abolishing analogy and its language.”³⁴ Rejecting a theology of God that he characterizes as “sheer, impenetrable voluntarism,” the Holy Father reminds his audience that “rather, the truly divine God is the God who has revealed Himself as *logos* and, as *logos*, has acted and continues to act lovingly on our behalf.”³⁵

33 Ratzinger, 45.

34 Benedict XVI, “Faith, Reason, and the University—Memories and Reflections,” in *The Regensburg Lecture*, ed. James V. Schall (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2006), #27.

35 Ibid.

Openness to the full breadth of *logos* provides for the appropriate autonomy and status of philosophy, theology, history, mathematics, physical science, and biological science; it has always been a hallmark of the Catholic intellectual tradition. Aware of assaults on the status of some of these *scientiæ*, Pope Benedict criticized the approach of those who believe that “scientific certainty” is the only legitimate form of knowledge and that it can only be found as a result of analyses based on “the interplay of mathematical and empirical elements.”³⁶ After all, the English word “science” comes from the Latin *scientiæ* that derives from *sciens*, the present participle of *scio*, meaning “I know or understand.” When the “radius of science and reason”³⁷ is reduced, the question of God and His work in creation becomes, by definition, un-scientific, unknowable, and unreasonable.

In this fragmented form of reason, deeply human questions such as the origin and destiny of man and those handled by religion and ethics “have no place within the purview of collective reason as defined by ‘science,’ so understood, and must thus be relegated to the realm of the subjective.”³⁸ This is a devastating shortcoming and the hallmark of modernism. Benedict succinctly points out that “the subject then decides, on the basis of his *experiences*, what he considers tenable in matters of religion, and the subjective ‘conscience’ becomes the sole arbiter of what is ethical.”³⁹ (emphasis added) When theological and particularly moral questions become completely personal matters, religion and ethics are placed outside of the scope of reason. As the history of the twentieth century makes very clear, “disturbing pathologies of religion and reason...necessarily erupt.”⁴⁰ Benedict reminds his audience that the modern and postmodern tendencies to attempt to create an ethical system based on the principles of biological evolution, psychology, or

36 Ibid., #45.

37 Ibid., #46.

38 Ibid., #48.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid., #49.

sociology, are always grossly lacking.

One of the causes of the movement to reduce reason comes from the challenge of cultural pluralism. This threat comes both *ab extra* and *ab intra*, e.g., the influence of Hellenism in Catholic thought has been questioned even by Catholic theologians, such as Hans Küng (1928–). These theologians would try to create some “pure” version of the New Testament message, not “infected” by Hellenistic culture, to preach not only in the West but also in mission territories. Benedict firmly rebukes this approach, stating, “This thesis is not simply false, but it is coarse and lacking in precision. The New Testament was written in Greek and bears the imprint of the Greek spirit, which has already come to maturity as the Old Testament developed.”⁴¹ For this reason, “the fundamental decisions made [by the early, Greek-speaking Church] about the relationship between faith and the use of human reason are part of the faith itself; they are developments consonant with the nature of faith itself.”⁴²

The rejection of Aristotelian metaphysics and the intelligibility that it provides the other sciences did not appear for the first time in the twentieth century. The movement of Martin Luther (1483–1546) toward a *sola Scriptura* theology was partially rooted in an attempt to remove what he considered to be the “alien” presence of philosophy in theology. Three hundred years later Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) suggested that faith needed to be “protected” from the reason of metaphysics. In other words, the Church “needed to set thinking aside in order to make room for faith.”⁴³ It becomes obvious when one adopts this mindset that any discussion of a Creator and creation is outside the realm of reason and is understood *sola fide*. In his *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant introduced the modern self-limitation of reason. Additionally, given the overwhelming success of the empirical method in empirical science, Kant’s reduced form of reason was further radicalized yielding what Benedict calls “a

41 Ibid., #52.

42 Ibid., #53.

43 Ibid., #35.

synthesis between Platonism (Cartesianism) and empiricism, a synthesis confirmed by the success of technology.”⁴⁴

Benedict does not retreat into fundamentalism to respond to the challenges of modernity. Rather, he seeks to identify the positive features and retain them, e.g., modernity “presupposes the mathematical structure of matter, its intrinsic rationality, which makes it possible to understand how matter works and use it efficiently: this basic premise is...the Platonic element in the modern understanding of nature.”⁴⁵ Furthermore, Benedict emphasizes how modern scientific reason “points beyond itself.”⁴⁶ In his Verona address of October 19, 2006, Pope Emeritus Benedict returned to this topic:

Mathematics as such is a creation of our intelligence: the correspondence between its structures and the real structures of the universe—which is the premise for all the modern scientific and technological developments, already formulated explicitly by Galileo Galilei with the famous assertion that the book of nature is written in mathematical language—arouses our admiration and raises a great question. It implies, in fact, that the universe itself is structured in an intelligent manner, in such a way that there exists a profound correspondence between our subjective reason and reason as objectified in nature. So it becomes inevitable to ask if there must not exist a single originating intelligence, which would be the common source of both the one and the other.⁴⁷ (emphasis added)

This approach respects the autonomy and ends of the formal and natural sciences while acknowledging that they do not and cannot exhaustively describe reality.

It is a marvelous claim of the Christian religion that the human intellect is capable of knowing (albeit imperfectly) God, His will, and His work in creation. Furthermore, His invitation to a loving relationship is a

44 Ibid., #40.

45 Ibid., #41.

46 Ibid., #59.

47 Benedict XVI, “Address of the Holy Father to the Convegno Nazionale Della Chiesa in Italia,” (2006): , http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2006/october/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20061019_convegno-verona_en.html (accessed 7 February 2014).

distinctive feature of the God of the Scriptures. At Regensburg, Benedict reflected on the significance of man's relationship with the Divine *Logos*: "God does not become more divine when we push him away from us in a sheer, impenetrable voluntarism; rather, the truly divine God is the God who has revealed himself as *logos* and, as *logos*, has acted and continues to act lovingly on our behalf."⁴⁸ Perhaps one could summarize Pope Emeritus Benedict's insight here as "*Deus est ratio (logos) et Deus est caritas (agape)*."⁴⁹ This wise approach orients one to avoid the perennial difficulties in theology of overemphasizing God's transcendence, e.g., as found in Islam, or His immanence, e.g., as found in Modernism.

Regrettably, these contributions and indeed the fundamental invitation to "engage the whole breadth of reason" in the contemporary university were lost on many as a result of the media's emphasis on the Islamist reaction to the address. At Regensburg, Benedict made reference to a dialogue that occurred very likely during the winter of 1391 between the erudite Byzantine Emperor, Manuel II Paleologus, and an educated Persian on the subject of Christianity and Islam, and the truth of both. In the course of this exchange, the Emperor stated, "Show me just what Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached."⁵⁰ He then went on to explicate in detail the irrationality of spreading religion by the sword. Benedict beautifully summarized it stating, "Violence is incompatible with the nature of God and the nature of the soul."⁵¹

The Emperor went on to affirm,

God...is not pleased by blood—and not acting reasonably (σὺν λόγῳ) is

48 Benedict XVI, "Faith, Reason, and the University—Memories and Reflections," in *The Regensburg Lecture*, #27.

49 James V. Schall, *The Regensburg Lecture* (South Bend: St. Augustine's Press, 2007), 123.

50 Emperor Manuel II Paleologus cited in Benedict XVI, "Faith, Reason, and the University—Memories and Reflections," in *The Regensburg Lecture*, #12.

51 *Ibid.*, #13.

contrary to God's nature. Faith is born of the soul, not the body. Whoever would lead someone to faith needs the ability to speak well and to reason properly, without violence and threats...To convince a reasonable soul, one does not need a strong arm, or weapons of any kind, or any other means of threatening a person with death...⁵²

Commenting on this fact, Benedict recognized that because of the Emperor's Christian intellectual formation, it was self-evident for him to believe that to act unreasonably is contrary to God's nature. However, this presupposition was not held by the Persian because according to "Muslim teaching, God is absolutely transcendent. His will is not bound up with any of our categories, even that of rationality."⁵³ The consequences of this error for theology are devastating. Benedict gave the example of the highly respected eleventh century Muslim intellectual, Ibn Hazm, who "went so far as to state that God is not bound even by his own word, and that nothing would oblige him to reveal the truth to us. Were it God's will, we would even have to practice idolatry."⁵⁴

Reporting on the reaction to the Pope's address in the Islamic world, the *Wall Street Journal* editorial board entitled its piece "Benedict the Brave." Although it was clearly not his intent, the Pope certainly "hit a nerve" as various terrorist organizations in Iraq called for attacks on the Vatican City State. In Somalia, a Muslim cleric with connections to the ruling Islamist party called on Muslims to "hunt down" and murder the Holy Father. While in Pakistan, the legislature unanimously passed a resolution condemning the Pope and demanding an apology.⁵⁵ In essence, all of these responses from the Islamic world proved a point made by Benedict that intercultural dialogue is not possible if reason (*logos*) is excluded from the exchange.

Pope Emeritus Benedict concluded his Regensburg address stating that

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid., #14.

54 Ibid., #15.

55 "Benedict the Brave," *The Wall Street Journal*, 19 September, 2006, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB115862615497066989>.

“it is to this great *logos*, to this breadth of reason, that we invite our partners in the dialogue of cultures. To rediscover it constantly is the great task of the university.”⁵⁶ Benedict would certainly acknowledge however that it is unlikely that the intellectual problems of scientism and reductionism will be surmounted *solely* through good philosophical reasoning. In the Academy, there is often a “wall of ideology” that can only be broken down when, as Carlo Lancellotti writes, “the human heart...[is]...‘wounded’...by the beauty of the cosmos, which endlessly calls reason not to close upon itself but to open itself up to the infinite mystery of being.”⁵⁷ This is the openness to which Pope Emeritus Benedict invited the world at Regensburg: a stance of “wonder in front of Being in all its dimensions.”⁵⁸ In a very “Benedictine” way, emphasizing Christ’s presence as *logos* and *agape*, Lancellotti suggests a path forward for redeeming reason through the Gospel:

...it has been the Christian experience that this “redemption” of reason can only happen as a fruit of the encounter with the beauty of Christ. Only the dramatic encounter with the Word incarnate can bring reason back to its truth: that its being is “to be touched by Being,” just like the faculty of sight finds its being in being struck by light.⁵⁹

BENEDICT THE THOMIST

It is well-established that Professor Joseph Ratzinger began his academic career firmly as an Augustinian, having written his doctoral dissertation on St. Augustine, *Volk und Haus Gottes in Augustins Lehre von der Kirche* (The People and the House of God in Augustine’s Doctrine of the Church). Nonetheless, it is interesting to note the strong Thomistic aspects of the thought of the later Cardinal Ratzinger and Pope Benedict

56 Benedict XVI, “Faith, Reason, and the University—Memories and Reflections,” in *The Regensburg Lecture*, #16.

57 Carlo Lancellotti, “Science, Contemplation, and Ideology” (paper presented at the The World and Christian Imagination, Baylor University, 9-11 November, 2006), 6-7.

58 *Ibid.*, 7.

59 *Ibid.*

XVI. In particular, one sees a high level of concord between the renewed Thomism of the Albertus Magnus Lyceum for Natural Sciences⁶⁰ and the thought of the Pope Emeritus Emeritus.

In 2010, Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI dedicated three Wednesday audiences (on June 2, 16, and 23) to the contributions of Saint Thomas Aquinas. While certainly aware of the weaknesses of the twentieth century Neo-Scholastic Thomism to which he was exposed in his seminary education, Benedict is also cognizant of the enduring contributions of Aquinas and the need for the Church to look to him as a touchstone in Catholic thought. In particular, in the June 16 address, he commented on Thomas' contribution to the dialogue between faith and reason:

...In the nineteenth century, when the incompatibility of modern reason and faith was strongly declared, Pope Emeritus Leo XIII pointed to St. Thomas as a guide in the dialogue between them. In his theological work, St. Thomas supposes and concretizes this relationality. Faith consolidates, integrates, and illumines the heritage of truth that human reason acquires. The trust with which St. Thomas endows these two instruments of knowledge faith and reason may be traced back to the conviction that both stem from the one source of all truth, the divine *Logos*, which is active in both contexts, that of Creation and that of redemption.⁶¹

For Benedict, the gift of the *logos* for the human soul enables man to acknowledge and appreciate the intelligibility of creation. It also permits man to acknowledge that God is the creator of all things, visible and invisible, and therefore all creation is governed by order and reason. As a consequence, the human intellect can study and understand the natural world by acknowledging the mathematical structure of reality, applying quantitative methods to model the natural world, formulating a hypothesis based on the model, testing the hypothesis through experimentation, and revising the hypothesis based on the results of the experiments to define a theory. But the Christian does not remain at this

60 Based in River Forest, Illinois, USA.

61 Benedict XVI, "General Audience - Saint Thomas Aquinas (2)" (16 June), 16 June 2010.

level of reason; he also looks beyond physics, i.e., metaphysics. Benedict would say that the mathematical *logos* discovered in the natural sciences always points beyond itself to “Another.”

According to Benedict, the metaphysical approach of Thomas Aquinas is an important instrument to preserve the openness of the human intellect to the fullness of reality. In his address of June 16, 2010 he also stated that

Thomas presents to us a broad and confident concept of human reason: *broad* because it is not limited to the spaces of the so-called empirical-scientific reason, but open to the whole being...and *confident* because human reason, especially if it accepts the inspirations of Christian faith, is a promoter of a civilization that recognizes the dignity of the person.⁶²

Critics of metaphysics must be reminded that the human intellect is capable of analyzing reality according to different modes of abstraction. The English word “abstraction” comes from the Latin root *abstrahere*—“to pull from” or “to take out.” Thus, as Lancellotti, points out: “...in front of any object, reason is capable of ‘taking out’ certain aspects by applying to experience appropriate ‘categorical selections’.”⁶³ In the field of modern physics, the scientist investigates real existing beings, through the use of instrumentation, under one very particular aspect: spatial and temporal extension. As a consequence, he then discovers what Lancellotti calls the “mysterious and beautiful mathematical structures hidden in the physical data, which reveal a deeper order immanent within reality which was not immediately evident to the mind.”⁶⁴

In order for the compatibility of the theology of creation and the natural sciences to be clearly evident, a proper ontology is necessary. According to the American priest and philosopher, Benedict M. Ashley, OP (1915–2013), since all knowledge is acquired through the senses, it would be logical to establish the natural sciences as epistemologically prior to the

62 Ibid.

63 Lancellotti, 4.

64 Ibid.

others and to establish the validity of a metaphysics on the following conditions:

4. There can be no valid metaphysics formally distinct from natural science unless its subject, Being as Being (*esse*), as it analogically includes both material and immaterial being, has first been validated in a manner proper to the foundations integral to natural science by a demonstration of the existence of immaterial beings as the cause of material beings.
5. Modern natural science can achieve such a demonstration, but only if its own foundations are rendered unequivocally consistent with sense observation by an analysis such as is exemplified by Aristotle's *Physics* as interpreted by Aquinas.⁶⁵

Fundamentally, if a metaphysics of material beings cannot be credibly demonstrated, how can this same metaphysics be used for immaterial creatures, e.g., angels, or to discuss God Himself—*ipsum esse subsistens*.

This interpretation of the method and doctrine of Thomas Aquinas, very much in harmony with the thought of Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI, seeks a positive dialog with the natural sciences. In particular, it is supportive of an integrative approach of *philosophia naturalis* with the foundations of empirical science. While such a metaphysics would be formally distinct from the natural sciences, it is also open to the event of Divine revelation. Additionally, it avoids the anthropocentric emphasis of Transcendental Thomism that often makes human self-consciousness the point of departure for metaphysics.

In a lecture at the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome, the British priest and theologian, Paul Haffner, pointed out that regrettably “in the last century, the belief in creation has been reduced mostly to the affirmation that everything that exists is due to Divine causality. There has been a tendency to see the content of the Christian faith as a response to the word of revelation handed down through the history of

65 Benedict M. Ashley, *The Way toward Wisdom, Thomistic Studies* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), 53.

salvation.”⁶⁶ This emphasis is strongly expressed in the thought of the Transcendental Thomist, Karl Rahner, SJ, (1904–1984) and his theological anthropology that emphasizes man as a “h⁶⁷

Instead of following or further developing the classical Thomistic metaphysics and epistemology, Rahner pursued the existentialism of his teacher, the German philosopher, Martin Heidegger (1889–1976). Rahner’s 1941 work, *Hearers of the Word*, attempted to reinterpret Thomistic metaphysics from the point of view of Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology. By beginning with Heidegger’s idea that the question of the meaning of one’s being is preceded by a “pre-grasp” of the world’s horizon of meaning, Rahner suggested that man’s quest for meaning of experience is grounded in a “pre-conceptual” grasp of God’s infinite horizon of being. Along with *Spirit in the World*, *Hearers of the Word* manifested the philosophical views that underlie his entire theological system. *Spirit in the World* offers a general philosophical anthropology while *Hearers of the Word* is deliberately more theological and particularly addresses the question of revelation.⁶⁸

Since the time of the Apostles⁶⁹, orthodox Christians have always maintained that “matter matters” and for this reason the Church condemned the teachings of the Docetists who denied the fact of the Incarnation. The Docetists claimed that Jesus only seemed to assume a human nature and that his human form was merely an illusion. In a sense reviving the ideas of these ancient heretics, German idealist philosophers believe that reality, or reality as far as it can be known, is essentially mental and immaterial. Therefore, it is not surprising that

66 Paul Haffner, “Verso una Teologia dell’ Ambiente,” *Lecture at the Pontifical Gregorian University*, 4 December 2013 (Roma).

67 Karl Rahner, *Hearers of the Word (Hörer Des Wortes: Zur Grundlegung Einer Religionsphilosophie)*, ed. Johann Baptist Metz, trans. Michael Richards (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969).

68 Wesley Wildman, “Karl Rahner,” *Boston Collaborative Encyclopedia of Western Theology* (7 December: <http://people.bu.edu/wwildman/bce/rahner.htm> (accessed 7 December 2013).

69 See I John 1:1-3; I John 4:1-3; and 2 John 1:7.

the influences of this school have had a detrimental effect on faith by disconnecting theology from its roots in God's tangible work in creation.

CONCLUSION

In the work of Joseph-Ratzinger Benedict XVI, one finds an exceptional articulation of Christian faith, rooted in a total openness to the full capabilities of human reason. This reason respects the mathematical structure of the material universe and the method of natural science, while also appreciating the metaphysical aspects of creation and indeed the Creator Himself. Through his further development of the theology of creation and brilliant dialogue with philosophers and scientists that seek to impose illegitimate restraints on human reason, the intrinsic compatibility of Christian faith with the natural sciences has been made manifestly clearer by Pope Emeritus Benedict.

Chesterton once remarked, "There are arguments for atheism, and they do not depend, and never did depend, upon science. They are arguable enough, as far as they go, upon a general survey of life; only it happens to be a superficial survey of life."⁷⁰ Nonetheless, obstacles remain that hinder the postmodern, non-believing man from accepting the compatibility of Biblical, metaphysical cosmology with contemporary, physical cosmology. Often, the root of this dismissal comes from a rejection of faith in creation itself. Ratzinger identifies three forms of concealment of the concept of creation in contemporary thought that contribute to the perceived conflict between science and theology:

1. "Nature" is understood exclusively in the sense of the object of science; any other definition of the word is dismissed as meaningless.
2. Reaction and resentment against technology, which is already noticeable in Rousseau, has long since become a resentment against humans, who are seen as the disease of nature.

⁷⁰ Gilbert Keith Chesterton, *The Collected Works of G.K. Chesterton*, vol. 35 (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1931), 444.

3. Nature is undermined for the sake of grace; it is robbed of its belongings.⁷¹

With regard to the first form of concealment, Ratzinger points out that an inadequate understanding of “nature” has a detrimental effect on moral life and the ordering of society. For example, “theological arguments about the ‘nature of humans’ or ‘natural rights’, resting as they do on the concept of creation, meet a look of blank incomprehension; in fact, they seem nonsensical, the relic of an archaic ‘natural philosophy’.”⁷² In reducing “human nature” to the mere biochemical structure of man, it is impossible to make ethical statements. All that can be done is state what is feasible, not what is moral. With his well-known wit and humor, Chesterton once remarked, “To mix science up with philosophy is only to produce a philosophy that has lost all its ideal value and a science that has lost all its practical value. It is for my private physician to tell me whether this or that food will kill me. It is for my private philosopher to tell me whether I ought to be killed.”⁷³

Developing the thought of the Swiss biologist and philosopher, Adolf Portmann, (1897–1982), Benedict illuminates the problem of the behavioral sciences “adopting” the concept of nature for their own ends.⁷⁴ The fundamental difficulty is that this kind of naturalness does not exist in man. Portmann uses the term “natural artificiality” to describe the different types of human society and points out how whatever aspect of human social life is considered, e.g., language, government, family life, etc., everything is dependent on decision-making. Ratzinger asks, “Where is decision making going to find its criteria? Are humans ‘condemned,’ as Sartre thought, to finding themselves in formless freedom?”⁷⁵ This will indeed be the case if creation is not granted its proper status as the “metaphysical middle term between nature and

71 Ratzinger, 93-94.

72 Ibid., 92.

73 Gilbert Keith Chesterton, *All Things Considered* (London: Methuen, 1908), 187.

74 Adolf Portmann, *Biologie Und Geist* (Göttingen: Burgdorf, 2000).

75 Ratzinger, 93.

artificiality.”⁷⁶

In the second form of concealment of the concept of creation, reaction against technology develops into resentment against humans. Mankind is the enemy of nature, disturbing its “natural” balance and causing it harm; man uses his mind and freedom to the detriment of nature. For example, the French ethnologist, Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908–2009) and the American psychologist, Burrhus Frederic “B. F.” Skinner (1904–1990), take up a line of thought in which “humans must be healed of being human.”⁷⁷ Skinner would even go so far as to say that free will is an illusion. Ratzinger notes that both of these men express a perspective that is becoming more and more widespread and contributing to various forms of nihilism among young men and women in the historically Christian west.

The final form of concealment is profoundly theological and related to the two aforementioned types: nature “is robbed of its belonging”⁷⁸ by grace. Looking to the New Testament, Benedict draws insight from St. Paul: “It is not the spiritual which is first, but the physical, and *then* the spiritual.”⁷⁹ When the order is inverted, creation is rejected and grace is divested of its foundation. Far from elevating grace, according to Ratzinger, “the undermining of creation can never become a vehicle of grace, but only of an *odium generis humani* (hatred of the human race), a Gnostic disenchantment with creation, which ultimately does not desire grace any longer.”⁸⁰ For Ratzinger, *agape* is heart of Christianity and the antithesis of Gnosticism. This distinctly Christian love presupposes faith in the Creator, self-acceptance as His creature, and concern for one’s neighbor.

While the natural sciences are an *essential* discipline for understanding aspects of reality, reality itself transcends the natural sciences. According

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid., 94.

78 Ibid.

79 I Corinthians 15:46 (RSV)

80 Ratzinger, 95.

to Ratzinger, “moral-religious” reasoning, in contrast to “physical-natural scientific” reasoning, is not a mere expression of superstition and subjective preferences. “It is in fact the more fundamental of the two reasons, and it alone can preserve the human dimensions of both the natural sciences and technology and also prevent them from destroying humankind.”⁸¹ Postmodern man seems very willing to make an act of (natural) faith in favor of UFOs or the so-called “Mayan Doomsday” of 12/12/2012. With the help of Divine grace, an effective articulation of the Christian theology of creation can help these same men to see in the design of the universe a manifestation of the love of the Creator and have faith in the divine revelation of the *Logos*. For this reason, the Church hopes that men come to know the Lord who “out of the abundance of His love speaks to men as friends (see Exodus 33:11; John 15:14-15) and lives among them (see Baruch 3:38), so that He may invite and take them into fellowship with Himself.”⁸²

81 Ibid., 46-47.

82 Vatican Council II, *Dei Verbum* (1965), 2.

REV. MSGR. JAMES M. MCNAMARA

HOLINESS

I adore you, O Christ, and I praise you, for by your Holy Cross you have redeemed the world.

I am uniquely qualified to speak about holiness!

Let me begin by this declaration: I have never once lost my patience! It is true. I have never lost my patience because I never had any patience to begin with. It is not like I begin my day with this big bag of patience and then it dwindles throughout the day. This is why I am uniquely qualified to speak about holiness. The path to holiness for me is Jesus Christ. I feel my weakness and I yearn for His grace.

The movement from fear to faith is one of the fundamental movements of the spiritual life. It is not a movement we make once and then have that conquered and can live by faith the rest of our lives. The movement from fear to faith is a continual process throughout our lives.

It is fitting that we turn to Mary, the young woman who moved from fear to faith in the very first conversation that is recorded between her and God. The conversation is mediated by an angel. Mary has confidence in God even though she does not know what is going to happen. Confidence is greater than trust and it leads to a joy of spirit

In the initial unfolding of salvation, both Zechariah and Mary are told not to be afraid. The messenger told Zechariah: *"Do not be afraid because your prayer has been heard"* (Luke 1:13). Gabriel told Mary: *"Do not fear. You have found favor with God"* (Luke 1:28). The movement from fear to faith is essential if the children of promise are to be born. Zechariah is unable to speak because of his disbelief. Mary is able to praise God in

her beautiful Magnificat because she trusted that the Lord's words to her would be fulfilled.

Mary praises God. Zechariah is left in a school of silence. As you begin this new chapter in your life, you will have Mary moments and Zechariah moments, moments of confidence and moments of silence! Embrace silence. It taught Zechariah to understand God's dream.

We might revisit the old concept of self-denial here. Self-denial does not mean to negate oneself as nothing and bad. Yes, we are nothing without God. But God has created us, God has come to redeem us, God does love us. Self-denial means finding myself in God who rewards rather than finding myself in my own accomplishments and how I look in front of others. Contemporary society has this backwards and as a result, insecurity is paralyzing the prospects of love.

I would like to reflect upon holiness from my experience as a parish priest and a pastor. My first assignment was to St. Martin of Tours in Amityville, New York. More about that when we get to retreat. In the thirty years between my first time on the faculty here and my present time, I was pastor of three parishes: Our Lady of Grace in West Babylon (6500 families), Holy Cross in Nesconset (3700 families) and Our Lady of the Miraculous Medal in Point Lookout (900 families).

At Our Lady of Grace parish in West Babylon we put new wallpaper in the lobby. As I passed by, some elderly women were looking at the wallpaper. They said: "Father, did you choose this paper?" I said: "Do you like it?" They responded: "Yes, it is very nice." I admitted I did not choose the paper. Others did. For them that was the wrong answer. I was the pastor and I was to decide everything. Times have changed. Priests are not held on a pedestal. Younger people look at us with suspicion and caution.

These are not easy times for the priesthood and for priests themselves. In the Beatitudes, blessed did not mean happy. I am not talking about happiness here. I am talking about meaning and purpose. I often plead with my parishioners to let us priests be priests and stop dragging us

down with every fuss and fiddle. I want to give my life to God, not to the electric candles that break down. What is worth fighting for? What is worth dying for? I mean no disrespect to the Church because I love the Church, but we need to do more than simply maintain what is. We need to win people over to Christ by a spirit of joy and a lifestyle of love.

Having sounded off a bit, let me add some personal thoughts from prayer. First, we live in these times and with these challenges. I can wish things were otherwise. I can and do complain about things as they are. But I also know that holiness is not a possibility for me in some abstract world or in some protective world of my own making. Holiness is a possibility for me not despite my bowl of complaints but in the midst of them. There is a dying involved in the daily grind I am speaking about. It is a dying to my pride, that I have more important things to do. It is a dying to my impatience. It is a dying to my judgmental tendencies. It is a dying to myself, so that, Jesus Christ may live here and now when I respond to this question or that request, not with impatience or annoyance, but with mellowness of spirit, or meekness, or peace, or purity of heart.

St. Paul spoke about the thorn in the flesh. Three times St. Paul asked Jesus to remove this. Jesus responds; *"My grace is sufficient for you"* (2 Cor. 12: 9).

Holiness in the seminary context is simply this: Be faithful to the present moment and be attentive to the person in front of you.

In *Pastores Dabo Vobis*, Pope John Paul II speaks throughout the document about pastoral charity. As shepherds, our sanctity lay in pastoral charity, in all its circumstances and opportunities.

The second personal reflection on these issues comes from observing the people in my parish. My second reflection comes from family life. I see families struggling.

The economy is a pressure for many. Both parents work or only one parent is in the home. Parents cannot seek a transfer from their children or children from their parents. They deal with life as it is. They work

through the problems they encounter and do their best to keep going. Many are edifying in their faithfulness and realism. I am humbled by them. They are becoming holy not despite their children, but in light of them. They are serving God not by changing the world, but by changing a diaper. They are glorifying God not by some great act of martyrdom in the shedding of blood, but in daily acts of laundering, chauffeuring, and working. When I meditate on family life, I am indeed humbled and inspired to go back into the fray of the Church at this time in history with these circumstances and challenges.

It is a little-known fact that the darkest part of the night is just before dawn. Yes, the darkest part of the night is just before the dawn. And is not that where we find ourselves in the Church today – in the darkest part of the night? But then is it not also true that the dawn is near?

My brothers, let us be men of faith and hope in these circumstances at this point in history. Let us take up our cross and follow Jesus. Let us take up the cross as it is presented to us, not as we would choose it. Let us ask for the grace to boast of nothing but the cross of Jesus Christ through whom the world is crucified to us and us to the world.

I adore you, O Christ, and I praise you for by your Holy Cross you have redeemed the world.

REV. JOHN P. CUSH, STD

AN INTRODUCTION TO AND APPRECIATION OF
CATHERINE PICKSTOCK'S
EUCCHARISTIC THEOLOGY

IN HER WORK

AFTER WRITING: ON THE LITURGICAL CONSUMMATION OF PHILOSOPHY (1998)
A STUDY IN RADICAL ORTHODOXY

INTRODUCTION

David Ford analyzes late 20th and early 21st Century British theology rather succinctly:

Then there are what one might call British theology's two basic "default settings," in the sense of positions which are taken by a good number of theologians as a sort of norm or at least a recurring point of reference for discussions The first of these takes something like Barth's approach to modernity mainstream Chalcedonian Christianity as renewed through the Reformation is the most reliable form of Christian truth, and it inspires a critique of modernity, through usually not what Rowan Williams describes as "experimenting with the rhetoric of its uncommitted environment."¹

He goes on to describe the alternative position:

The second approach takes Thomas Aquinas (sometimes read in a very Augustinian way or even with Augustine as the dominant voice) as the default setting, and the choice of a premodern position gives a very different vantage point on modernity—often saying or implying that something went radically wrong in early modernity and seeing the Reformation as part of the problem.

1 Ford, David F. "British theology after a trauma: Divisions and conversations." *Christian Century* (2000): 425.

Many of the “Radical Orthodoxy” group would take this line, and they have provoked some sharp confrontations.²

Among those who would be counted in Ford’s second “default position” would be Catherine Pickstock. A theologian and member of the Faculty of Divinity at the University of Cambridge, as well as a fellow, a tutor, and a reader in theology and philosophy of Emmanuel College, Cambridge, Pickstock brings a unique voice to contemporary Anglo-American theology. Thoroughly steeped both in the Christian tradition of Augustine and Aquinas as well as the postmodern linguistic philosophy of Derrida and Foucault, she attempts to address one of the most important concepts in the Church through the lens of Radical Orthodoxy, namely the Eucharist.

RADICAL ORTHODOXY AS A NON-SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY

Radical Orthodoxy (RO) is a primarily Anglophone theological movement, arising out of Cambridge University.³ It is not a school of theology in the traditional sense of the term. There are no hard and certain rules to which a theologian must subscribe to be part of RO. The theologians who would consider themselves as part of the RO all have very different interests in theology and all have very different concepts of how RO needs to operate. They all do, however, have one main concept that dominates their theology: that there should not be an autonomous secular sphere and that there should be an alternative theology to the correlationist theology that seems to dominate in most theological schools.⁴ Catherine Pickstock writes, concerning the

2 Ibid.

3 In *Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology*, edited by Milbank, Pickstock, and Ward, the editors acknowledge the Cambridge origins of the volume in a two-fold manner: first, in the fact that the majority of the contributors are past or present Cambridge faculty or students and second, in their positive usage of the great philosophers and theologians of the past, they hope to be in line with the Cambridge Platonists like Christopher Smart and Ralph Cudworth. (See Acknowledgements)

4 James K.A. Smith posits a sharp contrast between RO and the Tübingen school, among others (*IRO*, 34-42).

relationship between most contemporary theology and RO: "It seems to me that there are no sharp boundaries between radical orthodoxy and other identifiable tendencies within what one might generally call post-secular theology: One can mention, for example, the Yale School, Radical Traditions at Duke University, and Scriptural Reasoning, associated with Peter Ochs at the University of Virginia."⁵

Perhaps it might be best to say that RO is a "school of theology" to the extent that its three main protagonists serve as editors to a series of books entitled the *Radical Orthodoxy Series*.⁶ If one were to say what it is that unites such diverse thinkers as Milbank, Pickstock, Ward, William T. Cavanaugh, Frederick Bauerschmidt, and Phillip Blond, it might be best expressed in a quote from the introduction to *Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology* (1999):

The present collection of essays attempts to reclaim the world by situating its concerns and activities within a theological framework. Not simply returning in nostalgia to the premodern, it visits sites in which secularism has invested heavily—aesthetics, politics, sex, the body, personhood, visibility, space—and resituates them from a Christian standpoint; that is, in terms of the Trinity, Christology, the Church and the Eucharist. What emerges is a contemporary theological project made possible by the self-conscious superficiality of today's secularism. For this new project regards the nihilistic drift of postmodernism (which nonetheless has roots in the outset of modernity) as a supreme opportunity. It does not, like liberal theology, transcendentalist theology and even certain styles of neo-orthodoxy, seek in the face of this drift to shore up universal accounts of immanent human value (humanism) nor defences of supposedly objective reason. But nor does it indulge, like so many, in the pretence of a baptism of nihilism in the name of a misconstrued 'negative theology'. Instead, in the face of the secular demise of truth, it seeks to

5 Catherine Pickstock, "Reply to David Ford and Guy Collins," *The Scottish Journal of Theology* 52 (2001): 406.

6 Published by Routledge, these texts are described as follows: "Radical orthodoxy combines sophisticated understanding of contemporary thought, modern and post-modern, with a theological perspective that looks back to the origins of the Church. It is the most talked-about development in contemporary theology." (See frontispiece of John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock, *Truth in Aquinas* (London/New York: Routledge, 2001).

reconfigure theological truth.⁷

THE ECCLESIOLOGY OF RADICAL ORTHODOXY

It should be noted that seven of the twelve contributors to *Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology* (1999) are Anglicans. They are described by Fergus Kerr as “all of a High Church persuasion.”⁸ However, five are Roman Catholics. As Kerr notes, “This is not simply a High Anglican project. As we shall see, the project is easy enough to locate, historically and textually, in terms of a controversy internal to Roman Catholic theology throughout most of the twentieth century.”⁹ In terms of a strict affiliation to either (or any) denomination of Christianity, Gavin D’Costa writes: “neither of these ecclesial communities ever make their real presence felt ... it is a church theology, with no ‘accountability’ to any real church.”¹⁰ This will be an important factor to consider when studying Pickstock’s eucharistic theology.

Laurence Paul Hemming declares it “wrong to diagnose there is no ecclesiology at work in the movement.”¹¹ R. R. Reno posits that a RO ecclesiology is where “predominant Anglican practice could not provide an adequately rich catholic tradition, and the Roman Church, as currently constituted, could not provide an adequate institutional basis for faithfulness to the catholic tradition. Therefore a tradition had to be

7 John Milbank, Graham Ward and Catherine Pickstock, “Introduction- Suspending the material: the turn of radical orthodoxy,” In *Radical Orthodoxy: a New Theology* (London/NY: Routledge, 1999), 1.

8 Fergus Kerr, “A Catholic Response to the Programme of Radical Orthodoxy,” In *Radical Orthodoxy?- A Catholic Enquiry*, edited by Laurence Paul Hemming (Burlington, VT/Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2000), 47.

9 Ibid.

10 Gavin D’Costa, “Seeking after Theological Vision,” in *Reviews in Religion and Theology*, November 1999, Vol. 6, no. 4: 358.

11 Laurence Paul Hemming, “Introduction- Radical Orthodoxy’s Appeal to Catholic Scholarship,” in *Radical Orthodoxy?- A Catholic Enquiry*, edited by Laurence Paul Hemming (Burlington, VT/Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2000), 8.

invented. Of course, the invention was denied."¹² It is sufficient to state along with Reno that "[t]he three leading figures of Radical Orthodoxy, Milbank, Pickstock, and Ward are Anglican, deeply influenced by the piety and practice of Anglo-Catholicism, and this encourages them to replace particularity with theory, identity with ideality."¹³ RO is firmly rooted in a British, Cambridge, Anglo-Catholic mentality, but it holds a bond of loose affiliation with all who wish to reject the terms imposed on theology and the Church by secular postmodernity and with those who wish to reclaim an archaeology and application of patristic and medieval texts to the postmodern context. Pickstock herself, in describing RO, states: "Radical Orthodoxy can be taken as potentially embracing all those who espouse a basically orthodox theology, but do not regard themselves simply as ecclesiastical or political traditionalists."¹⁴ She further sums up RO in a very simple manner: "[r]adical orthodoxy has never seen itself as an exclusive movement, but rather as a loose tendency."¹⁵ John Milbank holds to the catholicity of RO, despite its non-ecclesiastical affiliations: "Radical Orthodoxy, if catholic, is not a specifically Roman Catholic theology; although it can be espoused by Roman Catholics, it can equally be espoused by those who are formally 'protestant,' yet whose theory and practice essentially accords with the catholic vision of the Patristic period to the high middle ages."¹⁶

This article intends to offer first a biographical introduction to Pickstock's thought and then an overview of what is perhaps her most famous text, *After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy* (1998). Following this overview, it will begin with an exploration of Pickstock's use of sign in her theology of Eucharistic Presence; then, it will explore her use of the single most important philosophical theme for Radical Orthodoxy, the Platonic concept of participation (*methesis*),

12 R. R. Reno, "The Radical Orthodoxy Project," In *First Things* 100 (February 2000): 42.

13 Ibid.

14 Catherine Pickstock, "Reply to David Ford and Guy Collins," *Scottish Journal of Theology* 54.3 (2001): 405.

15 Ibid.

16 Milbank, "The Programme of Radical Orthodoxy," In *RO?- CE*, 36.

within her theology of Eucharistic Presence; following upon that theme, it will study transubstantiation within Pickstock's thought as it relates to Eucharistic Presence; and finally, Pickstock's use of the philosophical concept of absence in relation to her theology of Eucharistic Presence.

A BRIEF SKETCH OF THE WORLDVIEW OF CATHERINE PICKSTOCK

As mentioned earlier, Catherine Pickstock is a Cambridge-based theologian, a professor of philosophy of religion.¹⁷ As an academic, Pickstock's primary interests lie in three areas:

1. The application of linguistics to theories of religious language, analogy and liturgy, with a consideration of the implications of this interaction for linguistics itself.
2. A critical consideration of postmodern philosophy in relation to the re-interpretation of premodern theology.
3. A reconsideration of the Platonic tradition in interaction with the Biblically based faiths, in particular the question of theurgy and understandings of the soul.¹⁸

As a student of John Milbank, who was then based in Cambridge University, Pickstock completed her doctoral dissertation under him, which would later be revised to become her first book, *After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy* (1998).

Prior to the publication of *After Writing*, Pickstock was the author of several articles, exploring many of the themes that would comprise

17 Olivier-Thomas Venard, "Radical Orthodoxy- une première impression," *Revue Thomiste* 101 (2001): 410.

18 This is taken from Dr. Pickstock's faculty page at Cambridge, found at <http://www.csap.cam.ac.uk/network/catherine-pickstock/> (accessed November 5, 2013).

her *magnum opus*.¹⁹ With the publication of *After Writing*, she became much more widely known and most reviewers, while acknowledging some flaws and offering some critiques, considered *AW*²⁰ to be a major contribution to theology.²¹ Peter J. Leithart's comments might serve as summary for many reviewers' opinions concerning *AW*: "*After Writing* raises questions that are critical for the church and our civilization, and the answers offered are often right and always provocative. However unsatisfying Pickstock's book is in some respects, it is good to have such a substantial and sophisticated treatment available."²²

Catherine Pickstock's next major publication after *AW* was *Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology*, co-edited with John Milbank and Graham Ward.²³ After that publication, the author seemed to be moving in the direction of discussing the importance of liturgy as seen through the lens of Radical Orthodoxy. This is exhibited in the publication of such articles as "Liturgical Spirituality" in *Pro Ecclesia* (1999), "Liturgy and Modernity" in *Telos* (1998), and "Liturgy, Art, and Politics" in *Modern*

19 Among these articles would be "Liturgy and Language: The Sacred Polis," *In Liturgy in Dialogue: Essays in Memory of Ronald Jaspers*, edited by P. Bradshaw and B. Spinks, 115-137. London: SPCK, 1993; "The Sacred Polis: Language as Synactic Event," *Literature and Theology* 8, no. 4 (1994): 367-383; "Necrophilia: The Middle of Modernity," *Modern Theology* 12, no. 4 (1996): 405-433; "How Plato Deconstructs Derrida," *Telos* 29, no. 1 Spring 1996); and "A Short Essay on the Reform of the Liturgy," *New Blackfriars* 78 (February 1997): 56-65.

20 From this point onward, I will abbreviate *After Writing: On The Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy* (1998) as *AW*.

21 Among the more helpful reviews include David B. Hart in *Pro Ecclesia* 9, no. 3 (Summer 2000): 367-372; Fergus Kerr in *New Blackfriars* 79, no. 929/930 (July-August, 1998): 352-358; Peter J. Leithart in *Westminster Theological Journal* 61, no. 2 (Fall 1999): 303-307; and Aidan Nichols, "Hymns Ancient and Post-Modern: Liturgy as Consummate Philosophy," in *Communio* 26, no. 2 (1999): 429-455.

22 Peter J. Leithart, "Review of *After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy*," in *Westminster Theological Journal* 61, no. 2 (Fall 1999): 303-307

23 In this volume, she contributes an essay, "Soul, city and cosmos after Augustine," 243-277, examining the metaphysical category of music in the Western tradition in light of Augustine's *De Musica*.

Theology (2001).²⁴

In 2001, Pickstock, along with John Milbank, published *Truth in Aquinas*. Each of the chapters has a particular theme associated with truth. Pickstock's contributions, chapters one and four, discuss "Truth and Correspondence" and "Truth and Language." She collaborated on an original essay with John Milbank, "Truth and Touch," written exclusively for this volume. Chapters one and four are derived from previous published articles, "Thomas Aquinas and the Quest for the Eucharist," in *Modern Theology* (1999) and "Imitating God: The Truth of Things According to Thomas Aquinas" in *New Blackfriars* (2000).²⁵ Reactions to this volume were rather mixed, with some praise and some criticism. Lawrence Dewan writes, concerning *Truth in Aquinas*:

While I admire the authors' ambition to eliminate any intellectual or spiritual "schizophrenia," any failure to appreciate the unity of integral Christian mind, I am in general unhappy with the detailed effort. It is not only that the authors write in a way I often find less than lucid, but that I am frequently far from agreement with their interpretation of St. Thomas.²⁶

Dewan further goes on to state "Every step of the way in this book, one finds oneself in disagreement."²⁷ Henry J. Spaulding, II, in his review comments: "*Truth in Aquinas* is complex, yet compelling in its attempt to

24 See "Liturgy and Modernity," *Telos* no, 113, (Fall 1998): 19-40; "Liturgical Spirituality," *Pro Ecclesia* 8, no. 4. (1999): 502-504; and "Liturgy, Art and Politics," *Modern Theology* 16.2 (2000): 159-180. These three journals, *Telos*, *Pro Ecclesia* and *Modern Theology*, are rather sympathetic to RO and seem to publish a great deal of RO centered articles.

25 Chapter one first appeared as the Annual Aquinas Lecture (1999) in *Blackfriars*, Oxford and was later published as "Imitating God: The Truth of Things According to Thomas Aquinas," *New Blackfriars* 81 (2000):159-180. Chapter four originated as the Homeland conference on the Eucharist in 1998 at Duke University and was first published as "Thomas Aquinas and the Quest for the Eucharist," *Modern Theology* 15, no. 2 (April 1999): 159-180.

26 Lawrence Dewan, "On Milbank and Pickstock's *Truth in Aquinas*," *Nova et Vetera*, English Edition,

27 *Ibid.*, 211.

offer a theological situation for life."²⁸ All, however, were aware of the tremendous contribution of Pickstock to contemporary theology.

From this point, Pickstock began to attempt to address the nature of Radical Orthodoxy, what it is and what it is not in her essay, "Reply to David Ford and Guy Collins," in *Scottish Journal of Theology* (2001).²⁹ In this brief work, one comes to an appreciation of how Pickstock views Radical Orthodoxy, its place in theology and how she views the work of theology in general.

DUNS SCOTUS AS PUBLIC ENEMY NUMBER ONE

Next, Pickstock begins to address again the vilified figure in Radical Orthodoxy, John Duns Scotus. As mentioned in the introduction to this study, and as will be explored later in this chapter in the section of "Presence and Absence," Scotus, a medieval theologian, is perhaps the most widely controversial figure in modern Anglo-American theology in general and in the thought of Radical Orthodoxy in particular. Pickstock addressed Scotus in two primary articles: first, in "Modernity and Scholasticism: A Critique of Recent Invocations of Univocity" (2003) and second, in "Duns Scotus: His Historical and Contemporary

28 Henry J. Spaulding, II, "Review of *Truth in Aquinas*," *Wesleyan Theological Review* (March 1, 2002): 19.

29 Pickstock's essay, "Reply to David Ford and Guy Collins," *Scottish Journal of Theology* 54, no. 3 (2001): 405-422, is in reaction to two other articles, all published in the same edition of *Scottish Journal of Theology*. First, Guy Collins, "Defending Derrida: A Response to Milbank and Pickstock," 344-365 and David F. Ford, "Radical Orthodoxy and the Future of British Theology," 385-404. In the same edition, following Pickstock's "Reply," Ford adds "A Response to Catherine Pickstock," 423-426. It is a fascinating example of peers coming to understand the theology of each other in an academic setting and in a non-polemical fashion.

Significance."³⁰

Catherine Pickstock's interest in liturgical studies as a gateway for Radical Orthodoxy was rekindled in the past decade as well. Her publications include "A Poetics of the Eucharist" (2005), "Liturgy and the Senses" (2010), and "The Ritual Birth of Sense" (2013).³¹ Liturgical scholars have had a variety of reactions to Pickstock's theology, most especially that arising from one aspect of her thought in *After Writing*, namely her codification of a pre-Tridentine mediaeval Latin Rite Mass as "the paradigm of genuine liturgy."³² Among those who would hold that her reading of this liturgy is ahistorical and a product of a reality

30 See Catherine Pickstock, "Modernity and Scholasticism: A Critique of Recent Invocations of Univocity," *Antonianum* 78, no. 1 (2003): 3-42 and "Duns Scotus: His Historical and Contemporary Significance," *Modern Theology* 21, no. 4 (2005): 543-574. Radical Orthodoxy's understanding of Duns Scotus was addressed in several different articles, primarily Olivier Boulnois, "Reading Duns Scotus: From History to Philosophy," *Modern Theology* 21, no. 4 (October 2005): 603-608; Richard Cross, "Where Angels Fear to Tread: Duns Scotus and Radical Orthodoxy," *Antonianum* 76, no. 1 (2001): 7-41; Lluís Oviedo, "Il Dibattito Contemporaneo su Scoto e la Sua Eredità," *Antonianum* 76, no. 1 (2001): 3-196; Orlando Todisco, "L'univocità dell'ente e la svolta moderna," *Antonianum* 76, no. 1; Adrian Pabst, "De la chrétienté à la modernité? Lecture critique des thèses de *Radical Orthodoxy* sur la rupture scotiste et ockhamienne et sur le renouveau de la théologie de Saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 86 (2002): 561-599. In response to Pickstock's reading of Scotus, Matthew Levering released "Participation and Exegesis: Response to Catherine Pickstock," *Modern Theology* 21, no. 4 (2005): 587-601.

31 See Catherine Pickstock, "A Poetics of the Eucharist," *Telos* no. 131 (Summer 2005): 83-91; "Liturgy and the Senses," In *Paul's New Moment: Continental Philosophy and the Future of Christian Theology*, edited by John Milbank, Slavoj Žižek and Creston Davis, 125-145 (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2010); and "The Ritual Birth of Sense," in *Telos*, no. 162 (Spring 2013): 29-55. In this last article cited, Pickstock shows her interest in and recovery of past thinkers by her use of the liturgical theology of Odo Casel.

32 Pickstock, *After Writing*, 170.

created by Pickstock would be John F. Baldovin and Kevin Irwin.³³

PICKSTOCK'S LATER WORK

Her work, *Repetition and Identity*,³⁴ published in 2013, brings Pickstock back to the concept of the existing thing in philosophy and its application to theology. In this work, she posits a realism of sign and the importance of identical repetition as a triumph of analogy over univocity, as well as mining the Christian tradition through the early Greek Fathers and the work of Søren Kierkegaard.

Pickstock has also been the subject of reports and interviews by the popular media, most especially concerning her thoughts on liturgy.³⁵ It is not simply the novelty of her comments on the Medieval Mass that should be the focus when Pickstock's theology is examined. Pickstock

33 See John F. Baldovin, "Catherine Pickstock and the Medieval Liturgy," In *Ars liturgiae: Worship, Aesthetics and Praxis- Essays in Honor of Nathan D. Mitchell*, edited by Claire V. Johnson, 55-74 (Chicago: Liturgical Training Press, 2003); idem, "The Philosophical Critique," In *Reforming the Liturgy: A Response to the Critics*, 13-35 (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2008); and Kevin Irwin, "Critiquing Recent Liturgical Critics," *Worship* 74, no. 1 (2000): 2-19. Among those with a more favorable attitude towards Pickstock's understanding of liturgy include Julie Gittoes, *Anamnesis and the Eucharist: Contemporary Anglican Approaches* (Hampshire: Ashford, 2008); Adolfo Ivorra, "La 'liturgia' de las Radical Orthodoxy entre Catherine Pickstock y James K. A. Smith," *Scripta theologia* 43, no. 1 (Ene-Jan 2011): 163- 178; Aidan Nichols, "Hymns Ancient and Post-Modern: Liturgy as Consummate Philosophy," *Communio* 26, no. 2 (1999): 429-455; and Brian Douglas, "John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock, in *A Companion to Anglican Eucharistic Theology*, volume 2: Twentieth Century to the Present, 497-528 (Leden, the Netherlands: Brill, 2012).

34 Pickstock, *Repetition and Identity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

35 See, for example, the following articles: James P. Lucier, "Pickstock Chooses Radical Orthodoxy," *Insight on the News* 16, no. 2 (January 2000); Stuart Caldecott, "Restoring the Liturgy with Catherine Pickstock," *Inside the Vatican* 9, no. 9 (2001): 88-90; Jeffrey Tucker, "Interview with Catherine Pickstock," *Sacred Music* 134, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 163; "Radical Orthodoxy: An Interview with John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock," *Word On Fire Blog*, July 2011, www.wordonfire.org/WoF-Blog/WoFBlog-July-2011/Radical-Orthodoxy-An-Interview-with-John-Milbank-.aspx#comments (accessed July 30, 2013).

offers theology an original approach to the theology of Eucharistic Presence, firmly rooted within the Catholic Christian Tradition and the Western philosophical tradition, which this study will explore, and posits the supreme place of the Eucharist in human existence. Her contributions are important and, despite the at times overwhelming grandiosity and sheer verbosity of the writing of *Radical Orthodoxy*, Pickstock's place as a supreme contributor to philosophical theology is assured³⁶. Her writing is at the service of theology; her allegiance is not to a contemporary movement; it is to Christianity. She phrases it well by stating: "The survival and success of radical orthodoxy is neither here nor there; what matters is the future of theology."³⁷

AN OVERVIEW OF THE STRUCTURE OF *AFTER WRITING*

After Writing, as mentioned, was the doctoral thesis presented by Catherine Pickstock, written under the guidance of John Milbank at Cambridge University. It was published in 1998 and is described, humbly, by Pickstock as an "essay."³⁸ She plainly states her purpose at the very beginning of the preface to her work: "This essay completes and surpasses philosophy in the direction, not of nihilism but of

36 See Pickstock's comments in "Reply to David Ford and Guy Collins," *Scottish Journal of Theology* 54, no. 3 (2001):406- "It is true that this introduction to the essay volume (*Radical Orthodoxy- A New Theology*) necessarily contains rousing remarks and flourishes; there is no denying that it represents the fanfare of a rather surprising grouping newly excited about something happening." Stephen D. Long comments on the at times jargon filled verbiage of *Radical Orthodoxy*- "Radical orthodoxy's labyrinthine prose tempts some to read it only as an academic parlour game used for inconsequential power struggles in high-brow university religion and philosophy departments." From "Radical Orthodoxy," In *The Cambridge Guide to Postmodern Theology*, edited by Kevin Vanhoozer, 133, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

37 Pickstock, "Reply to David Ford and Guy Collins," *Scottish Journal of Theology* 54, no. 3 (2001): 406.

38 Pickstock will continue to use this phrase to describe *AW*, beginning with the preface of her work on xii.

doxology.”³⁹ The author goes on to describe clearly the structure of her argument by stating that philosophical thought, as exhibited through Platonism, argues not for the “primacy of metaphysical presence, but rather a primacy of liturgical theory and practice.”⁴⁰ Positing the highest example of her claim in the lived experience of medieval Christendom, Pickstock states that “it was during this period that the destruction from within of a liturgical city and a doxologic, took place, culminating eventually in the restoration, during the early modern period and beyond, of those very Greek sophistic positions which the Platonic liturgical philosophy had initially refused.”⁴¹ Her goal, above all, is to give “directions for the restoration of the liturgical order.”⁴²

From this point, Pickstock puts forth her approach to her thesis: straightforwardly, she states that she will accomplish her roadmap for the “liturgical order” by offering a “... detailed reading of Plato’s *Phaedrus*, the mediaeval Roman Rite, and a discussion of the theology of the Eucharist.”⁴³ Acknowledging that her thesis is very much part of the Radical Orthodoxy movement, Pickstock posits that her choice against the nihilism of postmodernity permits her to both recognize the “the indeterminacy of all our knowledge and experience of selfhood”⁴⁴ as well as viewing “this shifting flux as a sign of our dependency on a transcendent source which ‘gives’ all reality as a mystery, rather than as adducing our suspension over the void.”⁴⁵

Pickstock states that the chosen ground of her study is in language and that she has decided to engage in this debate concerning language for two reasons: first, she wishes to discuss one of the central mantras of

39 AW, xii.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

postmodernity—"All is language."⁴⁶

The second reason is that she believes the postmodern approach to language can naturally lend itself to "theological intervention."⁴⁷ Here, Pickstock stresses a key distinction between the thought of Jacques Derrida and that of Michel Foucault and Michel de Certeau. Derrida, on the one hand, stresses the priority of the written word over that of the spoken. The other aforementioned postmodernists stress the fact that this priority of the written has led to what Pickstock describes as the "sinister project of *mathēsis* or of 'spatializing' knowledge" or "mapping all knowledge onto a manipulable grid."⁴⁸ This *mathēsis*, according to Pickstock, exerts itself into daily living by positing that language is an "instrument of control by a detached 'spiritualized' human self."⁴⁹

A SYNOPSIS OF PART I OF *AFTER WRITING*:
"THE POLITY OF DEATH"

Pickstock asks "Does not this culture merely consummate the abolition of time by space?"⁵⁰ To these two ends, Catherine Pickstock address the first part of her work. First, she attempts to address Derrida's proposal that the "modern, fixed, 'metaphysical' subject is indeed more linked to writing than speech."⁵¹ Pickstock attempts to do so by analyzing Derrida's interpretation of Plato's *Phaedrus*. In contrast to Derrida's assertion that Plato's "suspicion of writing"⁵² leads to a triumph of a metaphysical, logocentric 'presence of self' of philosophy,⁵³ Pickstock

46 Ibid., xiii. James K. A. Smith discusses the positive aspects of this postmodern thought and also applies it to Radical Orthodoxy in his text, *Who's Afraid of Post-modernism: Taking Derrida, Lyotard, and Foucault to Church* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006.)

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.

holds that, in fact, the Platonic preference for speech over writing is simply because of "temporality, open-endedness, and link with physical embodiment."⁵⁴

Second, Pickstock holds that the Platonic preference for orality is more than a simple recognition of human temporality, but, ultimately, an affirmation of what language is most truly concerning: doxology. She states that "language exists primarily, and in the end only has meaning as, the praise of the divine."⁵⁵ The doxological nature of language gives rise to the notion of the transcendent, which permits space and time to be balanced. This, in turn, avoids what Pickstock describes as "a spatial degeneration into a dominated presence, or a temporal degeneration into a flux without pause and therefore without any real embodiment."⁵⁶

It is the failure to keep transcendental realism primary that leads to the "modern programme of *mathēsis*."⁵⁷ Pickstock faults Derrida's idea that this modern spatialization is a result of Platonic metaphysics, but in truth comes from the misunderstanding of the sophists. She then faults Foucault's omission of the genealogy of spatialization. Pickstock holds that the primacy of *mathēsis* comes from "the late mediaeval and early-modern loss of the primacy of the doxological and liturgical within every realm of culture."⁵⁸ She states that, with the loss, space overcomes time, with space substituting for eternity. From spatialization comes an "anti-ritual" and leads to the present age's position of language as the exact opposite of liturgy. It is here that Pickstock makes the strident claim "As a concomitant of this degeneration, I show how the same spatialization leads to a sundering of life from death, involving an attempt to shore up life against death which paradoxically results in a universal sacrifice to death."⁵⁹

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid., xiv.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

A SYNOPSIS OF "TRANSITION" IN *AFTER WRITING*

Having demonstrated the first part of her treatise the *status quaestionis*, in this section of *After Writing*, Pickstock begins to demonstrate the effects of spatialization. She states that the "empty subjectivity" and "necrophilia" of the present age was "pre-enabled by transformations in late-mediaeval theology, ecclesial, and social practice itself, and, more specifically, with its construal and practice of liturgy and Eucharist."⁶⁰ Having already used the image of the liturgical city, now decimated, Pickstock lays the fault of the decline of the liturgical order at the feet of John Duns Scotus' univocity and nominalism. The effect of the loss of the doxological sense creates the "unliturgical world" of modernity. David B. Hart, in a critical review of *After Writing*, summarizes Pickstock's views with the following vivid description:

Pickstock's argument concerns the "unliturgical world" of modernity, where every avenue of access to transcendence has been closed off, a regime of interminable immanence has been instituted, truth has been reduced to the empty correspondence between a "spatialized" reality and the isolated ego, and nihilism has achieved its consummate form: a world in which language and the delicate choreographies of worldly life are no longer imagined as capable of mediation our participation in the mysterious source that gives us the present out of the depths of the past and the fullness of the future. Here all language and experience have been made subservient to the totalizing spectacle of the absolutely present, the immobile universe of the secular city, surveyed by the punctiliar subject of modernity, invigilated and controlled at every level by the irresistible forces of social science, capital, the modern state, and the mass market.⁶¹

As a result of this "unliturgical world," the concept of spatialization causes a shift to occur in the Eucharistic theology. Pickstock, following a line of thinking articulated by Henri de Lubac in his work *Corpus Mysticum: L'Eucharistie et L'Eglise au Moyen-Age* (1949), demonstrates what she

60 Ibid.

61 David B. Hart, "Review Essay on *After Writing*: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy," *Pro Ecclesia* 9, no. 3 (Summer 2000): 367. Despite the seeming hyperbole of the paragraph, Hart summarizes well the intentions of Catherine Pickstock.

describes as a “most fundamental shift”⁶² in the understanding of the three dimensions of the theological “body,” namely the actual historical body of Jesus, the sacramental body of Christ in the Eucharistic species and the ecclesial body of Christ present in the Church. Pickstock states, using the methodology of Michel de Certeau,⁶³ that these three foci have had a “change in the distribution of the binary organization of ternary foci.”⁶⁴ By this, Pickstock means that the implicit relation between the three aspects of the body of Christ became disordered. She holds, along with de Lubac, that the “implicit *caesura*”⁶⁵ between the historical body of Christ and the sacramental body of Christ changed to that of latter; thus a disconnect occurred between the sacramental body of the Christ and the ecclesial body of Christ.⁶⁶ Due to this disconnect, the concept of the *Corpus Verum* and the *Corpus Mysticum* had become askew. For most today, the common understanding of the *Corpus Verum* would be that of the Eucharistic Body of Christ, while the *Corpus Mysticum* would be the Church.⁶⁷ Not so for the Patristic era or even the early mediaeval period. Pickstock writes: “Such unity could only be attained through reception and concomitant entry *into* the body of Christ, and so the real presence

62 Pickstock, *AW*, 158.

63 *Ibid.*, Pickstock is citing Michel de Certeau, *The Mystic Fable*, translated by Michael B. Smith, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992), 82–85.

64 *Ibid.*

65 *Ibid.*

66 Pickstock cites here Henri de Lubac, *Corpus Mysticum: L'Eucharistic et L'Eglise au Moyen-Age*, (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1949), 228.

67 de Lubac holds that this shift of understanding between real and mystical was originally understood as a mutual unity, not an opposition. Pickstock describes the unity as such: “This (later) nomination of the Church as a “mystical” body did not make it any less a ‘real’ body. Indeed, to the contrary, it is precisely *because* the Church was considered a *corpus verum*, and was efficacious in producing a unified body, that the Eucharistic body itself was considered, in the patristic and early-mediaeval period, to exceed the status of a mere symbol and to comprise the *real* Body and Blood of Christ.” (*AW*, 159, citing de Lubac, 281.) William T. Cavanaugh, in this work, *Torture and Eucharist: Theology, Politics and the Body of Christ* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), another work in the canon of Radical Orthodoxy, details the effects of this paradigm shift in sacramental theology and ecclesiology and the practical and tragic effects that it has had in 20th century Chile.

of the sacramental body is *essentially* and not merely nominally attested to by the ecclesial communion."⁶⁸ According to Pickstock, the effects of this spatialization of the Eucharist and the shift in understanding will have long-lasting effects for the Church and the theology of the Eucharist.

A SYNOPSIS OF PART II OF *AFTER WRITING*:
"THE SACRED POLIS"

In the second and final part of *After Writing*, Pickstock attempts to demonstrate exactly how, in the high Middle Ages, liturgical language and practice truly exemplified and "perfected the Platonic doxological account of meaning."⁶⁹ She states that she will show this through a study of the Mass of the Roman Rite. Pickstock states that she chooses the Roman Rite as the model because, she believes, that it answers four dichotomies that had arisen from the first part of her work.

First, she states that one severe dichotomy is when "language regarded primarily as written, versus language regarded primarily as spoken."⁷⁰ The Roman Rite answers that dilemma even though the celebration of liturgy is primarily oral because it achieves, in her opinion, the perfect balance between the written text and the oral presentation. The second dichotomy involves the "prioritization of space over time, versus a chronotype which resolves the opposition of space over time."⁷¹ The Roman Rite resolves the dichotomy by achieving a balance between time and space by the "echoing of eternity of space in time."⁷² The third dichotomy that Pickstock wishes to address is "a construction of the real as given, versus its construction as gift."⁷³ The Roman Rite answers this difficulty by positing, according to showing both as the pure gift

68 Ibid., 159-160.

69 Ibid., xv.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid.

of peace. Fourth and finally, Pickstock mentions the difficulty of “the realization of an essentially empty subject (whether self-identical or discontinuous in postmodern fashion), versus an wholly unironical, liturgical subject which is coherent but not foreclosed.”⁷⁴ The Roman Rite answers that by asserting a liturgical subject as “a coherent and analogically repeated subject,” in spite of its constitution of “deferral and supplementation.”⁷⁵

For Pickstock, “liturgical language is the only language that really makes sense”⁷⁶ and that “the event of transubstantiation in the Eucharist is the condition of possibility for all human meaning.”⁷⁷ It is my hope, in the sections that follow, to demonstrate Catherine Pickstock's Eucharistic theology in terms of the following aspects: sign and presence; sign and absence; participation; and transubstantiation.

PICKSTOCK'S THEOLOGY OF EUCHARISTIC PRESENCE

SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS

In *AW*, Pickstock makes a remarkable claim:

The words of Consecration “This is my body” therefore, far from being problematic in their meaning, *are the only words which have meaning, and lend this meaning to all other words*. This is because they fulfill the contradictory conditions of the beneficent secrecy of every sign (certain/uncertain, continuous/discontinuous, iconic/arbitrary, present/absent) to such a degree of oppositional tension that the inhering of bread in Body is not a relation of signification (as for a Zwinglian view) but more like a condition of possibility for all signification. The bread/Body amalgam is, as it were, such an extreme case of sign that it is no longer sign, yet becomes a sign in being given to us, given as a promise of sign of future givings, and so given as the turning of all things into gift, since a gift is a gift only in its signifying promise of renewed

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.

gifts to come.⁷⁸

This is a remarkable statement. Fully immersed in the Tradition of the Church, yet fully aware and engaged in dialogue with philosophy, Pickstock dares to posit that the Eucharist is the center of all reality, that the highest expression of that reality is the celebration of the Mass and that Transubstantiation is the highest expression of language. In an age froth with ecumenical tensions concerning the issue of Eucharist between the Catholic, Anglican, Orthodox and Protestant doctrines of Eucharistic Presence, during a time of secularism in the world, both in the academic realm and in the pastoral life, she reaffirms the age-old Catholic approach of the significance and centrality of the Eucharist. Steven Shakespeare summarizes Pickstock's rationale for proposing a re-appreciation of the Eucharist in four points:

1. It restores the primary place of language as worship of God.
2. It shows how God is revealed in the world in a way that establishes and confirms a real relationship between the infinite and the finite. It shows us that 'being is that which is always relational' (AW, p. 248)
3. It shows how created things and signs are not doomed to be dead objects, but can be part of a living response to God. It gets round all of modern and postmodern contradictions between presence and absence, life and death, worldly and other-worldly.
4. It shows us how the incarnation of God in Christ is received and continued in community, in the Church's reception of the Eucharist.⁷⁹

PICKSTOCK AND THE LATIN MASS

At this point, it might be wise to address one of the main points for which Catherine Pickstock is most famous: her embrace of the Latin

⁷⁸ Pickstock, *AW*, 263.

⁷⁹ Steven Shakespeare, *Radical Orthodoxy: A Critical Introduction* (London: SPCK, 2007): 69.

Mass as the supreme example of how the Eucharist is able to exhibit the doxological, relational, living and ecclesial dimensions which Shakespeare summarizes in the above quote.

Pickstock writes:

The Roman Rite, which dominated the Latin western tradition up until the changes wrought by the Second Vatican Council in 1962, provides a model for genuine consummation of language and subjectivity in and through a radical transformation of space and time. It will be argued that the Roman Rite, the configuration of language as simultaneously "gift" and "sacrifice" exalts a different and salvific formulation of the various dichotomies which have been seen to reside at the heart of immanentism: orality and writing, time and space, gift and given, subject and object, active and passive, life and death.⁸⁰

For her, "the liturgy of the Middle Ages was embedded in a culture which was ritual in character."⁸¹ She describes the liturgical language of the Mass as "impossible," in contrast to the "urge" of the Derridean difference.⁸² Pickstock claims that "liturgy is at once a gift *from* God and a sacrifice *to* God, a reciprocal exchange which shatters all ordinary positions of agency and reception, especially as these have been conceived in the west since Scotus."⁸³ As a consequence of the human race's fall with original sin, Pickstock claims that true liturgical expression is rendered "impossible" and this *aporia*, which renders the human subject incapable of fulfilling one of his primary roles, as one who praises. It is only in the person of Christ, "whose resurrection ensures that our difficult liturgy is not hopeless, and enables us to rejoin

80 Pickstock, *AW*, 169. I feel that it is necessary to address Pickstock's choice of the Medieval Latin Mass as the paradigm of liturgical doxology before the study of how philosophy functions in her Eucharistic theology of Presence. To most readers and those acquainted with Pickstock, this is solely for what she is famous. By addressing her liturgical choices in terms of an introduction, it permits to put the issue to the side and allows the reader to then focus on her theological and philosophical choices. Although aspects of this liturgical theology will be featured in my study, most especially in the section on sign, it is not the focus of this particular study.

81 *Ibid.*, 170.

82 *Ibid.*, 176.

83 *Ibid.*, 176-177.

the angelic liturgy taking place in an ambiguous and shifting space beyond our own."⁸⁴

Pickstock chooses the medieval pre-Tridentine liturgy as her paradigm of worship because, as Steven Shakespeare states:

... it is full of stops and starts. It doesn't have a straightforward, linear structure. And this means it jolts us out of the mundane, secular world into a dynamic relationship with God. As we take part in it, our identity is reshaped and we are opened out to God. Our giving is taken up into the life of the giving God, into the life of the Trinity.⁸⁵

Pickstock views the medieval pre-Tridentine Mass as far from a corruption of the pure liturgy of the early Church for which the reforms of Vatican II had been striving. Instead, she analyses the liturgical texts of this Mass as indicating "... nothing is more arbitrary than the spatial suppositions as to the consummate 'possibility' of human action, as expressed in such a complacent structures, mentioned above, as 'argument,' 'order,' 'discrete stages.'⁸⁶ She goes further, stating that the "liturgical stammer" indicates an "admission of distance between itself and the transcendent 'real.' It is this very admission of distance which permits a genuine proximity with God."⁸⁷ This choice of the medieval Eucharistic rite as model is essential for Pickstock because, in reaction to postmodernity, which views the mediation of language as the suspension of "over the abyss" of the failure of language,⁸⁸ but rather as "the *occurrence* of the impossible through Christological mediation, which reveals the void as plenitude, impossibly manifest in the very course of deferral and substitution."⁸⁹

Finally, Pickstock chooses this pre-Tridentine Eucharistic liturgy as the paradigm and model because it is the place of identity and journey. She

84 Ibid., 177.

85 Shakespeare, 69.

86 Pickstock, *AW*, 178.

87 Ibid.

88 Ibid.

89 Ibid.

describes the Mass as a journey in the same manner as Plato describes *topos* (place) and *genus* (lineage) in his work *Phaedrus*, with Socrates' question to Phaedrus: "*poi dē kai pothen?*" or, loosely translated, "Where are you coming from and where are you going?"⁹⁰ Pickstock writes, concerning Socrates' question:

This question is posed at the mid-point of a journey, reversing the chronological order of origin and destination, to suggest that the place of origin which constitutes a person's identity is a supplementary characterized by its open-endedness and recursive structure. Implicit within this question, therefore, is a critique of any claim to a singular, unfaltering, anterior origin. For the journey subsequent to the origin is as much constitutive of that origin as it is dependent upon it. And here the "second" is not merely that which arrives too late to be first, but is that which permits the "first" its priority, in such a way that its constitutive force of delay prevents the origin's primitive authority.⁹¹

Thus, for Pickstock, the origin doesn't indicate only unchanging, clear identity as much as demonstrating that "subsequent performances are just as much involved in the constitution of its identity."⁹²

For Pickstock, the very ritual of the Mass itself exhibits identity and journey. From the words of the Sign of the Cross, "*In nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti. Amen,*" which for her indicate both the individual's entrance into the liturgy and "the difficulty of the passage."⁹³ The placement of these words at the start of the sacred liturgy show forth an *exitus-redditus*, a going forth and going into the Divine. The Names of the Persons of the Trinity invoked with these words and with this gesture offers a journey, "for the Father is the journey of the generation of the Son from which the Spirit proceeds."⁹⁴ This name, stating not only existence, but essence, is in stark contrast to a nominalist sense of language, as it "understands and inaugurates the *journey* of lineage, and

90 Ibid., 180. An alternate translation might be "Where have you been hiding yourself?"

91 Ibid., 180-181.

92 Ibid., 181.

93 Ibid.

94 Ibid., 182.

the *narrativity* of naming."⁹⁵ This invocation of the name of the Blessed Trinity shows both the mystery of the Godhead; by addressing the Divine, the human being knows his immense distance from the reality of the Trinity.

Even the "Amen" uttered at the end of the sentence transcends the mere affirmation of truth; it is, according to Pickstock, "Truth's own performance."⁹⁶ The affirmative word is intrinsically connected to the event of the truth; it is both "witness and source, both outside and inside, the manifestation of the beginning within the conclusion, the commencement which perpetually returns anew. This Amen is the language in common between God and worshipper, for it is at once the incarnational bodying forth of God and the true human response to God."⁹⁷

The destination of the journey that is the Mass is the "*altare Dei*." However, by this phrase, Pickstock means more than just the physical structure of the altar of sacrifice in the sanctuary. She writes: "The altar is therefore a supplementary, and, in worldly terms, superfluous destination which is also a beginning, the place towards which we must travel in order to be able to offer our sacrifice of praise."⁹⁸ Each of the phrases uttered by the priest and the liturgical ministers in these prayers at the foot of the altar permits an identification through impersonation by the assembled liturgical body and the priest and liturgical ministers performing the ritual. This journey towards the altar is made by one and all and it is this altar that, according to Pickstock, "perpetually recedes."⁹⁹ She writes: "[o]ur journey towards God cannot begin before its ending, before God Himself has journeyed towards us. Hence, the reason why the altar perpetually recedes is that to arrive at the place of worship, of divine

95 Ibid.

96 Ibid.

97 Ibid.

98 Ibid., 183.

99 Ibid., 185.

presence, we must *already be in that place.*"¹⁰⁰

TRANSUBSTANTIATION

Steven Shakespeare's analysis of Pickstock's choice of the pre-Tridentine Mass as her supreme paradigm of worship concludes with one observation: she chooses the Latin Mass because it is so completely associated with transubstantiation.¹⁰¹ Before an analysis of Pickstock's understanding of the function of philosophy within her theology of transubstantiation,¹⁰² it might be helpful to restate the Catholic Church's understanding of the doctrine of transubstantiation. Although Pickstock herself is a professed member of the Church of England, which does not profess belief in this particular Eucharistic doctrine, her personal comprehension of the doctrine does, by and large, coincide with a traditional Catholic understanding. In our analysis of Pickstock's doctrine, we need to ascertain if the term for the action describing how the Presence of Christ is in the Eucharist is not confused with the mode of the Presence of Christ in the Eucharist.

A glossary added as an addendum to the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* defines transubstantiation in the following fashion:

The scholastic term used to designate the unique change of the Eucharistic bread and wine into the Body and Blood of Christ. "Transubstantiation" indicates that through the consecration of the bread and the wine there occurs the change of the entire substance of the bread into the substance of the Body of Christ, and of the entire substance of the wine into the blood of Christ—even

100 Ibid.

101 Shakespeare, 69.

102 Again, it might be noted that we are limiting our study to Pickstock's understanding of transubstantiation and not covering all of the thinkers of the school of Radical Orthodoxy as they comprehend the concept of transubstantiation. It must also be helpful to note that the primary texts which will be analyzed to ascertain Pickstock's theology of transubstantiation come from AW and TA.

though the appearances or “species” of bread and wine remain.¹⁰³

The Council of Trent summarizes Church teaching on transubstantiation with the following statement:

Because Christ our Redeemer said that it was truly his body that he was offering under the species of bread, it has always been the conviction of the Church of God, and this holy Council now declares again, that by the consecration of the bread and wine there takes place a change of the whole substance of the bread into the substance of the body of Christ our Lord and of the whole substance of the wine into the substance of his blood. This change the holy Catholic Church has fittingly and properly called transubstantiation.¹⁰⁴

Pickstock, in some fashion, is critical of both a typically Catholic and Protestant view of the Eucharist. According to her, Scotus’ concept of univocity makes the Eucharistic bond between God and humanity untenable. Analyzing Pickstock’s thought on the matter, Shakespeare writes: “In the Reformation, neither Protestants nor Catholics managed to keep hold of the balance. Protestants turned the bread and wine into mere signs, detached from Christ’s reality. Catholics put such stress on the sacrament as the body of Christ that they neglected the truth that the community of the Church was Christ’s body too.”¹⁰⁵ Transubstantiation, with its incarnational logic, transcends the split of language and reality.¹⁰⁶

103 *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 2nd Edition, (revised in accordance with the official Latin text promulgated by Pope John Paul II), Libreria Editrice Vaticana: Vatican City State, 1997, 902. It should be noted that this glossary, prepared by then-Archbishop William J. Levada, “does not participate in the approval of the *Catechism* given in the Apostolic Constitution *Fidei depositum* of Pope John Paul II.” (864)

104 Council of Trent (1551): DS 1642. The Latin original reads: “Quoniam autem Christus Redemptor noster corpus suum id, quod sub specie panis offerebat, vere esse dixit, ideo persuasum semper in Ecclesia Dei fuit, idque nunc denuo sancta haec Synodus declarat: per consecrationem panis et vini conversionem fieri totius substantiae panis in substantiam corporis Christi Domini nostri, et totius substantiae vini in substantiam sanguinis eius. Quae conversione convenienter et proprie a sancta catholica Ecclesia transsubstantiatio est appellata.”

105 Shakespeare, 68.

106 By this “incarnational logic,” I mean the approach to language taken by James K. A. Smith in his work, *Speech and Theology: The Language and the Logic of the Incarnation* (London: Routledge, 2002).

According to Pickstock, transubstantiation is able to restore signs to the supreme status that they can be—as a true connection to the living God. According to Steven Shakespeare, transubstantiation “restores us to a true appreciation of time, the physical world and language itself. The Eucharist shows that there is an incarnational dimension to all language.”¹⁰⁷

In *After Writing*, Pickstock develops a theology of transubstantiation largely in reaction to its development in the history of theology. She primarily relies on the theology of Thomas Aquinas to explain her understanding of transubstantiation. Pickstock writes:

Although for Saint Thomas, Christ's body is really extended in the Sacrament, it is present “by way of substance, and not by way of quantity.” It is not that the dimensions of the bread and wine are changed into the dimensions of the Body and Blood, in such a way as to suggest that the whole is in the whole, and individual parts in individual parts. Rather, the *substance* of one's changed into the substance of the other. Thus, the whole is as much present in individual parts as it is in the whole.¹⁰⁸

Having already referenced *Summa theologiae* III, q. 76. A. 1, ad. 3, she then quotes Aquinas again, stating: “Christ's body is in this Sacrament substantively, that is, in the way in which substance is under dimensions, but not after the manner of dimensions, which means, not in the way in which the dimensive quantity of a body is under the dimensive quantity of place.”¹⁰⁹ She goes on to explain the Thomistic notion of dimension in the Eucharist by again quoting Aquinas from the aforementioned section of *Summa theologiae*. Pickstock states:

“[T]he whole dimensive quantity of Christ's body and all its other accidents are in this Sacrament,” although this does not displace the dimensions of bread and wine, III, q. 76. A. 4. But in reply to Objection One, Aquinas argues that whilst it is the substance of Christ's body which is present in the Sacrament, its dimensive quantity “is there concomitantly and as it were accidentally, “ though “not according to its proper manner (namely, that the whole is in the

107 Shakespeare, 70.

108 Pickstock, *AW*, 133.

109 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 76. a. 3 as quoted in *AW*, 133.

whole, and the individual parts in individual parts), but after the manner of substance, whose nature is for the whole to be in the whole, and the whole in every part."¹¹⁰

Thus, for Pickstock, Aquinas stands in counterpoint to the thought of John Duns Scotus. For her, Scotus' emphasis on absolute divine power alters his understanding of the manner of the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist. For Scotus, Christ is present in the Eucharist not due to a union between the Host and the divine Logos, as Aquinas states. She emphasizes that, in the case of Eucharistic Presence, "Christ is not an individual but only hypostatic as coincident with Being as such, and therefore ubiquitous."¹¹¹

Scotus, on the other hand, does not posit dimension in the Eucharist as a problem. It is the power and will of God that permits Christ's body to be present ontologically in two places at the same time, permitting Christ's body to have extension "in the sense of containing different parts in a whole without those parts occupying different spaces."¹¹² Citing Scotus' *Reportata parisiensia*, 4, d. 10 q. 3; q. 6, Pickstock explains the prime difference in understanding of Eucharist between Scotus and Aquinas: "His body is therefore present in a locative dimensional sense. The change which take place, therefore, in transubstantiation, is seen as specifically a change in dimensional reality, according to what one might call a proto-Cartesian determination of 'body' as exhaustively extensional in character."¹¹³

This lack of holism in the Eucharist according to Duns Scotus that can lead to what Pickstock describes as a Eucharistic necrophilia. This will be discussed more fully in the section entitled Eucharist and presence. In the "extraordinary and miraculous moment of transubstantiation," Scotus believes that that the Body of Christ is given without the Soul

110 Ibid.

111 Ibid.

112 Ibid.

113 Ibid.

being present.¹¹⁴ Pickstock contrasts this with the Thomistic notion of the union of Body and Soul being present in the Sacrament of the Eucharist.¹¹⁵ She states, "Such real unity means that wherever one "component" is, the other is also."¹¹⁶ The Body and Soul of Christ are united in the Eucharist through "real concomitance"¹¹⁷ as opposed to Scotus' understanding which posits soul and body as being "configured as parts of a whole," making a formal distinction, rather than a real or intellectual distinction.¹¹⁸

Should one follow Scotus' line of thought concerning the presence of Christ in the Eucharist after transubstantiation, Pickstock believes the fact that the Body of Christ's presence is more actualized than is soul is reduced to an arbitrary decision made on the part of God due to his absolute power. She writes: "[I]n the case of transubstantiation, Body and Soul are disjoined, His Body is here effectively presented in the manner of a corpse. Here, therefore, in the very heart of piety, the cult of necrophilia is begun."¹¹⁹

According to Brian Douglas, Pickstock's analysis is very much in accord with many Evangelical Anglicans and the stress placed in realism and sacramental principle. This is in reaction to those Anglicans who posit an "assumption that Christ is present in some fleshly manner of

114 Ibid., 134.

115 Ibid. Pickstock opines: "This (Scotus' concept of transubstantiation) contrasts with the Thomist view, according to which, in any human being, the soul and the body are not *really* distinct (since there can be no animal body uninformed by soul), but are differentiated by an operation of the mind (in the same way that it is only the *modus* of the human mind which distinguishes between the divine attributes."

116 Ibid.

117 Ibid., *op. cit. Summa theologiae* III, q. 76. A. 1 (and ad. 1) which states: HERE INSERT THE LATIN QUOTE.

118 Ibid.

119 Ibid.

dimensional reality as a corpse (immoderate realism)."¹²⁰

Pickstock offers a defense of transubstantiation in Aquinas in *After Writing*. After a thorough discussion of the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharistic species stating that "(S)uch a view of the bread and wine as more than extrinsic signs, but as literal participation in and essential symbolization of the Body, *including* not only the sacramental Body, but also the historical body of Jesus and the ecclesial body, means that it was not inappropriate for Aquinas to discuss the Eucharistic presence in terms of substance and accident."¹²¹ She emphasizes a key point, namely that Aquinas does not offer a mere fideist explanation of the conversion of the bread and wine into the Body and Blood of Christ, namely as a miracle which denies the established understanding of the Aristotelian categories of substance and accidents.¹²²

In Pickstock's interpretation of Aquinas, the metaphysical categories of substance and accidents are called "implicitly ... into question."¹²³ The interplay between prime matter and the pure actualized form was the ultimate understanding of these terms. Aquinas, according to Pickstock, understands this to truly mean a "passage between the Creator (who 'is' by nature) and the created which only is in such and such way."¹²⁴ Thus, for Pickstock, substance and accidents are understood in a relational and contextual manner. She states in terms of an explanation:

120 Brian Douglas, "John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock." In *A Companion to Anglican Theology, Volume 2: Twentieth Century to the Present*: 505, (Leiden: The Netherlands: Brill, 2012). He places Pickstock's Eucharistic theology in the same category as Robert Doyle, Peter Jensen and David Ford.

121 *Ibid.*, 259. Here Pickstock cites Henri de Lubac's *Corpus Mysticum*, 272 to reinforce her point concerning the appropriateness of Aquinas' use of traditional Aristotelian categories.

122 *Ibid.* Concerning this point, Pickstock mentions that this miraculous "override" of substance and accidents is how P. J. FitzPatrick understands the Thomistic use of accidents and substance in his work, *In Breaking of Bread: The Eucharist and Ritual* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 12-13.

123 *Ibid.*

124 *Ibid.*, 260.

Whereas normally any thing that is "accidental" in one context is "substantial" in another (for example, buttons, like the "redness" of a red jumper, are accidental in relation to the jumper, but nonetheless belong to the substance of buttons, just as red, when it is the colour of blood, cannot be other than red), in the Eucharist, the appearances of bread and wine become accident without remainder, and there is no "elsewhere" or "different context" in which they are still substantive.¹²⁵

The concept of substance and accidents in the Eucharistic Presence in the thought of Pickstock will be further developed in the section on presence and absence, especially as she develops this idea in her work, "Thomas Aquinas and the Quest for the Eucharist."

Brian Douglas considers Pickstock's use of the term transubstantiation and its place within the Anglican Eucharistic tradition.¹²⁶ He mentions Article XXVIII in *The Articles of Religion*¹²⁷ and states that it is rare that an Anglican theologian would use the term "transubstantiation" to describe what is occurring in the Eucharist. Douglas equates Pickstock's use of the term with what he would describe as "moderate realism" and that "She is distancing herself from any suggestion of immoderate

125 Ibid.

126 Douglas, 520.

127 The text reads: XXVIII. Of the Lord's Supper. The Supper of the Lord is not only a sign of the love that Christians ought to have among themselves one to another, but rather it is a Sacrament of our Redemption by Christ's death: insomuch that to such as rightly, worthily, and with faith, receive the same, the Bread which we break is a partaking of the Body of Christ; and likewise the Cup of Blessing is a partaking of the Blood of Christ.

Transubstantiation (or the change of the substance of Bread and Wine) in the Supper of the Lord, cannot be proved by Holy Writ; but is repugnant to the plain words of Scripture, overthroweth the nature of a Sacrament, and hath given occasion to many superstitions.

The Body of Christ is given, taken, and eaten, in the Supper, only after an heavenly and spiritual manner. And the mean whereby the Body of Christ is received and eaten in the Supper, is Faith.

The Sacrament of the Lord's Supper was not by Christ's ordinance reserved, carried about, lifted up, or worshipped. http://anglicanonline.org/basics/thirty-nine_articles.html (accessed November 8, 2013).

realism, but at the same time affirming the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist as a moderate realist presence."¹²⁸ Douglas believes that Pickstock's understanding of moderate realism is very much in line with Thomas Aquinas' understanding and use the term transubstantiation.¹²⁹

PARTICIPATION AND EUCHARISTIC PRESENCE IN PICKSTOCK

Pickstock, along with Graham Ward and John Milbank, in *Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology*, writes:

The central theological framework of radical orthodoxy is 'participation' as developed by Plato and reworked by Christianity, because any alternative configuration perforce reserves a territory independent of God. The latter can lead only to nihilism (though in different guises). Participation, however, refuses any reserve of created territory, while allowing finite things their own integrity.¹³⁰

For Radical Orthodoxy, participation is a key doctrine. It uses the doctrine of analogy to express the dynamic relationship between God and the world and can lead the individual human being to participation in the life of God. As Steven Shakespeare notes, the doctrine of participation is

128 Douglas, 520. He mentions that this notion of moderate realism (which Pickstock would define as transubstantiation) is suggested by the Anglican Roman Catholic International Commission, *The Final Report* (London: SPCK and CTS, 1984): 14, footnote 2 where "it is asserted that the word transubstantiation, in contemporary Roman Catholic theology, is used to affirm the fact of Christ's presence in the Eucharist and the mysterious and radical change in the elements which take place, not as explaining how the change takes place." Douglas thinks that Pickstock's use of the word "transubstantiation" can be useful in affirming in Anglican Eucharistic theology a moderate realist presence of Christ that "does not seek to delineate the metaphysical complexities of how any change in substance occurs." (Douglas, 521) However, he states: "It may be that the culture of the Anglican eucharistic theology tradition cannot easily assimilate this rehabilitated use of transubstantiation due to its association with corrupted versions and other prejudices which attach to this word for particular parties within the Anglican tradition." (Ibid.)

129 Douglas, 521.

130 John Milbank, Graham Ward and Catherine Pickstock, "Introduction- Suspending the material: the turn of radical orthodoxy," In *Radical Orthodoxy: a New Theology* (London/NY: Routledge, 1999), 3.

part and parcel in the life of the mission of the theologian. He writes: "So it is not enough for a theologian merely to accept the idea of analogy. She must also allow her very patterns of thought and existence, her being, to be caught up, lit up and perfected in the very being of God."¹³¹ This is exhibited in Pickstock's conception of her role as a theologian and in her understanding of the doctrine of participation as it relates to the substantial presence of Christ in the Eucharist.

For the theologian of the school of Radical Orthodoxy, participation informs his or her theology and shapes the basic metaphysic of the theologian himself or herself. With this point, one might wonder what is the basis of knowledge for the theologian? Shakespeare writes: "[a]ll knowing involves a genuine encounter of the infinite in the finite. There must be a genuine encounter with God, in which God is not simply an external will or commanding voice, but a surrounding, life-giving, guiding reality."¹³² He goes on to explain the role of reason within the system of Radical Orthodoxy. Shakespeare contends, contrary to the apparent rejection of reason by Radical Orthodoxy, that "Reason is not rejected in favour of another source of truth based wholly on authority."¹³³ According to John Milbank, faith and reason are not distinct in their essences, but are "differing degrees of participation in the mind of God."¹³⁴

This is a necessity in understanding the mindset of Catherine Pickstock

131 Shakespeare, 23.

132 Ibid.

133 Ibid. Shakespeare offers an apologetic to why reason and faith go together in Radical Orthodoxy. Using quotes from both *Theology and Social Theory* as well as *Being Reconciled*, he contends that statements like "Reason's domain is nihilism; whereas the discovery of a meaningful world governed by a *logos* can only be made by faith" (*Being Reconciled*, 120). Milbank means an alternative *logos*, namely the understanding of reason posited by secularism, "fake reason offered by the secular Enlightenment, which is western prejudice in fancy dress." (Shakespeare, 23.) Far from a fideism, Radical Orthodoxy contends that only the Christian vision truly harmonizes faith and reason.

134 Milbank, "The Programme of Radical Orthodoxy," In *Radical Orthodoxy- A Catholic Enquiry*, edited by Laurence Paul Hemming, 35, (Aldershot: Ashford, 2000).

as it applies to the function of philosophy in her Eucharistic theology of substantial presence. In Radical Orthodoxy, all objects of thought are understood as in relation to what gives and sustains them in being and brings them to their proper end. Shakespeare writes: "Time is not strung out over some empty abyss. Matter is not a collection of brute lumpy facts floating in the void. Both matter and time are made up of relationships, and rooted in an original relationship with God. They are gifts of grace, and therefore they can be bearers of meaning: for theology there are no 'givens' only 'gifts.'"¹³⁵

Pickstock would concur with the thought that the attempt to understand the modern world without the realm of revelation, leads to a reductionism, a spatialization of the world, which, in essence, is an expanded "immanentism" and a disavowal of the liturgical-sacramental and doxology nature of the world.¹³⁶ For Radical Orthodoxy, this immanence leads to either a sense of a lack of dependence on the transcendent or a false sense of autonomy that is not open to the transcendent. It is essential to recall Pickstock's work in the genealogy of the lack of participation and the rise of a "sheer immanence."¹³⁷ This world, according to Pickstock, can be described as "an increasing denial of genuine transcendence, understood as doxological reliance on a donating source which one cannot command."¹³⁸

135 Shakespeare, 24. The quote 'for theology there are no "givens" only "gifts"' is taken from Milbank, *Being Reconciled*, xi.

136 See James K. A. Smith, *Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: Mapping a Post-secular Theology*, (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2004), 187 as well as Pickstock, *AW*, 52.

137 . This rise of immanence is, according to Radical Orthodoxy, a result of an ontological shift arising from Scotus, "whereby created reality was seen as having a mode of being in itself such that it could be understood without reference to the transcendent Creator- without theology." (see Smith, *IRO*, 187, especially footnote 5.) Smith analyzes the claim of both Pickstock (*AW*, 44) and Milbank (*Word Made Strange*, 44 and *RO-NT*, 23) that Scotus' univocal understanding of ontology posits a separation from theology so much so that ontology is a separate, autonomous discipline without appeal to God. The genealogy of the philosophical thought that leads Pickstock to make such claims will be discussed in greater depth in chapter two

138 Pickstock, *AW*, 49.

This experience of “gift,” this understanding of self, world, and reality, is at the center of Radical Orthodoxy’s notion of participation and its battle of modernity, which “reduces everything to one level, draining the world of real worth.”¹³⁹ This transcendent worldview “suspends the material” of the world and sees the intrinsic relation that it has with the Divine.¹⁴⁰ Radical Orthodoxy contends that “only transcendence, which ‘suspends’ things in the sense of interrupting them, ‘suspends’ them also in the other sense of upholding their relative worth over-against the void.”¹⁴¹ By this “suspension of the material” caused by participation, all is seen through as participating in the Divine and all finds its ultimate meaning in and through participation. According to Milbank, Ward and Pickstock in *Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology*, this concept of participation “refuses the secular, but at the same time it does ‘re- envision’ a Christianity which *never* sufficiently valued the mediating participatory sphere which alone can lead us to God.”¹⁴² The relational worldview informs and enables Pickstock to offer that the Eucharist is supreme act of gift known and, through its incarnational nature, enables our participation within the Eucharist to be “concelebration.”¹⁴³ With Milbank and Ward, she writes:

The theological perspective of participation actually saves the appearances by exceeding them. It recognizes that materialism and spiritualism are false alternatives, since if there is only finite matter there is not even that, and that for phenomena really to be there they must be more than there ... This is to say that all there is *only* because it is more than it is.¹⁴⁴

Graham Ward summarizes well the seminal place of the doctrine of participation in the theology of Radical Orthodoxy:

Traditional accounts of the *imitatio Christi* [the imitation of Christ], and

139 Ibid.

140 Ibid. Shakespeare notes that the phrase “suspending the material” derives from Milbank, Ward and Pickstock’s introduction to *Radical Orthodoxy- A New Theology*, 3.

141 Milbank, Ward, Pickstock, “Introduction,” *RO-NT*, 3.

142 Ibid.

143 Pickstock, *AW*, 258.

144 Milbank, Ward, Pickstock, “Introduction,” *RO-NT*, 4.

doctrines of creation and eschatology, teach that the purpose of human beings is to be sanctified, and the function of the Church, as those who are in the process of sanctification, is to draw all creation back into participation in God—to co-operate with God in the redemption of the world. Christian desire moves beyond the fulfillment of its own needs; Christian desire is always excessive, generous beyond what is asked.¹⁴⁵

Pickstock, as mentioned previously, mines Plato's *Phaedrus*, to explicate her concept of participation. She places her argument for transcendent realism with Plato's philosophy of *methēxis*. She writes:

Plato did *not* wish to drive a wedge between form and appearance, the strongly positive view of *methēxis* (participation) in the *Phaedrus* frees him from the charge of otherworldliness and total withdrawal from physicality, for the philosophical ascent does not result in a 'loss' of love for particular beautiful things, since the particular participates in beauty itself. Thus the philosopher is synonymous with the lover of beauty, as also with one of a musical or loving nature (248d). Although, as Socrates acknowledges, the philosopher separates himself from human interests, turning his attention toward the divine, and is often thought to be insane, it is precisely within the physical world that he recognizes a likeness to the realities, and then is "stricken with amazement and cannot control himself" (241a). Furthermore, because of the transcendence of the good, this resemblance is no mechanistic mimesis, but a *constitutive* representation of that which it participates, which can only be truly participated in through a *sustaining* of its distance and otherness. Hence, the "deviation" via the physical form remains in a sense unsurpassable, and for this reason, when the philosopher sees a face or a form which is a good image of beauty, he immediately recognizes its divine quality and would willingly offer sacrifice to this image itself (251ab). It is the beauty of that which possesses form which functions as the image, in the world, of the good. Its proportion, measure, and truth are therefore named in the *Philebus* as the structural components of the good which thus appear *as* the beautiful. Although the good remains other from all being, including the other forms themselves, and is seen in distinction from all mere *onta*, yet it is within everything, and is seen in distinction from each single being only insofar as it shines out from within them.¹⁴⁶

Brian Douglas Pickstock's concept of participation and its implications for her theology of Eucharistic Presence. He contrasts Robert Doyle's

145 Graham Ward, *Cities of God* (London: Routledge, 2000), 75.

146 *AW*, 14-15. This extended quote is given so as to illustrate how clearly the concept of participation plays a role within the Eucharistic theology of Catherine Pickstock.

rejection of eucharistic realism, due to his position that mimesis means "containing the mirror images of the heavenly forms, so that the eternal pattern embedded in nature could be read by philosophical reflection."¹⁴⁷ Doyle's understanding is based on nominalism, whereas Pickstock's estimation is based on realism. Douglas' concise analysis of this section of Pickstock is well phrased:

The implications here of realism for eucharistic theology are apparent. The particulars of the Eucharist (the signs of bread and wine and their offering) participate in the divine form (the signified body and blood of Christ and the offering of Christ) in a real way, such that the signified is constituted in the sign, not merely as a mirror reflection, but as a participation of the image in the form, where the image possesses the form to such an extent that the image is capable of worship.¹⁴⁸

Pickstock's belief in Eucharistic real presence and her concept of participation are closely tied. The sign for her does not become that which is signified "in some immoderate realist sense,"¹⁴⁹ because she holds that "the good always exceeds the object which manifests it physically and can never be grasped in an absolute presence" and "on account of the excessiveness of transcendence, the good is always overflowing into that subject, which via *erōs*, strives to participate in it."¹⁵⁰ Pickstock's moderate realism contends that there is "a physical manifestation of the good (the signified) in the object (the sign) by participation."¹⁵¹

Participation holds a central theme in her work collected in the

147 Douglas, 499, quoting Robert Doyle, "Here we offer you a spiritual sacrifice"- an estimate, (Accessed online by Douglas at <http://acl.asn.au/old/> on December 31, 2009.)

148 Ibid., 499-500.

149 Ibid., 500.

150 AW, 22.

151 Douglas, 500. Here it is apparent that these four themes concerning Eucharistic Presence within the theology of Catherine Pickstock, all are interrelated. Therefore, some aspects of participation (the central theological point of participation will again be discussed in the section on presence and absence and presence and sign and all is seen under the general theme of transubstantiation.

volume, *Truth in Aquinas*.¹⁵² In the first chapter, entitled “Truth and Correspondence,” derived from her essay, “Imitating God: The Truth of Things According to Thomas Aquinas,” from *New Blackfriars* (July 2000), Pickstock does not directly discuss the Eucharist, but it is necessary to understand her thought concerning correspondence as it pertains to the formation of her Eucharistic theology. She begins by posing a question: “How should one respond to the death of realism, the death of the idea that thoughts in our minds can represent to us the way things actually are in the world?”¹⁵³ She is concerned with a correspondence theory of truth, basing her theory on that of Thomas Aquinas. In reaction to many in contemporary philosophy who contend “that we only have access to the world via knowledge and that we cannot check this knowledge against the world in order to see if it corresponds with it,”¹⁵⁴ Pickstock acknowledges that Aquinas is a proponent of a correspondence theory of knowledge, but she will attempt “to show why he is not quite the correspondence theorist he is sometimes taken to be, but rather something much more interesting: a theological theorist of truth who challenges in advance the assumptions of modern epistemologists at a level they do not even imagine.”¹⁵⁵ After showing the implications

152 As previously mentioned, this is a collection of essays concerning Thomas Aquinas’ thought through the lens of Radical Orthodoxy. It is co-authored by Pickstock and John Milbank, with each contributing two of the four essays each. In this collection, chapter 1 (“Truth and Correspondence”) and chapter 4 (“Truth and Language”) are by Pickstock, taken from two previously published articles. I will focus on Pickstock’s contribution to *Truth in Aquinas* and only touch upon Milbank’s thought if it pertains to the formation of Pickstock’s own Eucharistic theology of realism.

153 Pickstock, “Truth and Correspondence,” In John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock, *Truth in Aquinas*: 1 (London and New York: Routledge, 2001).

154 Douglas, 524.

155 Pickstock, *TA*, 1.

or rejecting the concept of correspondence in its entirety,¹⁵⁶ Pickstock attempts to demonstrate that Aquinas believed that “any truth whatsoever is a participation in the eternally uttered Logos.”¹⁵⁷ Truth, according to Pickstock, is never “‘tested’ in any way, but sounds itself and shines outward in beauty.”¹⁵⁸ She holds that God, omnipotent, the maker of all things, can use matter so that human beings can know the immaterial. Signs, for Pickstock, are used in this capacity because “a sign points away from itself by means of its nonetheless essential mediation, back to what it represents.”¹⁵⁹ Knowledge comes “by participation in divine knowledge” and “this relation to the above is mediated by our turning to the material world below.”¹⁶⁰ This is, according to Douglas, “a clear affirmation of moderate realism as it is found in the sacramental principle and set out in relation to the Eucharist, where the material elements (e.g. bread and wine) participate in the divine.”¹⁶¹

Within *Truth in Aquinas*, an incarnational-Christological approach is taken with regards to participation, and in the third chapter, “Truth and Touch,” Catherine Pickstock and John Milbank develop this concept.¹⁶² They posit that the Incarnation of Christ restores the human being’s participation in divine understanding, and that, in addition to things being true as participating in God, “also they are only true as conjoined

156 Here, Pickstock specifically delves into the work of Bruce Marshall, specifically “‘We Shall Bear the Image of the Man of Heaven: Theology and the Concept of Truth’ in L.G. Jones and S. E. Fowl (Eds.), *Rethinking Metaphysics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 93-117. She states that Marshall argues that “one need not fear suspicion of correspondence, for, first of all, the death of realism need not mean an out-and-out embrace of anti-realism, and, secondly, theology introduces a specifically Christological mode of correspondence according to which, Christ the God-man is true in his imitation of the life of the eternal Trinity.” (TA, 1).

157 Pickstock, TA, 4.

158 Ibid., 9.

159 Ibid., 15.

160 Ibid., 16.

161 Douglas, 526. This understanding of sign will be explored later in this chapter and Pickstock’s understanding of Aquinas’ thought will be discussed in chapter two.

162 This chapter is taken from a previously unpublished work by both Milbank and Pickstock.

to the body of the incarnate *Logos*.¹⁶³ Touch, as an interactive event, is the prime medium of participation and is essential for our “sacramental re-education.”¹⁶⁴

Milbank and Pickstock write:

We are permitted to encounter God through the most intimate and discerning touch of all, which is that of the tongue in taste. For Aquinas, as for Augustine, the Eucharist most of all accomplishes a reversal. Normally, food and drink are to nourish the body, which is to sustain the mind. But here the mind is not only to attend to what it eats and drinks, which can alone instruct it in the truth; it is even—after Augustine—to *become* this food and drink, which makes present the truth incarnate. Ordinarily, food and drink become us; here we are to become this food and drink. And in this case, at last, the exclusiveness of touch which permitted its penetration, is conjoined with that generality and commonality hitherto peculiar to sight and hearing. For when we touch the body and blood of Christ, we touch everything, and infinite others may touch all the same points of the body at the same time.¹⁶⁵

Milbank and Pickstock go on to write:

Thus another ontological revision has been effected. In the Eucharist, touch as taste ceases to be restrictive in its exclusivity. Instead, from now on, if we wish to see the universal, to see God, we must aspire to touch and shape in truth, along with all other people, every last finite particular as included within and disclosing the body of Christ. Henceforward, the journey to the God is equally the journey to the God-Man, and so equally to all creatures, and no longer away from them. Now, to see God is also to make the future.¹⁶⁶

Because of participation, the Divine *Logos* shares in the life of the Most Blessed Trinity. Due to participation, the Divine *Logos* shares his life with humanity through the Eucharist, which is the body and blood of Christ. “The signs of the Eucharist, the food and drink, therefore instantiate the signified truth, as do all particulars.”¹⁶⁷ Hence, it is apparent the high status afforded the doctrine of participation within the Eucharistic

163 John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock, “Truth and Touch,” In *Truth in Aquinas*, 60.

164 *Ibid.*, 83.

165 *Ibid.*, 83-84.

166 *Ibid.*, 84.

167 Douglas, 528.

theology of substantial presence according to Catherine Pickstock.

SIGN AND EUCHARISTIC PRESENCE IN PICKSTOCK

In part two, chapter four of *After Writing*, Catherine Pickstock, having already discussed what she describes as the

... immanentist manipulation of signs ... which is reliant upon a construal of language as innocuous decoration, or mere "adornment" of a prior frame of the "real," so that its true signs arrive invisibly, "over against" the subject, the liturgical city, as we shall see, is *avowedly* semiotic. Its lineaments, temporal duration, and spatial extension are entirely and constitutively articulated through the signs of speech, gesture, art, music, figures, vestment, colour, fire, water, smoke, bread, wine, and relationality. These 'signs' are both things (res) and figures or signs of one another and of that which exceeds appearance, Such a language of signs is received openly, willingly, and repeatedly, in and through its being passed on to others, and itself constitutes the offering and consummation of the citizens' subjectively as a "living sacrifice." This sacrifice through the *communication-as-offering* of signs stresses, therefore, the superlatively articulate *relationality* of subjectivity.¹⁶⁸

Pickstock had already established in the first part of *AW* the concept of the "unliturgical world,"¹⁶⁹ one that holds "a spatial reality without depth"¹⁷⁰ and one which results in "a supra-linguistic philosophical logos, independent of time and space,"¹⁷¹ one which "suppresses embodiment and temporality."¹⁷² Brian Douglas, in his analysis of Pickstock's *After Writing* compares the unliturgical city described by Pickstock to the theology of Robert Doyle. Douglas comments: "Doyle in adopting this 'textual calculus of the real', denies that God works through signs and symbols and argues against the idea of sacramental

168 Pickstock, *AW*, 169-170.

169 *Ibid.*, 3.

170 *Ibid.*

171 *Ibid.*, 4.

172 *Ibid.*

principal at work as part of God's plan."¹⁷³

In *AW*, after introducing her argument for transcendent realism based on participation, Pickstock describes the idea of "non-identical repetition." She states the non-identical repetition consists of a "mediation of the transcendent in and through the immanent."¹⁷⁴ Douglas, in his analysis of the concept of non-identical repetition, states that "Identical repetition implies immoderate realism in the Eucharist both in relation to presence and sacrifice, but non-identical repetition in the sense used by both Pickstock and Ford, implies the sort of moderate realism David Armstrong describes as a loose identity between sign and signified, as opposed to a strict identity which is characteristic of immoderate realism."¹⁷⁵

CONCLUSION

RO has been accused as being too narrowly-focused, yet at the same time, lacking in precision. It has been described as ecclesiastically rootless but, similarly, as too rooted in the Anglo-Catholic tradition. It has been said of RO that it is too indebted to the patristic-medieval period and dismissive of all theology since the early modern period, while at the same time being accused of almost being too contemporary in its concerns. It has been described as too academic and too esoteric, while suffering from charges of imprecision, generality and a lack of sufficient scholarship.¹⁷⁶ Yet, few can deny the major impact on Anglo-American Christian theology that it has had over the past 25 years. The impact of RO on theology is massive. James K. A. Smith comments concerning Pickstock's mentor, John Milbank's *Theology and Social Theory* (but I

173 Douglas, 498. See footnote 833 in Douglas describing "where Doyle argues for the priority of what he describes as a 'word ontology' over any sacramental principle based on realism."

174 Pickstock, *AW*, 25.

175 Douglas, 501.

176 Catherine Pickstock addresses each of these charges in her essay, "Reply to David Ford and Guy Collins," *Scottish Journal of Theology* 54.3 (2001): 405-422.

believe that this could be applied to the entire RO movement): "For most, Milbank's unapologetic claims regarding the Christian metanarrative sounded a clarion call to stop doing theory according to 'the rudiments of this world, rather than according to Christ' (Col. 2:8)."¹⁷⁷

In summary, Graham Ward describes RO as follows: "Employing the tools of critical reflexivity honed by continental thinking, taking on board the full implications of what has been termed the linguistic turn, Radical Orthodoxy reads the contemporary world through the Christian tradition, weaving it into the narrative of that tradition."¹⁷⁸ Terms are used, thinkers are appropriated, sometimes in new and surprising ways. R. R. Reno writes:

It would be a great mistake, however, to write off the proponents of Radical Orthodoxy because of their jargon-filled postmodernism. It may invite silliness, but more often it loosens the grip of Derrida and Foucault on the intellectual and moral imaginations of the lost souls drifting through contemporary universities. Milbank et al. use the prevailing vocabulary and verbal techniques of cultural and literary studies to expose the dark emptiness of secular post-modernism, hoisting it on its own petard. If Radical Orthodoxy is any sign of the future, tomorrow's academy will see countless theses on the subversive power, not of transsexuality, but of the Eucharist—in all, a welcome development.¹⁷⁹

Perhaps David Burrell describes the importance of RO the best:

Yet in part these features must be seen in context of what I would assess to be their greatest asset: a thoroughly post-modern, in the sense of non-foundational theology, which is exciting precisely to the extent that it is *not* "revisionist" or "correlationist." In those modes, theology is always "catching up" with the vanguard of contemporary thought; whereas Radical Orthodoxy puts theologizing ahead of the pack, with its uncompromising critique of post-modern idioms, while translating their non-foundational intent by showing how faith itself can be a mode of knowing. That may explain why I find *Modern Theology* more exciting than *Theological Studies*, though hardly why anyone

177 Smith, *IRO*, 26.

178 Ward, "Radical Orthodoxy and/as Cultural Politics," in *RO-CE?*, 106.

179 Reno, 37.

should be forced to choose between the two.¹⁸⁰

I wholeheartedly agree. Catherine Pickstock is one of the most complex, fascinating theologians in the English-speaking world and it is my hope that other theologians will build upon her foundation, however eclectic it may be, to study the Eucharist.

180 Burrell, 76.

CONTRIBUTORS

Rev. John P. Cush is Academic Dean and a formation advisor at the Pontifical North American College. A priest of the Diocese of Brooklyn, New York, Fr. Cush earned the Doctorate in Sacred Theology (STD) from the Pontifical Gregorian University, Rome, Italy in 2017 in the field of fundamental theology. He also serves as lecturer of Theology at the Gregorian and an adjunct professor of Church History at the Pontifical University of the Holy Cross, Rome, Italy. He is the author of the forthcoming book, *The How-To Book of Catholic Theology: Everything You Need to Know But No One Ever Taught You* (Our Sunday Visitor: Huntington, IN, 2020) and is a regular contributor to *National Catholic Register*.

Mr. Aaron J. Kelly is a second theologian at the Pontifical North American College. A seminarian for the Diocese of Rochester, New York, Aaron Kelly studies Sacred Theology at the Pontifical University of St. Thomas Aquinas in Urbe, Rome, Italy. Aaron earned the Licentiate in Philosophy (PHL) from The Catholic University of America in 2018. His license thesis is entitled, "The Teleology of Friendship According to Cicero and St. Aelred of Rievaulx."

Rev. Joseph R. Laracy is assistant professor of Systematic Theology in the School of Theology at Seton Hall University, West Orange, New Jersey. A priest of the Archdiocese of Newark, New Jersey, Fr. Laracy earned the Doctorate in Sacred Theology (STD) from the Pontifical Gregorian University, Rome, Italy in 2019 in the field of fundamental theology. Fr. Laracy is the author of several scholarly articles in multiple fields, among which is Laracy, Joseph R., "A Logotherapeutic Approach to Pastoral Counseling Education for Catholic Seminarians," *American*

Journal of Psychiatry and Neuroscience 7, no.2 (June 2019): 43-51.

Rev. Msgr. James M. McNamara, PA is a spiritual director at the Pontifical North American College. A priest of the Diocese of Rockville Centre, New York, Monsignor McNamara is the author of several books including *The Power of Compassion* (Paulist: Mahwah, New Jersey, 1983) and *In the Presence of the Wise and Gentle Christ* (Paulist: Mahwah, New Jersey, 1993).

Sister Mary Angelica Neenan, OP is affiliate associate professor of Theology at the University of Dallas in Irvin, Texas. A Dominican Sister of the Congregation of Saint Cecilia, Nashville, Tennessee, Sister Mary Angelica earned the Doctorate in Sacred Theology (STD) in the field of moral theology at the Pontifical University of Saint Thomas Aquinas in Urbe, Rome, Italy in 2011 and is the author of *The Human Soul and its Faculties: Philosophical Anthropology and Moral Theology* (Edizioni OCD: Rome, 2015)

Rev. Walter R. Oxley is an official in the Doctrinal Section of the Vatican's Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith and serves as an adjunct Spiritual Director at the Pontifical North American College. A priest of the Diocese of Toledo, Ohio, Fr. Oxley earned the Doctorate in Sacred Theology (STD) from the Pontifical Gregorian University, Rome, Italy in 2010 in the field of dogmatic theology. Formerly the Vice-Rector of the Pontifical College Josephinum, Columbus, Ohio, Fr. Oxley is the author of *Personhood and Communion* (Blessed Hope Press: Riga, Latvia, 2018), "An Intimate Gaze: The Father with his Beloved Son the Priest" (in *The Priest as Beloved Son*, IPF Publications: Omaha, NE, 2015) and "Rediscovering Relation as a Value in Priestly Formation" (in *Seminary Theology III: Seminary Formation and Psychology*, IPF Publications: Omaha, NE, 2013).

Rev. Adam Y. Park is the Vice-Rector for Seminary Life at the Pontifical North American College, where he also serves as director of Human Formation and as a formation advisor. A priest of the Archdiocese of Washington, D.C., Fr. Park earned the Licentiate in Sacred Theology (STL) from the Pontifical Gregorian University, Rome, Italy in 2006 in

the field of fundamental theology

Rev. Randy DeJesus Soto is the Carl J. Peter Chair of Homiletics of the Pontifical North American College, where he also serves as spiritual director. A priest of the Diocese of San Jose, Costa Rica, Fr. Soto earned the Doctorate in Sacred Theology (STD) from the Pontifical Gregorian University, Rome, Italy in 2003 in the field of Biblical Theology, already possessing a Licentiate in Biblical Theology (STL) from the Pontifical Gregorian University, Rome, Italy in 1996. He is the author of many scholarly articles and books including *Lectio Divina*, Vox Christi Publishing, Kenrick Seminary, St. Louis, MO, 2013 and, with Rev. James Swetnam, SJ, *Introduction to the Study of New Testament Greek (Swetnam-Soto Greek English Lexicon of the New Testament)* (Rome: Gregorian & Biblical Press, 2019).

Mr. Alexander J Wyvill is a second theologian at the Pontifical North American College. A seminarian for the Archdiocese of Washington, Alex Wyvill studies Sacred Theology at the Pontifical Gregorian University, Rome, Italy. Alex earned the Licentiate in Philosophy (PHL) from The Catholic University of America in 2018. His license thesis is entitled "Getting Things Right: Normativity in Heidegger's Concept of Truth.

